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INTRODUCTION

Recent surveys indicate that perhaps as many as one-fifth of all
of the corporations in the United States are nonprofit, and that this
proportion is steadily growing.1 Nevertheless, the basic corporate
law applicable to nonprofit organizations is at a remarkably immature state of development, and remains startingly uninformed
by either principle or policy. Confusion continues to surround
even the most fundamental issues, including the purposes for which
nonprofit corporations may be formed, the distinction between nonprofit and cooperative corporations, and the appropriate limits on
distributions from nonprofit corporations to individuals who are
associated with them. This unsettled state of affairs is reflected
clearly in the fact that there have been three major efforts to reform
nonprofit corporation law in recent years, and that the resulting
statutes-the Model Act, the New York act, and the California actall differ fundamentally in their most basic structural features.
Much of the confusion in this area evidently originates from
the lack of any coherent conception of the basic purposes served by
the nonprofit form of organization. In an effort to help fill this
gap, I devoted an earlier article to a broad examination of the role
that nonprofits perform in the modern economy.2 This Article
proceeds to consider fundamental issues in the organizational law
applicable to nonprofit corporations, using the theories advanced
in the earlier article as a guide to policy.
In essence, I argue here that existing nonprofit corporation
law, including the various recent efforts at statutory reform, is, in
fundamental respects, misconceived and badly flawed, and I proceed
to suggest a restructuring of the law along more coherent and more
functional lines. Because some of the difficulties in the existing
law evidently result from confusion concerning the relationship
between nonprofits and cooperatives, I also suggest some restructuring, and rather broader use, of the statutes governing cooperative
corporations.
Much of the discussion deals with issues that are within the
traditional realm of state corporation law. A number of other
sources of law, however, bear on the organization of nonprofit
corporations-from the Internal Revenue Code to the legal profession's Code of Professional Responsibility-and the discussion
reaches out to encompass these sources as well.

1 See H. OLECK, NoNq-Ptorr CoRponxrsONS, ORGANIZATIONS AND AssoCrATIoNS
1-2 (3d ed. 1975); Oleck, The Nature of Nonprofit Organizations in 1979, 10 U.
TOL. L. REv. 962, 980-84 (1979).
2
Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
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I. THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES AND APPROPRIATE ROLE OF
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

Before looking in detail at questions of organizational law, it
is necessary to have a clear notion, first, of what is meant when it is
said that an organization is "nonprofit," 3 and second, of the functions that are most appropriately served by the nonprofit form of
organization. Indeed, as suggested above, it is precisely the lack
of any coherent conception of the essential characteristics and role
of nonprofit organizations that appears to be at the root of most of
the difficulties in the existing law.
The discussion of these issues draws heavily on my earlier
article concerning the role of nonprofit enterprise, in which they
are explored in much greater detail.4 Those who wish a more
thorough discussion are encouraged to turn to that essay.
A. Characteristicsand Classification
The defining characteristic of a nonprofit organization is that
it is barred from distributing profits, or net earnings, to individuals
who exercise control over it, such as its directors, officers, or members. This does not mean that a nonprofit organization is prohibited from earning a profit. Rather, it is only the distribution of
profits that is prohibited; net income, if any, must be retained and
devoted to the purposes for which the organization was formed.;
Moreover, it is only net income, or pure profits, that may not be
distributed; nonprofits are generally free to pay reasonable compensation to individuals, including controlling individuals, for labor
services or capital provided to the organization. For simplicity, I
shall refer to this prohibition on the distribution of profits as the
"nondistribution constraint."
In the United States, most nonprofits of any consequence are
incorporated. For these organizations, the nondistribution con3

The statutes, case law, and commentary occasionally use the term "not-forprofit" rather than "nonprofit". See, e.g., Note, New York's Not-for-Profit Corporation Law, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1972) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.U. Note].
Despite the efforts of some authors to draw a distinction between the two termsefforts commonly rooted in confusion concerning the issues discussed in sections
I and II of this Article-the two terms are generally used interchangeably in
practice, and no reason exists to distinguish them. See Hansmann, supra note 2, at
838 n.17. This article treats the terms as synonymous, and uses the shorter of the
two.
4
Hansmann, supra note 2.
GSee, e.g., Indiana Not-for-Profit Corporation Act, § 1(c), IND. CODE ANN.
§23-7-1.1-4(c) (Bums Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §35-2-108 (1979);
N.M. STAT. ATN. §53-8-28 (1978).
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straint is imposed, explicitly or implicitly, by the state nonprofit
corporation statutes under which they are formed. Sometimes nonprofits, particularly private foundations and other philanthropic
intermediaries, are not incorporated, but rather are formed as
charitable trusts; for them, state trust law is the source of the nondistribution constraint. Finally, there are many unincorporated
associations that might appropriately be termed nonprofit. The
law that applies to such associations-and, in particular, the legal
source of the nondistribution constraint-is vague, however, and
their nonprofit status is therefore ambiguous. This Article concentrates almost exclusively on nonprofits that are incorporated,
because this is not only by far the most economically significant
category of nonprofits, but also the category for which the law is
most in need of reformulation.
Because of the nondistribution constraint, a nonprofit corporation, unlike a business corporation, cannot issue shares of stock that
grant their owners a simultaneous right to participate in both profits
and control. Some other device for allocating ultimate control
over the organization must therefore be employed. The nonprofit
corporation statutes are typically quite flexible in this regard. If
the articles of incorporation so provide, the right to elect the board
of directors, and to vote on other fundamental issues, can be lodged
in a group of individuals designated as the organization's members.
Alternatively, the power to appoint the directors can be given to
other specified individuals or organizations, or the board can simply
be made autonomous and self-perpetuating.
Given the variety of forms and functions common among nonprofits, it simplifies reference and analysis to categorize nonprofit
organizations both according to the sources of their income and
according to the way in which they are controlled.
Those organizations that receive the bulk of their income from
relatively unrestricted donations and contributions I shall call
donative nonprofits; typical examples are CARE, the American Red
Cross, and the American Heart Association. Those organizations
that, on the other hand, obtain most of their income from prices
charged for goods or services they produce I shall call commercial
nonprofits; this category includes many nonprofit day care centers,
nursing homes, and hospitals, as well as the American Automobile
Association and Consumers Union (publisher of Consumer Reports).
Whether a nonprofit is donative or commercial, I shall refer to the
individuals who are the ultimate source of its income as its patrons.
The patrons of a donative nonprofit, therefore, are its donors, while
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the patrons of a commercial nonprofit are its customers. With an
organization that has both donors and customers-as in the case of a
college that receives alumni contributions as well as student tuition,
and therefore combines both donative and commercial elementsthe term patron will be used to include both groups.
Organizations that are controlled by their patrons I shall refer
to as mutual nonprofits. Social clubs, which are controlled by their
customers, provide one typical example; Common Cause, the citizens' lobby, which is controlled by its contributors, provides another.
Those organizations that, on the other hand, are not controlled by
their patrons I shall call entrepreneurialnonprofits. Most hospitals,
for example, are in this latter category, as are many organizations
for the relief of the poor and distressed, such as the Salvation Army.
The intersection of these two dichotomous classifications yields
four categories of nonprofits: donative mutual, donative entrepreneurial, commercial mutual, and commercial entrepreneurial.
Figure 1 below arrays common examples of the types of organizations that fall within these categories.
Figure 1

donative

commercial

mutual

entrepreneurial

Common Cause
National Audubon
Society
political clubs

CARE
March of Dimes

American Automobile
Association
Consumers Union
country clubs

art museums
National Geographic
Society
Educational Testing
Service
hospitals
community
nursing homes

These four categories, it should be emphasized, merely describe
polar or "ideal" types-extreme points on a continuum-rather than
discrete forms of organization. Many nonprofit organizations cannot clearly be assigned to one type or another. Universities, for
example, often combine elements of all four types: as already noted,
they typically have both donative and commercial aspects; moreover, their boards of trustees are often elected in part by the alumni
(who comprise the bulk of the former customers and current

504

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 129:497

donors), and in part are self-perpetuating, so that they are neither
clearly mutual nor clearly entrepreneurial nonprofits.
It should also be emphasized that this categorization is offered
simply for ease of description and reference, and not because I believe that these descriptive categories should be given legal significance. Indeed, one of the major themes of this Article is that,
contrary to current trends, nonprofit corporation law should be
unitary, applying essentially the same rules and standards to all
nonprofit corporations regardless of classification.
B. The Role of Nonprofit Organizations
To understand the unique functions served by the nonprofit
form of organization, it is helpful to compare the role of nonprofits
with that of profit-seeking (or "for-profit" or "business") organizations.6
Like for-profit organizations, virtually all nonprofit organizations are, in a sense, engaged in the sale of services. This is, of
course, true by definition for commercial nonprofits. Yet donative
nonprofits, too, "sell" their services-and it is the donors who are
the purchasers. For example, when an individual makes a contribution to the American Red Cross, or to the Metropolitan Opera,
it is not quite a pure gift in the sense that the directors of the
organization are free to do anything that they wish with the money.
Rather, the contribution is a payment made with the understanding
that it is to be devoted entirely to assisting disaster victims, or to
presenting more and better opera productions. .That is, such contributions are essentially efforts to "buy" disaster relief, or opera,
and this is what the organizations in question exist to produce
and "sell."
Why is it necessary that organizations such as these be nonprofit? In particular, why could not a for-profit firm provide the
same services? The reason, in most cases, appears to be that either
the nature of the service in question, or the circumstances under
which it is provided, render ordinary contractual devices inadequate
to provide the purchaser of the service with sufficient assurance that
the service was in fact performed as desired. The advantage of the
nonprofit form in such circumstances is that it makes the producer
a fiduciary for its purchasers, and thus gives them greater assurance
that the services they desire will in fact be performed as they wish.
6 For some observations on the role of nonprofit organizations vis-a-vis governmental organizations, see Hansmann, supra note 2, at 894-96.
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1. Clarifying Examples
Some examples may help to make this clear.
a. Third Party Payment
Consider, initially, those donative nonprofits, such as CARE,
the Salvation Army, and the American Red Cross, that collect contributions with which to provide relief to the poor and distressed.
Why is it necessary that these organizations be nonprofit? Could
not profit-seeking firms instead provide the same service-whether
dried milk for hungry children in Africa, or bandages for disaster
victims, or food for derelicts-in return for payments from philanthropically inclined individuals?
The answer, in considerable part, apparently lies in the fact
that the individuals who receive the services in question have no
connection with the individuals who pay for them. Thus, for example, suppose that a profit-seeking counterpart to CARE were to
promise to provide one hundred pounds of dried milk to hungry
children in Africa in return for a payment of ten dollars. Because
the patron has no contact with the intended recipients, he or she
would have no simple way of knowing whether the promised service
was ever performed, much less performed well. Consequently, the
owners of the firm would have both the incentive and the opportunity to provide inadequate service and to divert the money thus
saved to themselves.
The advantage of the nonprofit form in such circumstances is
that, because the nondistribution constraint prohibits those who
control the organization from distributing to themselves out of the
organization's income anything beyond reasonable compensation for
services they render to the organization, they have less opportunity
and incentive than would the managers of a for-profit firm to use
the organization's income for anything other than what the organization's patrons intend it to be used for. In these circumstances,
therefore, an individual would presumably much prefer to patronize
a nonprofit organization than a for-profit organization. Consequently, it is not surprising that such redistributive services are
provided almost exclusively by nonprofit firms.
b. Public Goods
Similar reasoning applies to the provision of what economists
term a "public good"-that is, a good or service such that (1) the
cost of providing the good to many persons is not appreciably more
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than the cost of providing it to one; and (2) once the good has been
provided to one person, it is difficult to prevent others from enjoying it as well.7 Typical examples are noncommercial broadcasting,
public monuments, and scientific research.
Even if individual consumers are willing to contribute to the
cost of such services, rather than yielding to the incentive to be
"free-riders" on the contributions of others, it is likely that they
will do so only if the services are provided by a nonprofit. The
reason for this is simply that, owing to the indivisible nature of the
service involved, the consumer generally has no simple means of
observing whether his or her contribution has increased the level
of the service provided. Rather, the consumer must take the producer's word that the contribution will be used to purchase more
of the good, rather than simply going into someone's pocket. Such
a promise will be easier to believe if the producing firm is subject
to the nondistribution constraint. Thus, listener-supported radio,
tax reform lobbying, and heart research are all typically financed
through nonprofit organizations.
c. Complex PersonalServices
Those organizations-most of which we would classify as commercial nonprofits-that provide complex and vital personal services,
such as nursing care, day care, education, and hospital care, offer
yet another example. The patients at a nursing home, for example,
are often too feeble or ill to be competent judges of the care they
receive. Likewise, hospital patients and consumers of day care,
owing to the difficulty of making an accurate personal appraisal of
the kind and quality of services they need and receive, must necessarily entrust a great deal of discretion to the suppliers of those
services. The nondistribution constraint reduces a nonprofit supplier's incentive to abuse that discretion, and, consequently, consumers might reasonably prefer to obtain these services from a nonprofit firm.
2. "Contract Failure"
In short, nonprofit firms serve particularly well in situations
characterized by what I shall refer to, for simplicity, as "contract
failure"-that is, situations in which, owing either to the nature of
the service in question or to the circumstances under which it is
produced and consumed, ordinary contractual devices in themselves
7

Public goods, because of these characteristics, are often, but need not be,
See generally E. MANsFIm., MICnOECONOMICS 47094 (3d ed. 1979); See also text accompanying note 409 infra.

provided by the government.
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do not provide consumers with adequate means for policing the
performance of producers. In such situations, the nonprofit form
offers consumers the protection of another, broader "contract"namely, the organization's commitment, through its nonprofit
charter, to devote all of its income to the services it was formed to
provide.
It follows that the charter of a nonprofit corporation serves a
rather different purpose than does the charter of a business corporation. In a business corporation, the charter, and the statutory
and decisional law in which it is embedded, serves primarily to,
protect the interests of the corporation's shareholders from invasion by those immediately in control of the corporation, including
management and other shareholders. In a nonprofit corporation,
on the other hand, the restrictions imposed on controlling individuals by the charter and the law are primarily for the benefit of
the organization's patrons. As a consequence, business corporation
law is often a poor model for nonprofit corporation law. Unfortunately, as will be seen below, this is a point that has often been
missed by those who draft and interpret the law of nonprofit
corporations.
3. Countervailing Considerations
The nonprofit form brings with it costs as well as benefits. The
curtailment of the profit motive that results from the nondistribution constraint can reduce incentives for cost efficiency, for responsiveness to consumers, and for expansion or creation of new
firms in the presence of increasing demand. Moreover, the inability of nonprofits to raise equity capital through the issuance of
stock can severely hamper their ability to meet needs for new
capital. Only when contract failure is relatively severe is it likely
that the advantages of nonprofits as fiduciaries will clearly outweigh these corresponding disadvantages, and thus give the nonprofit firm a net advantage over its for-profit counterpart.
Further, the nondistribution constraint is obviously not airtight. Indeed, as will be emphasized below, the constraint is often
poorly policed 8 and even, in many cases, poorly defined.9 As a
consequence, the managers of nonprofits often find, and take advantage of, the opportunity to profit at the expense of the organization. Such behavior, of course, further reduces the advantages
offered to patrons by nonprofit as opposed to for-profit firms in
situations of contract failure.
8

See text accompanying notes 319-83 infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 176-266 infra.
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In the case of services for the needy, public goods, and other
services commonly provided by donative nonprofits, the need for a
fiduciary organization is so obvious that for-profit firms are virtually unheard of. On the other hand, contract failure is not so
obviously a critical problem for many consumers of the services
that are often provided by commercial nonprofits, such as day care,
nursing care, hospital care, and education. As a consequence, these
services are commonly provided by for-profit as well as nonprofit
firms.
C. Nonprofits Versus Cooperatives
In the popular mind and, as will be seen below, in the law as
well, the cooperative and nonprofit forms are sometimes confused.
They are, however, distinct organizational types that generally serve
distinctly different purposes.
Most states have separate cooperative corporation statutes under
which cooperatives can be formed. These statutes typically provide that the organization's customers may both exercise voting control over the organization and receive distributions of the organization's net earnings; 10 thus, the nondistribution constraint that characterizes nonprofits is not applied to cooperatives. Together with
this difference in form, there is a difference in function. Cooperatives tend to arise, not in situations of contract failure, but rather
in situations in which the organization's customers feel a need to
maintain control of prices set by the enterprise-as, for example,
when the enterprise occupies a position of natural monopoly.".
The functions served by the two organizational forms may at
times overlap. As will be discussed at length below, some organizations (such as social clubs) that do not appear to be a response to
contract failure, and that might more appropriately be formed as
cooperatives, have, for various reasons, commonly been formed as
mutual nonprofits, and the continuing efforts to adjust nonprofit
corporation law to accommodate such organizations have been a
12
major source of confusion and weakness in that law.
D. Summary
In sum, I am suggesting that the essential role of the nonprofit
organization is to serve as a fiduciary for its patrons in situations of
10 See, e.g., N.Y. Coop. Comu.
1979).

LAw

§§ 14, 72

11 See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 889-90.
12 See text accompanying notes 290-318 infra.

(McKinney

1951 & Supp.
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contract failure. This statement, it should be emphasized, has both
a positive (descriptive) and a normative aspect. Taken descriptively, it is an assertion that nonprofit organizations tend to arise
in situations in which there is evidence of contract failure and not
in cases in which contract failure is absent. Casual empiricism appears to support this conclusion, at least in its broad contours. 13
More important for the purposes at hand, however, is the normative
aspect of this analysis-namely, the assertion that the fiduciary role
described here is the appropriate role for nonprofit organizations.
It follows from this assumption that the law should be designed to
make the nonprofit form as effective as possible in performing this
role. And this is the premise that underlies everything said below.

II.

PERMISSIBLE PURPOSES FOR NONPROFIT

CORPORATIONS

The prevailing confusion concerning the appropriate role of
nonprofit organizations is nowhere so clearly reflected as in the varying approaches taken in the state statutes toward the purposes for
which nonprofit corporations may be formed. And because, particularly in the most recent efforts at statutory reform, the treatment of permissible purposes is central to the approach taken by
the statute as a whole, this is necessarily the first issue to be
considered.
A. Statutoiy Limitations on Purposesfor Incorporation
In a number of states, the nonprofit corporation statutes explicitly limit the purposes for which nonprofit corporations may be
formed, typically confining them to activities of a charitable, educational, scientific, fraternal, or similar character. The following
13
Thus, in industries in which contract failure is clearly an insignificant problem, as in the production and distribution of standard industrial equipment or
agricultural produce, nonprofits are virtually nonexistent. Instead, nonprofits are
confined almost exclusively to the provision of personal services that are quite
comple,; or that are purchased in circumstances that put the patron at some sort
of informational disadvantage.
To be sure, the organizational law of nonprofits-not to mention tax law,
regulatory law, and subsidy programs-has not always been designed with a clear
view of the proper functions of nonprofits in mind. The result has undoubtedly
been to distort somewhat the evolution of the nonprofit sector, inhibiting the development of nonprofits in some areas in which contract failure is a problem and
encouraging their development in some other areas beyond the extent that appears
justified by the degree of contract failure. Thus, the law, together with other
elements, see Hansmann, supra note 2, at 897, is a supply-side variable that may
prevent nonprofits from developing in the precise pattern that might be expected
by looking only at the pattern of demand for the services of nonprofits to which
contract failure alone would presumably lead.
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provision in the Illinois General Not-For-Profit Corporation Act
provides a good example:
Not for profit corporations may be organized under
this Act for any one or more of the following or similar
purposes: charitable; benevolent; eleemosynary; educational; civic; patriotic; political; religious; social; literary;
athletic; scientific; research; agricultural; horticultural;
soil, crop, livestock and poultry improvement; professional,
commercial, industrial or trade association; promoting the
development, establishment and expansion of industries;
electrification on a co-operative basis; telephone service
on a mutual or co-operative basis; ownership and operation of water supply facilities for drinking and general
domestic use on a mutual or co-operative basis; ownership of residential property on a co-operative basis; and
administration and operation of property owned on a
condominium basis. 14

In contrast, many other states impose no such restrictions, simply permitting incorporation of a nonprofit for any lawful purpose. 15 Thirty years ago the former, more restrictive form of
statute was the most common. 6 The recent trend, however, has
been toward the latter, more liberal approach.'7 This liberalizingtrend has sometimes been loudly protested.' 8 Nowhere, however,
does it appear to have been intelligently debated. It is difficult to,
find a coherently stated rationale for the limitations contained in
the older statutes, or conversely to find a clear statement of the
reasons for the recent trend toward their elimination. Even the
'4 Illinois General Not For Profit Corporation Act, § 4, ILL. Aim. STAT. ch32, § 163a3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978). The Illinois statute is unusual in explicitly including cooperatives and condominiums among the permissible purposes.
For a discussion of the relationship between nonprofit and cooperative corporations, see text accompanying notes 67-118 infra.
'5 E.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 181.03 (West 1957).
The Wisconsin statutedoes, however, prohibit the formation under it of organizations devoted to certain
activities, such as banking, that are governed by other statutes. Id. See also
Omo RBv. CODE ANN. § 1702.03 (Page 1978); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 852
(West Supp. 1980); TEN. CODE ANN. §48-401 (1979).
16 See Note, Permissible Purposes for Nonprofit Corporations, 51 CoLrUM. L.
Rlv. 889 (1951).
lInterestingly, Illinois, whose statute is quoted at the text accompanyingnote 14, supra, is an exception to this trend. Early in the century, Illinois permitted nonprofits to incorporate "for any lawful purpose." See People ex rel.
Bonney v. Rose, 188 Ill. 268, 59 N.E. 432 (1900). Restrictions on permissible.
purposes were first imposed in 1937. See People ex Tel. Padula v. Hughes, 296 Ill.
App. 587, 16 N.E.2d 922 (1938).
18 E.g., Oleck, Proprietary Mentality and the New Non-Profit Corporationm
Laws, 20 Crv. ST. L. REv. 145 (1971).
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authors of the Model Act state that "[t]he most difficult decision of
policy in drafting the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act is the
determination of the purposes for which corporations may be organized under it." 19 Evidently unable to reach agreement on the
issue, the authors of the Model Act offer two alternative purposes
clauses, with little in the way of useful guidance in choosing between them.20 The first clause, apparently supported by a majority
of the drafting committee, 21 contains a lengthy list of permissible
purposes somewhat in the style of the more traditional statutes.22
The alternative clause follows the more modem trend by permitting incorporation "for any lawful purpose or purposes." 23 In
short, we are left largely on our own to determine whether and
why it makes sense to limit the purposes for which nonprofit corporations may be formed.
B. Interpreting the Limitations
Before one can judge the wisdom of the limitations on purposes imposed by the more traditional statutes, one needs to develop some understanding of the meaning of those limitations. This,
as it turns out, is not an easy task.
1. Profit Seeking as a Purpose
As a preliminary matter, it is important to realize that one
issue that should not be in dispute at this point is whether a nonprofit corporation can be organized and operated for the purpose
of providing profits to those who control it. As discussed in section I, the very essence of a nonprofit corporation is its commitment not to distribute profits to controlling persons. Thus, when
any organization incorporates as a nonprofit, it should be pledging
adherence to the nondistribution constraint. A nonprofit corporation act that permits nonprofit corporations to be formed "for
any lawful purpose" should therefore logically be interpreted as
permitting the pursuit of any purpose that is not inconsistent with
the nondistribution constraint.
19ALI-ABA MODEL NONPROTr

Cor. AcT viii (1964)

[hereinafter cited as

MoDE:L AcT].
20

The confusion concerning permissible purposes that underlies the Model
Act goes much deeper than this. See text accompanying notes 78-85 infra.
21 MoDEL AcT, supra note 19, at viii.
22Id. §4.
23 Id. alternative § 4.
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Similarly, a statute that, like the Illinois statute quoted above, 24
contains a restricted list of permissible purposes should be interpreted as requiring more than mere compliance with the nondistribution constraint; in addition, the organization must confine
itself to certain enumerated types of activities. The nonprofit corporation statutes are often drafted in a manner that appears to
make this point clear. For example, many statutes include the
nondistribution constraint as part of the definition of the term
"nonprofit," 2' and some go further by including a separate provision in the statute that explicitly enjoins any corporation formed
under the statute from distributing net earnings to controlling persons. 26 Not infrequently, however, a statute, or the commentary
on a statute, confuses this issue. For example, the Model Act,
which includes the nondistribution constraint both in its definition of the term "nonprofit" 27 and as a specific injunction applicable to all corporations formed under the Act, 28 would appear
unambiguous in this regard. Yet, in the preface to the Act, its
authors suggest confusingly that their alternative purposes clause,
which permits incorporation "for any lawful purpose," would in
fact permit profit seeking as an objective (provided the profits are
not distributed currently) while the other, more restrictive purposes clause would not.29 The recently enacted New York statute,
as shall be seen below,3 0 reflects similar confusion.3 1

2. Permissible Purposes Under the Restrictive Statutes
Assuming, therefore, that profit seeking as an objective is-or
should be-ruled out under any nonprofit corporation statute, what
further restrictions are imposed by those statutes with restrictive
purposes clauses? That is, what purposes are included, and what
are excluded, by such statutes?
24

See text accompanying note 14 supra.

25

E.g., Illinois General Not For Profit Corporation Act § 2(c), ILL. ANN.

STAT.26 ch. 32, § 163al(c) (Smith-Hurd 1970).
E.g., CAL. CoRP. CoDE § 5410 (West Supp. 1980).
27

supra note 19, § 2(c).
Id. §26.
291d. viii-ix.
30
See text accompanying notes 86-101 infra.
MODEL ACT,

28

31

The purposes clause from the Illinois statute, quoted at text accompanying
note 14 supra, also reflects fundamental confusion of this sort on its face, for it
explicitly includes cooperatives among its permitted purposes although, as noted in

section I, the cooperative form, as usually understood, includes the authority to distribute net earnings to shareholders and members and therefore is inconsistent
with the nondistribution constraint that characterizes nonprofits.
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Consider the Illinois statute quoted above.32 It is not difficult
to identify various types of activity that are more or less clearly
encompassed by that list. For example, there would presumably
be little question about the right to incorporate a church, a scientific research institute, or a school under that statute. On the
other hand, it is rather difficult to be precise about the activities
that are excluded by that list. There is only one reported decision in Illinois-and none, it appears, in any other state-explicitly
sustaining the refusal to grant a nonprofit corporate charter to an
organization (in the Illinois case, a labor union) simply on the
ground that its intended purposes, though presumably consistent
with the nondistribution constraint, were not within the restricted
set of purposes authorized by the corporation statute.3 As a con32

See text accompanying note 14 supra.
People ex reL Padula v. Hughes, 296 IlM. App. 587, 16 N.E.2d 922 (1938).
One case, also decided in Illinois, frequently cited in discussions of permissible
purposes for nonprofit incorporation is People ex rel. Bonney v. Rose, 188 IMI.268,
59 N.E. 432 (1900).
That case, unfortunately, simply compounds the confusion
in this area. Plaintiffs Bonney et al. had sought to charter a Chicago street railway company as a nonprofit corporation in Illinois, which at the time had a nonprofit corporation statute permitting nonprofit incorporation "for any lawful purpose,
other than for pecuniary profit." See note 17 supra. Secretary of State Rose
refused to grant a charter, whereupon the plaintiffs brought suit for mandamus.
Documents submitted by the plaintiffs, and reproduced in the Illinois reports,
suggest that although the organization would effectively have been a commercial
nonprofit financed by user fees, the plaintiffs intended to operate the organization
strictly on a nonprofit basis-that is, in conformity with the nondistribution constraint. Indeed, the plaintiffs expressed a rather idealistic motivation. See 188
Ill. at 27-28 (letter from petitioners to respondent Secretary of State).
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court sustained the Secretary of State's refusal to
grant a charter, stating, without supporting argumentation or evidence, only that
"[i]t is evident that the corporation sought to be organized is a corporation solely
for business purposes and the pecuniary profit and gain of the incorporators, and
that it does not fall within the purview of the statute." 188 IM. at 275, 59 N.E.
at 432. Presumably, either the court had reason to believe that the plaintiffs'
motivation was less idealistic than they suggested, and that they intended to draw
profits from the enterprise, or else the court was simply confused about the nature
of nonprofit organizations and, in particular, unable to conceive that an activity
normally organized on a profit-seeking basis could also be organized on a nonprofit
basis.
Similar confusion has been evident in New York, at least until passage of the
new New York nonprofit corporation statute, discussed below at text accompanying
notes 86-101 infra. See note 98 infra; 1942 Op. N.Y. A'tty Gen. Ann. Rep. 219
(nonprofit corporate charter denied for what would essentially be a commercial
mutual nonprofit selling transporation services to its members at cost, on the
ground that provision of such services is an activity of a "business nature," id.
220, and therefore must be organized under the business corporation statute).
One can only speculate concerning reasons for the general absence of reported
cases. The purposes listed in the statutes may cover, or may be sufficiently loosely
interpreted by the state authorities to cover, most types of nonprofits that anybody
would want to establish-or would want to establish badly enough to lead them to
carry litigation to the appellate courts. Also, individuals who are denied a nonprofit corporate charter in one state may simply seek to incorporate in another state,
rather than undertake prolonged litigation.
3
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sequence, one is left to the language of the statute itself, and to
the interpretations given to enumerated purpose clauses in related
contexts, such as state and federal statutes granting tax exemptions
and other forms of preferential treatment. 4
In general, it is commercial nonprofits that are hardest to fit
within the language of restrictive statutes such as that in Illinois.
Donative nonprofits, almost by definition, generally either redistribute wealth or provide public goods.8 5 Their activities can
therefore often be characterized by such terms as "charitable,"
"benevolent," "eleemosynary," or "civic" without excessive straining.86 Of course, many commercial nonprofits would presumably
also come within the language of the Illinois statute. This would
appear to be the case, for example, with a secondary school or a
private golf club operated as a commercial nonprofit. Moreover,
there is considerable authority today for the view that nonprofit
hospitals are to be classified as "charitable" organizations even when
they do not depend on donations and provide no free or below-cost
care,8 7 and thus are strictly commercial nonprofits. 38 It is, rather,
commercial nonprofits operating outside the usual areas of nonprofit
activity that appear to be excluded. For instance, a commercial
84

For example, section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts from
income taxation nonprofit organizations that serve, inter alia, religious, charitable,
scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes. These cate-

gories have been subject to considerable administrative and judicial interpretation.
See cases collected in P. TpxuscH & N. SuGA.wAur, TAx-ExElWT CHArmTABLE ORGANiZATIONS 71-128 (1979).
35
When a patron makes a contribution to a donative nonprofit, the services
financed with that contribution must necessarily either be for the benefit of the

patron himself or for the benefit of third parties (if they were for the benefit of
those in control of the organization, it would not be a true nonprofit-that is, it
would violate the nondistribution constraint). In the latter case, the organization
is redistributive, though not necessarily for the benefit of the needy. In the former
case, the services must have the character of public goods (which is to say they
benefit others at the same time they benefit the patron, see text accompanying

notes 6 & 7 supra) because, if they were private consumption goods for the patron,

then the organization would by definition be a commercial rather than a donative
nonprofit.
36

See note 40 infra.
Internal Revenue Service has now taken this position in interpreting
LR.C. §501(c)(3), discussed in note 34 supra. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B.
117. The 1969 Revenue Ruling does require, however, that an emergency room
be open to all, including indigents. The validity of this interpretation of the
term "charitable" was sustained in Eastern Ky. Welfare Bights Org. v. Simon,
506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), although the suit was subsequently dismissed by
87The

the Supreme Court for lack of standing, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
38The various public utility cooperatives expressly authorized in the statute
are also commercial in the sense in which the term is used in section I. Illinois is,

however, unusual-and, as shall be argued in section V, quite misguided, see
text accompanying notes 267-318 infra and note 31 supra-in making explicit provision for the incorporation of cooperatives under its nonprofit corporation statute.

31]

REFORMING NONPROFIT CORPORATION LAW

nonprofit seeking to provide some ordinary consumer good or service would be difficult to place among the categories permitted by
the Illinois statute.
To see the issues more clearly, it helps to consider an example.
Thus, suppose-to take an extreme case-that several individuals
desire to organize a shoe store as a nonprofit corporation. The
incorporators plan to control and operate the shoe store themselves.
They, or some of them, will serve as employees of the store. They
plan to observe the nondistribution constraint scrupulously, never
paying to themselves anything beyond a reasonable salary for work
performed for the store. They do not expect the store to receive
any donations, from themselves or anyone else. The store's income
will come exclusively from the prices charged for the shoes it sells.
Any financing required will be obtained by means of loans, credit,
and merchandise obtained on consignment. Like any other shoe
store, this store will sell its shoes to anyone, rich or poor, who is
willing to buy them. The shoes they sell will be purchased from
commercial for-profit manufacturers. In short, the store will be a
pure entrepreneurial commercial nonprofit.
Why would the incorporators choose to structure such an enterprise as a nonprofit corporation? Perhaps because (1) they are
entering the business primarily for the sake of enjoyment; (2) they
have no capital of their own, so that the most that they would be
likely to earn from such an enterprise under any form of organization would be a salary, and (3) they feel that the nonprofit form
will help assure their customers that they are charging no more than
a fair price for the shoes they sell. Or perhaps they are hostile to
capitalism on ideological grounds, feeling that it fosters exploitative
relationships between owners and workers. Or perhaps they are
simply acting on a whim.
It would be difficult to place a shoe store within any of the
relatively specific categories listed in the Illinois statute such as
"'religious," "literary," or "horticultural." If the store is to come
within the statute, therefore, it will presumably need to qualify as
-'charitable," "benevolent," or "eleemosynary." Because it is doubtful whether, in modern doctrine, the latter two terms add anything
to the first, 39 the inquiry comes down to determining whether the
shoe store would fall within the legal definition of "charitable."
And, although the definition of charity has been broadened somewhat in recent years, most courts would probably decide this ques3

J

9 See G.G. Bo.ERT & G.T. BOGERT, Thm

LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES

370 (2d ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as BoGERT oN TRumS].
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tion in the negative. 40 Thus, the shoe store appears to fall outside
the list of permissible purposes provided by the Illinois statute, and
our would-be incorporators therefore apparently fail to qualify for
a charter.
A nonprofit shoe store, of course, may seem implausible; it was
chosen as an example to present the issues involved in their starkest
and clearest light. There are many other types of enterprises that
would be more likely than a shoe store to choose the nonprofit form,
however, and that would still arguably fail to qualify for a charter
under the Illinois statute. These might include, for example,
pharmacies, book stores, and periodical publishers.
C. The Consequences of Denying Nonprofit Incorporation
Suppose, to continue the example, that the prospective incorporators of the nonprofit shoe store were denied a nonprofit corporate charter. What is at stake? What alternatives would be open
to them? In particular, could they create an effective substitute for
the nonprofit corporate form by means of other legal devices? The
question is worth considering in detail, not only because it helps
us understand the direct consequences of refusing to grant a nonprofit charter, but also because it helps illuminate some important
features of the corporate law that applies to both nonprofit and
for-profit corporations.
One alternative would be to establish the store as a business
corporation, and then operate it as a nonprofit. That is, the managers of the store could (1) finance all of their capital needs through
debt (as we assumed they would do if they were able to set it up
formally as a nonprofit), (2) issue some common shares to the
directors of the enterprise for token consideration, and (3) follow a
firm policy of never paying dividends on the common stock. In
financial terms this would be the equivalent of the nonprofit corporation that our entrepreneurs originally desired to create.
40

Broadly speaking, the legal concept of charity has traditionally included
two concepts: (1) aid to the poor; and (2) projects that benefit the community

at large such as public works. See generally id. § 369. The rather unthinking
recent extension of this definition to include hospitals organized strictly as com-

mercial nonprofits, see note 37 supra; Hansmann, supra note 2, at 882, and to
commercial nonprofit nursing homes, see Rev. Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145, has
not been pressed further to include many other types of commercial nonprofits.

For example, the Internal Revenue Service has recently been upheld by the Tax
Court in refusing to classify as charitable, and therefore exempt, a pharmacy
operating as a commercial nonprofit selling drugs at discount or cost to elderly
and handicapped persons. Federation Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72
T.C. 687 (1979), aff'd, 625 F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1980).
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Would such an operation contravene the business corporation
law? It probably would if stock in the corporation were sold to
investors who did not endorse the policy of no dividends. 41 But
there appears to be no precedent for denying the right of management to pursue a no-dividend policy when all of the shareholders
are in agreement with such a policy. In any case, who would have
both the desire and the standing to contest such a policy in those
circumstances?
Yet such an organization would not be completely equivalent
to a nonprofit corporation, because it would not be legally bound
to the nondistribution policy. It would be open to the shareholders
at any time to succumb to the temptation to enrich themselves by
paying out dividends, and thereby convert the organization into a
for-profit corporation in fact as well as in form. As a consequence,
the organization's patrons might justifiably be a bit suspicious of it,
and withhold some of the trust that they might place in an ordinary
nonprofit.
To meet this difficulty, the incorporators could perhaps seek to
have the no-dividend policy written into the organization's articles
of incorporation. Even this would be only a partial solution, however, because, in general, it is within the power of a business corporation's shareholders-at least if they act unanimously-to amend
the articles of incorporation; a provision in the articles attempting
to make the no-dividend clause unamendable could well be unenforceable. 42 Indeed, the notion of chartering a business corporation
41 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 499-509, 170 N.W. 668,
682-85 (1919) (not within discretion of directors to reduce distributions to shareholders in order to benefit the public).
42
Or, what is the same thing, amendable. See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP.
Acr § 58 (1974) (apparently granting to a majority of the shareholders the right
to make any amendments they wish in the articles of incorporation, so long as the
resulting articles are not inconsistent with current state law). Likewise, a contractual agreement among shareholders not to pay out dividends could presumably be
voided by unanimous agreement among shareholders. But see Kittinger v. Churchill,
161 Misc. 3, 292 N.Y.S. 35, aft'd, 249 A.D. 703, 292 N.Y.S. 51 (1936) (shareholders in a religious organization formed under the business corporation statute
denied some of the usual powers of shareholders on the theory that to do otherwise
would frustrate the intent of the founders of the organization to establish what
was essentially a nonprofit entity).
The problem with both of these devices is that the beneficiaries of the nodividend provision, namely, the organization's patrons, are not parties to i, and.
therefore their consent need not be obtained to eliminate the provision. Of course,
more complicated approaches exist that would be effective. For example, each
patron could be sold a share of no par, class B common stock for nominal consideration each time he or she patronized the organization. The class A common
stock would be held by the incorporators and their successors, and would carry
general operating control over the organization. The articles could then provide
that a majority of both classes must vote approval of any change in the no-dividend
clause (indeed, this would probably be required by the Model Act provision cited
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containing such a no-dividend restriction in its articles-and particularly an unamendable restriction-raises some difficult issues.
For is not a corporation with such a clause in its charter in fact a
nonprofit corporation? And if the state grants a charter to such
a corporation under the business corporation statute, is it not
thereby subverting the policy, embodied in the nonprofit corporation statute, of denying the right to form a nonprofit corporation
for such a purpose? That is, should not a state business corporation
statute be construed to forbid the chartering of a business corporation that contains a nondistribution clause in its charter, on the
ground that such a corporation is in fact a nonprofit corporation
and must therefore be formed under the state's nonprofit corporation statute 43-at least if the latter statute restricts the purposes for
which nonprofits may be formed?
In any case, it would undoubtedly be extremely difficult, and
perhaps impossible, to convince prospective patrons that such an
unusual organization is in fact the fiduciary equivalent of a nonprofit; suspicion would be the natural response. And because the
primary function of a nonprofit is to serve as an organization that
patrons can trust, this could effectively defeat the purpose of operating the organization along nonprofit lines. Similar obstacles
would stand in the way of basing such an organization on the partnership or proprietorship form, or of attempting any private contractual approach to the problem. There would, of course, remain
the option of obtaining a special nonprofit charter from the legislature 44 or establishing the enterprise as a governmental corporation,
but both of these approaches would, at the very least, be cumbersome and, for most prospective incorporators, infeasible alternatives.
In short, it is extremely difficult to construct a facsimile of a nonprofit organization from for-profit statutes. 45 As a consequence,
.supra in any case), effectively giving the patrons a veto. But this would be quite
unwieldy-and patrons might be extremely slow to understand it. Such an organization, incidentally, would have something in common with a cooperative. See
text accompanying notes 267-318 infra.
43 See Kittinger v. Churchill, 161 Misc. at 15, 292 N.Y.S. at 47 (suggesting
that, in general, it is improper to form, as a business corporation, an organization
that is religious in character and expressly intended to be nonprofit).
44 But why would, or should, a legislature grant a special charter to a nonprofit
for a purpose that is not permissible under the general nonprofit corporation act?
45
Sometimes the charitable trust form can serve as an alternative to the nonprofit corporate form, but, for organizations such as our shoe store, this would not
be an available option, because the only purposes for which a charitable trust can
be formed are those that the law deems charitable. See note 50 infra & accompanying text Indeed, because charity is among the permissible purposes for nonprofit incorporation in every state, no state exists in which an organization could
be established as a charitable trust but not as a nonprofit corporation.
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denying nonprofit incorporation to enterprises such as our shoe
store involves denying them a significant organizational option.
D. Can The Restrictions Be Justified?
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we can proceed to
consider the arguments that might be invoked in support of restrictions on nonprofit incorporation.
1. Tax Exemption and Other Subsidies
It might be thought that the restrictions can be justified as a
means of limiting the range of organizations that receive the benefits of tax exemption or of other forms of subsidy or preferential
treatment that are commonly extended to nonprofits. It does not,
however, make sense to refuse to permit a particular activity to be
organized on a nonprofit corporate basis simply because it does not
appear to merit tax-exempt status or some other type of special
benefit. Just because an organization is incorporated as a nonprofit does not mean that it qualifies for tax exemption at the
federal or state level. Rather, the tax statutes generally exempt
only a specified subset of all nonprofit organizations." The same
is also true for most other forms of special treatment, such as reduced postal rates 47 and exemption from federal securities registration requirements. 48 Thus, granting an organization a nonprofit
corporate charter does not necessarily involve extending any of
these benefits to it. The question of incorporation can therefore
be considered separately from such other matters of policy.
To be sure, tax exemption and other special benefits have generally been broadly administered to include the greater part of the
activity conducted in the nonprofit form. 49 As a consequence,
broadening the range of activities conducted by nonprofits might
be expected to lead to a broadening of the range of activities receiving such special treatment. Rather than dealing with this
problem by restricting the availability of nonprofit incorporation,
however, it seems wiser to confront it directly by refining and
rationalizing the subclasses of nonprofits that qualify for each form
of special treatment-a task that is, in any case, long overdue.
46 The numerous specific categories of nonprofits that
from the federal income tax are set forth in IR.C. § 501(c).
4739 U.S.C. § 3626(e) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
4815 U.S.C. §77c(a)(4) (1976).
49 See Hausmann, supra note 2, at 881-84.

qualify for exemptiom

See note 34 supra.
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2. Tying Up Assets and Other Public Burdens
Contemporary restrictions on the permissible purposes for nonprofit corporations find precedent in, and indeed presumably derived their original inspiration from, the limitations that the law
has always placed on the purposes for which charitable trusts can
be formed. These latter limitations are the source of the legal
definition of charity,50 which is the broadest and the most commonly encountered category in the lists of permissible purposes
that appear in the nonprofit incorporation statutes.
Historically, there were several good reasons for limiting the
purposes for which charitable trusts could be formed. First, and
most important, the charitable trust provided a device whereby
assets could be devoted to a particular purpose in perpetuity. Some
type of limitation on purposes therefore helped to prevent society's wealth from becoming tied up to a large extent in useless
pursuits-a particularly important consideration at a time when
wealth was primarily in the form of land, which was more or less in
finite supply.5 1 In addition, the state generally took upon itself
much of the responsibility for policing and enforcing charitable
trusts, and there was little reason to undertake such a burden
52
where no commensurate public benefit was involved.
Such considerations perhaps continue to justify restrictions on
the formation of charitable trusts. It is not at all clear, however,
that they have any relevance to the formation of nonprofit corporations.
Consider first the problem of tying up assets in perpetuity.
Many nonprofits do, of course, hold assets subject to perpetual conditions. For example, a college might hold funds received from
a donor under the condition that the principal is not to be invaded, and that income from the principal is to be devoted in
perpetuity to, for example, the salary of a professor of romance
languages. Such perpetual restrictions on gifts to nonprofit cor50 The historical development of charitable trusts and of the legal concept of
charity is well surveyed in G. JoN-Es, HisToRY OF TE LAw OF CHARITY 1532-1827
(1969).
51 See BOGFRT ON TRUSTS, supra note 39, at 341-52.

A further concern, which

appears to have become quite pronounced by the eighteenth century and to have
been in considerable part responsible for the narrow definition of charity adopted
at that time, was the desire to prevent wealthy individuals from impoverishing their
heirs by giving away their fortunes. See G. JoNEs, supra note 50, at 105-08.
52 For example, the Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601, 43 Eliz., c. 4, which is
commonly cited for its listing of charitable purposes, was enacted to establish public
commissions for policing and enforcing certain types of charitable trusts. See G.
JoNEs, supra note 50, at 22-56.
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porations are often enforceable, in some states under the theory
that they create charitable trusts, and in other states under other,
vaguer doctrines. 53 Thus, one might fear than an unrestricted
right to form nonprofit corporations might unduly encourage endowments for frivolous purposes. Yet this seems an insubstantial
problem. No matter which theory courts have invoked in enforcing perpetual restrictions on gifts to nonprofit corporations, they
appear always to have confined their decisions to corporations whose
purposes are charitable. 54 No support appears to exist for the
proposition that perpetual restrictions on the use of money or property given to noncharitable nonprofit corporations are valid, unless
the terms of the restrictions limit the corporation to use of the
donation for purposes that are clearly charitable, thus effectively
making the corporation the trustee of a charitable trust for that
particular donation. 5 Yet all nonprofit corporation statutes already provide for the incorporation of any nonprofit established for
charitable purposes. Thus, extension of permissible purposes to
include all noncharitable organizations as well would not result in
a proliferation of restricted endowments for noncharitable purposes. In any case, if perpetual restrictions on endowed funds
become a problem in the nonprofit sector, the obvious response is
to place more stringent limitations on the enforceability of such
restrictions 5 6 rather than to limit the purposes for which nonprofits
may be formed in general.
To be sure, there might be cause for concern that widespread
use of the nonprofit form could cause capital to be tied up in relatively unproductive uses even in the absence of endowments with
donor-imposed restrictions. Because the managers of a nonprofit
generally have no claim to its assets, they have no direct financial
incentive to devote those assets to the most economically productive
purposes. On the contrary, because their jobs and salaries may be
at stake, nonprofit managers have an incentive to perpetuate the
organization as long as possible. As a result, a nonprofit with substantial assets, whose services are no longer in great demand, might
nevertheless continue providing those services until it has consumed all of its capital, instead of transferring its assets to another,
more socially useful, activity.
5

3 See W. CARY & C. BniGHr, TnE LAw AN

=

LORE or ENnDOWMEN

FuNas

14-18, 78 (1969).
54

See id.

S Cf. Schaeffer v. Newberry, 235 Minn. 282, 50 N.W.2d 477 (1951)

(devise
of land to village for use as a public park held to be creation of a charitable trust).
56 As proposed, for example, in L. SYmEs, Putrac PoLicy AN rm DEAD HAND
132-39 (1955).
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Problems of this nature, however, do not appear sufficiently
serious to justify limiting the permissible scope of nonprofit corporate activity. It appears unlikely that many nonprofits that have
outlived their usefulness will possess substantial assets. This is
especially true for commercial nonprofits, the type most commonly
excluded by corporation statutes with restrictive purposes clauses;
when demand for the services of a commercial nonprofit drops
sharply, the resulting loss of income from customers is likely to lead
to operating losses that cannot long be covered by liquidating assets.
Moreover, direct controls, such as further restrictions on the capacity
of nonprofits to accumulate assets beyond those necessary to make
adequate provision for the likely financial needs of the reasonably
foreseeable future, 57 again appear preferable to a policy as undiscriminating as denying incorporation for broad classes of activity.
Nor does it seem reasonable to restrict the scope of nonprofit
activity for the sake of easing the burden of public supervision.
To begin with, most states devote so few resources to supervising
nonprofits in general 58 that a proportionate increase in those resources to deal with expanded nonprofit activity would be negligible. 59 Moreover, the burden of public supervision might be
reduced if, as is suggested below, 0 the standing of private parties to
sue nonprofits for malfeasance were considerably broadened. Indeed, for commercial nonprofits, such as shoe stores, a generous view
of patrons' standing to sue, together with appropriate provision for
mandatory disclosure of basic financial information, 1 could well
obviate the need for all but the most cursory public supervision.
3. Protecting Patrons
Section I of this Article suggests that, in general, the role to
which nonprofit organizations are best suited is the provision of
goods and services under circumstances in which contract failure
makes profit-seeking firms an undesirable source of supply. It might
therefore appear that formation of nonprofits should be limited to
just those activities for which contract failure is clearly evident.
5
' Restrictions on accumulations are already applied by many states, at least
to nonprofits that are classified as charities. See E. FiscH, D. FRE AND E. SCHACHTER, CHAnrrms Aim CHArrABLE FOuNDATIONS §§ 117-119 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as CH=ABLE FOuNDATIONS]; BoGERT ON TRusTs, supra note 39, at § 352.
58 See text accompanying notes 323-26 infra.

59 See text accompanying notes 319-29 infra.
6
0 See text accompanying notes 345-83 infra.
61 See text accompanying notes 390-406 infra.
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When contract failure is not involved, there is generally no
reason to expect nonprofit firms to provide any particular advantage
over profit-seeking firms. On the contrary, in such a situation, one
would expect nonprofits to be less desirable suppliers than proprietary firms, given their problems of limited access to capital and poor
incentives for efficient production. Yet some consumers, accustomed
to thinking only that, in general, nonprofits are somehow "better"
than profit-seeking firms, 2 might continue to patronize nonprofits
even though it appears (accurately, as it turns out) that they are
offering a bargain that is inferior to that of their profit-seeking
63
competitors.
To be sure, the existing restrictions on nonprofit activity are
never explicitly rationalized or interpreted from this (or, for that
matter, from any other) perspective. Yet perhaps they are not entirely inconsistent with it either. The limitations on nonprofit
activity-as embodied, for example, in the term "charitable"-have
tended to loosen to encompass new activities once there has been
evidence of a substantial tendency for nonprofits to undertake such
activity.
At most, the effect of the limitations has probably been
simply to place the burden on those seeking to establish a new form
of nonprofit enterprise to convince a judge, a secretary of state, or a
state attorney general that there is good reason to grant them a
charter. In the absence of clear criteria for what constitutes a good
reason, analogy to activities already permitted to nonprofits will be
a common form of justification. And what such activities generally
have in common is contract failure.
Obviously, the restrictions on nonprofit activity have not previously been applied in a self-conscious effort to contain such activity
to clear cases of contract failure. One might nevertheless argue
that in the future they should be. Yet good reasons exist for rejecting restrictions that are based on such considerations. To begin
with, the potential harm to consumers from allowing nonprofits to
undertake traditionally proprietary activities appears insignificant,
for we are talking here about preventing nonprofits from operating
precisely in those areas in which consumers are best able to look
out for their own interests-that is, where, owing to the absence of
0

2See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 896-97.
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See Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HAv.
L. REv. 1416 (1980). Professor Clark suggests that, in using the nonprofit as
opposed to the for-profit form for organizing hospitals, and by gaining correlative
tax advantages, physicians might effectively be committing a fraud against consumers
of hospital services. Id. 1441-47.
0 See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 882.
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contract failure, the goods and services offered by competing nonprofit and for-profit producers are most easily compared. Further,
there is no obvious reason to believe that the legislators, state
officials, and judges who are responsible for establishing and administering the restrictions on nonprofit incorporation will be better
qualified than the market to make judgments concerning the relative performance of nonprofit and for-profit producers in any particular activity.
4. Protecting Normative Behavior
As I suggested in my earlier article, the normative constraints
that are important in assuring that nonprofits adhere to their
fiduciary obligations might be strongest in those areas in which
nonprofits have long been established, and correspondingly weaker
in those areas in which nonprofits undertake novel activities. 65 As
a consequence, one might wish to be cautious about letting nonprofits enter new fields, for fear that abuses in such fields will be
rather common-so common, perhaps, as to make the nonprofit
firms, on average, no more reliable than the for-profit firms. One
could go even further with this line of reasoning. It might be that
the presence of a "proprietary mentality" within some parts of the
nonprofit sector will tend to undermine the collective morality of
that sector as a whole, thus leading to a breakdown of fiduciary
standards even in areas that traditionally have been nonprofit.66
Such reasoning could provide some justification for the more
conservative approach to nonprofit incorporation, the effect of which
is to allow only gradual expansion of nonprofit activity beyond the
areas in which it has already become established. Yet, whatever
one might think about the validity of this line of reasoning, there
appear to be other, more appropriate responses to the hazards it
points up. In particular, it would appear far better policy to take
steps to address breaches of fiduciary duty directly, by improving
the mechanisms for enforcing the fiduciary responsibilities of nonprofit managers, rather than simply to make it difficult for all nonprofits, honest or not, to enter new fields in which they might serve
a valuable role. Such an alternative policy appears all the wiser
because a variety of available measures exists for improving the accountability of nonprofits, some of which are suggested below. 67
875-76.
66 There is a hint of this line of reasoning in Professor Oleck's attack, see
notes 15-18 supra & accompanying text, on the newer, more liberal nonprofit corporation statutes.
67
See text accompanying notes 319-83 infra.
65ld.
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5. Protecting Proprietary Behavior
There remains a final, rather different argument for limiting
of nonprofit activity-an argument that is nearly the conscope
the
verse of the one just discussed.
Contrary to the view implicitly taken by many economists,
there is good reason to believe that aggressive profit-seeking behavior is not a natural part of our genetic endowment, but is instead the product of considerable acculturation. Businessmen
manage enterprise to maximize profits, through such means as reducing costs and expanding sales and production, in large part
because they have grown up in a society that places considerable
value on such activity and provides constant schooling in the
methods appropriate to it. Thus, for example, efforts to establish
capitalist economies in less-developed countries are not always successful; the taste for pecuniary rewards, and for the business means
appropriate to achieving them, requires a good deal of indoctrination to take hold.
Consequently, one might argue that a society based on a free
enterprise economy must be ever vigilant to maintain the entrepreneurial ethic. It is important, for the sake of economic efficiency, to assure vigorous rivalry among proprietary enterprise in
all sectors of the economy in which competitive markets are appropriate. A broad expansion of nonprofit activity might pose a threat
in this regard. If nonprofit enterprise is allowed to enter a sector,
the entrepreneurial ethic might start to disappear from that sector. Profit-seeking activity might begin to appear slightly disreputable, and producers in the sector might abandon everything
they learned at business school and revert to their natural instincts
to be agreeable, to place strong emphasis on a sense of community
and pleasurable human intercourse within and among their firms,
to avoid overwork and compulsive striving, and so forth. Doubters
need only look at England to see that a society can quickly lose its
entrepreneurial instincts. It therefore follows that nonprofit activity should be closely confined to just those areas in which it is
absolutely necessary for reasons of contract failure.
Yet even if this argument is taken seriously-and I am not trying to suggest that it should be 8-it is by no means obvious that
0s Lest I be considered merely facetious in presenting this line of reasoning,
however, let me suggest that it might have played a role in the thinking of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when nonprofit corporation statutes were
originally being formulated. Surely there was some strong sentiment to the effect
that certain activities belonged only in the private, profit-seeking sector. One reflection of this sentiment can be found in the restrictive attitude that the courts
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limiting the permissible scope of nonprofit enterprise is an appropriate response to the problem involved. For, again, no particular
reason exists to believe that state authorities will be able to identify those markets in which the capitalist ethic is least (or most) in
need of preservation. Moreover, if one is really concerned about
the need to bolster entrepreneurial activity in the United States
today, there would appear to be many more obvious places to begin
than by placing arbitrary restrictions in nonprofit corporation
statutes.
6. Summary
Restricting the purposes for which nonprofits can be incorporated serves no obvious need that could not better be served by
other means. Moreover, to the extent that the statutory restrictions actually limit the scope of nonprofit activity, they might well
cause unnecessary harm. The service sector of our economy is
growing rapidly, both in absolute terms and as a fraction of the
nation's total economic activity. Much of this growth is coming
from the development of new types of services-in areas such as
research, health and custodial care, communications, and consulting and advisory services. It may be that the nonprofit form offers
the most suitable means of organizing a substantial share of this
activity) 9 A restrictive, and particularly a conservative, approach
to nonprofit incorporation might therefore inhibit the development
of these services, or push them inappropriately into the proprietary
or governmental sectors.
The wiser course would be to permit nonprofit corporations
to be formed for the purpose of undertaking any activity whatever
(consistent, of course, with the nondistribution constraint and the
criminal law).70 At the same time, however, one should realize that
sometimes took toward the power of municipalities to engage in activities normally
pursued by proprietary organizations. See Keen v. Waycross, 101 Ga. 588, 29
S.E. 42 (1897); MacRae v. Concord, 296 Mass. 394, 6 N.E.2d 366 (1937). On the
public/private distinction in corporation law generally and its relationship to nineteenth century liberal thought, see Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HAjv. L.

REv. 1057 (1980).

19 See V. FucHs, THm SERWCE ECONOmY (1968); Hansmann, supra note 2, at
835 n.1.
7oUntil recently, it
was not uncommon for states to grant considerable discretion to a judge or a state official (such as the secretary of state) to grant or deny
a nonprofit corporate charter. In many cases, this authority was used to deny
charters, on grounds of "public policy," to organizations whose purposes simply offended the sensibilities of the officials involved. Such discretionary authority consequently came under attack from the commentators, see Dwight, Objections to
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this liberal approach to incorporation makes it all the more important that appropriate measures are taken to assure that all nonprofits adhere to their fiduciary duties. Likewise, the expansion of
the nonprofit sector makes it crucial to define just which, if any,
nonprofits should have the benefit of the many special privileges
commonly accorded to them, from tax exemption to freedom from
involuntary bankruptcy.
E. The Leading Modern Statutes
In recent years, three nonprofit corporation statutes have been
drafted that deserve special attention because of the effort that has
gone into their development, the prominence of the jurisdictions
in which they have been adopted, and the widely divergent approaches they take to fundamental issues. These are the Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act, the New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Act, and the California Nonprofit Corporation Law.
Among other things, these statutes differ fundamentally in their
treatment of corporate purposes. These differing approaches are
worth considering in detail, not only because the preceding discussion helps to illuminate some of the problems from which they suffer, but also because their treatment of corporate purposes bears
directly on other important features of these statutes to be discussed below.
judicial Approval of Charters of Non-Profit Corporations, 12 Bus. LAW 454 (1957);
Note, Judicial Approval as a Prerequisiteto Incorporation of Non-Profit Organizations in New York and Pennsylvania, 55 CoLum. L. REV. 380 (1955), and in recent
years there has been a general retreat from such broad grants of discretion. Pennsylvania, for example, eliminated its statutory requirement for judicial approval in
1972, see Act of Nov. 15, 1972, No. 271, § 7319, 1972 Pa. Laws 1063, 1089 (codified at 15 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §7319 (Supp. 1979) (as amended)), repealing
Act of Jan. 18, 1966, No. 1406, § 10, 1965 Pa. Laws 1406, 1420, and the New
York Court of Appeals has now placed an extremely narrow interpretation on the
discretion afforded judges by the still extant provision for judicial approval in the
New York statutes, Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 31 N.Y.2d 965, 341 N.Y.S.2d
108, 293 N.E.2d 255 (1973); Association for the Preservation of Freedom of
Choice, Inc. v. Shapiro, 9 N.Y.2d 376, 214 N.Y.S.2d 388, 174 N.E.2d 487 (1961).
Ohio, on the other hand, has recently taken a startling step in the opposite direction. In State ex rel. Grant v. Brown, 39 Ohio St. 2d 112, 313 N.E.2d 847 (1974),
the Ohio Supreme Court sustained the discretionary refusal by the Ohio Secretary
of State to grant a nonprofit corporate charter to the Greater Cincinnati Gay Society on the ground that "the promotion of homosexuality as a valid life style is
contrary to the public policy of the state." Id. at 113-14, 313 N.E.2d at 848.
There is obviously no more-indeed, there is quite a bit less-reason to permit
state officials to exercise personal discretion in selecting permissible purposes than
there is to include restrictive lists of permissible purposes within the language of
the corporation statutes. No state gives its secretary of state or its judges the right
to grant or deny charters to business corporations on the basis of their personal
evaluation of the potential utility of its products; there is no reason to adopt a
different policy with respect to nonprofit corporations.

528

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 129:497

1. The Model Act
The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act 71 was originally drafted
in 1952 by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association, and was subsequently revised in 1957 and 1964. It has had
considerable influence, having been adopted in whole 72 or in part 73
in a substantial number of states.
The Model Act was consciously drafted to follow as closely as
possible the provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act, and
deviates from the latter Act only so much as its authors thought was
clearly necessary to accommodate the difference in subject matter.74
Because, as discussed in section I above, 75 the function served by
the nonprofit corporate form differs in fundamental respects from
that served by the business corporation, this has made the Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act something less than the ideal model.
In general, the Model Act's provisions are minimal and permissive.
It avoids entirely many difficult and important issues, such as the
conditions, if any, under which officers, directors, members, or
other controlling individuals can engage in self-interested transactions. 76 It is extremely vague or confused about other issues, such
as the conditions under which assets may be distributed to members
on dissolution. I shall comment in detail below on various of the
specific shortcomings of the Model Act. 7 For the moment, it is only
its provisions on permissible purposes for incorporation that are at
issue.
As already noted, the Model Act provides two alternative purposes clauses. The first (section 4 of the Act), which is evidently
the clause favored by a majority of the drafting committee, 78 provides that:
71 MoDEL AcT, supra note 19.
72

E.g., Iowa Nonprofit Corporation Act, §§ 1-101, IowA

CODE

Aim. §§ 504A.1

to 504A.101 (West Supp. 1980).
73 E.g., Illinois Ceneral Not for Profit Corporation Act, §§ 1-101, ILL. Am.
STAT. ch. 32, §§ 163a to 163a100 (Smith-Hurd 1970 & Supp. 1978); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. §§ 35-2-101 to 35-2-1105 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-8-1 to

53-8-99 (1978). See also MODEL AcT, supra note 19, at x (states adopting Model
Act in whole or in large part as of 1964).
74 MoDEL AcT, supra note 19, at vii.
75 See text accompanying notes 5-13 supra.
76 This failure cannot be ascribed to any lack of precedent
The problem of
self-interested transactions is addressed in the ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. Con'. AcT
§ 41 (1974). Some nonprofit corporation statutes contain conflict of interest provisions patterned after business corporation statutes. See notes 209 & 210 infra
& accompanying text.
77 See text accompanying notes 242-48 and 258 infra.
7s Mon
AcT, supra note 19, at viii.
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Corporations may be organized under this Act for any
lawful purpose or purposes, including, without being limited to, any one or more of the following purposes: charitable; benevolent; eleemosynary; educational; ... ; athletic;
.. ; animal husbandry; ... ; but labor unions, cooperative
organizations, and organizations subject to any of the provisions of the insurance laws of this State may not be
organized under this Act7 9
The alternative version of section 4 states simply that "[c]orporations may be organized under this Act for any lawful purpose or
purposes except . . . [list, if any]." 80 These two clauses appearexcept for the explicit exclusion of labor unions, cooperatives, and
insurance companies in the first-to be precisely equivalent. Indeed,
the traditional list of acceptable purposes in the first clause seems
entirely superfluous. The remarkably confused comments that the
authors of the Model Act offer in their preface, however, suggest
that they intended some fundamental differences in meaning between the two alternative provisions. 8'
To begin with, we are told that "[a] substantial minority of
the Committee favors broadening the permitted purposes to any
purpose not forbidden by law. Provision for this type of Act is
made in alternate Section 4 so as to facilitate local choice." 82 Thus,
the permissible purposes listed in the first version of section 4 must
in fact be intended to have some limiting force as examples of types
of purposes that are permissible; evidently, the authors intended
the words "including, without being limited to, any one or more of
the following purposes" to mean "such as the following purposes,
and other purposes of a similar type."
Even more surprisingly, the draftsmen go on to say that "[t]hus
under alternative Section 4 a corporation may be organized to help
its members make profits or to make profits itself through earnings
or capital gains for eventual distribution to its members in liquidation," s and they proceed to offer, as an example of a purpose encompassed by the alternative clause, "a joint business venture for
the profit . . . of its members."- 4 Thus, the authors evidently feel
that their alternative purposes clause-but not the first one-should
be read to permit profit-seeking activity. To be sure, the prefatory
791d. §4.

s0 Id. alternative § 4.
81 Id. vii-ix.
82

Id. viii.

83Id. ix.
84 Id.
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comments reflect the authors' view, embodied in other provisions
of the Model Act, that distributions of profits should be confined to
distributions made to members on dissolution, and that current
distributions of profits are impermissible even under the alternative
purposes clause. Yet, as will be seen below,8 5 this curious distinction between current and terminating distributions, which appears
to derive from yet further confusions about the appropriate role of
nonprofits, and which is by no means confined to the Model Act,
places only a limited qualification on the authors' remarkable willingness to abandon the nondistribution constraint.
2. The New York Statute
In the 1960s New York undertook a wholesale revision of its
nonprofit corporation laws. The resulting statute,"' effective in
1970, is of particular interest not only because it fails to follow the
Model Act, but also because it represents a distinctly novel legislative approach to nonprofit incorporation.
The major innovation in the New York statute is its division
of all nonprofit corporations into four types, defined as follows:
Type A-A not-for-profit corporation of this type may
be formed for any lawful non-business purpose or purposes
including, but not limited to, any one or more of the following non-pecuniary purposes: civic, patriotic, political,
social, fraternal, athletic, agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandry, and for a professional, commercial, industrial, trade or service association.
Type B-A not-for-profit corporation of this type may
be formed for any one or more of the following non-business purposes: charitable, educational, religious, scientific,
literary, cultural or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals.
Type C-A not-for-profit corporation of this type may
be formed for any lawful business purpose to achieve a
lawful public or quasi-public objective.
Type D-A not-for-profit corporation of this type may
be formed under this chapter when such formation is authorized by any other corporate law of this state for any
business or non-business, or pecuniary or non-pecuniary,
85 See text accompanying notes 176-266 and 385-406 infra.
86 N.Y. NoTr-FoR-PRoFFr Cor,. LAw §§ 101-1515 (McKinney 1970 & Supp.

1979).
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purpose or purposes specified by such other law, whether
such purpose or purposes are also within types A, B, C
87
above or otherwise.
The purpose of this classification is to provide for different
degrees of regulation for the different types. Type B is the most
closely regulated category, whereas type A is given the most latitude.8 8 I shall have a good deal to say later on-most of it negative-about the wisdom of such an effort to establish different
categories of nonprofits.8 9 For the moment, our concern is simply
to understand what purposes are provided for in these various
categories.
Type D is simply a connector to other special-purpose statutes
governing particular types of nonprofits, such as religious corporations or organizations involved in housing finance. It is designed
to avoid the necessity of repeating, in each of the special-purpose
statutes, all of the basic provisions of the general statute. Thus,
we need be concerned at this point only with types A, B, and C,
which are the only types that can be formed directly under the
general act.9 0
The type B listing authorizes charitable purposes, plus a few
other specific activities that may or may not fall within the common
law definition of charity. The rather arbitrary set of activities
specifically mentioned are drawn from section 501(c)(3) of the federal Internal Revenue Code, which essentially defines the class of
nonprofits that is entitled to the maximal set of preferences under
the federal income tax.91 The commentary to the statute states that
type B is intended to encompass those organizations in which "[t]he
benefit group is the public or some broad segment of it," and "[t]he
supporting group often is the general public." 92 Even with-or per87Id. § 201(b) (McKinney 1970).

88 See, for example, the provisions regulating dissolution of the corporation
and distribution of its assets. Id. §§ 1002-1005, 1008.
s9 See text accompanying notes 267-318 infra.
9oIt is worth noting that the type D list expressly includes "pecuniary" purposes. This evidently results from an effort to avoid restrictions on the types of
statutes to which type D can serve as a link in the future. But the intent is ambiguous. The use of the term "pecuniary" may result from the expectation that
private housing finance corporations will be formed under the Act. See N.Y. NoTFoR-PaoFrr Cort'. LAw, explanatory mem., at xii. (MeKinney 1970). Such corporations, although pecuniary in the sense of "having to do with money," could
still adhere to the nondistribution constraint. If, however, "pecuniary" means
profit-seeking without regard for the nondistribution constraint, it is plainly inconsistent with the statute's description of type D organizations as "not-for-profit."
91That is, both exemption from taxation for the organization under I.R.C.
9 501, plus qualification for the charitable deduction under I.R.C. § 170.
92 N.Y. NoT-FoR-ThoFrr Coa. L.w, commentary to § 201 (McKinney 1970).
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haps because of-this interpretive gloss, the boundaries of type B
are somewhat vague. Would a book club, for example, qualify as
a type B nonprofit, on the grounds that it is "literary"? Would it
depend on whether the club simply sells books to its members at
cost, or on whether the club provides a forum for lectures or discussions concerning books? Would it matter what kinds of books
are involved? Or whether membership in the club is open to anyone who seeks it? 93
The definition provided for type B is a model of clarity, however, compared with that given for type A. The commentary to
the statute states that type A is "intended to cover the usual membership type organization where the support of the organization is
derived from a limited class called 'members' and where the nonpecuniary benefits flow primarily to such limited class." 94 It would
have been easy enough to draft the definition of type A to say just
this and thus include roughly the same class of nonprofits defined
in section I as commercial mutual nonprofits. As it is, however,
the language defining type A nonprofits says something rather different, and much more ambiguous. Thus, it provides "for any
lawful non-business purpose or purposes, including, but not limited
to ....

" 95 Is this intended to mean something more restrictive

than "for any lawful non-business purpose or purposes"? Then
there is the question what a "non-business" purpose is-a question
to which we shall return below.96 Finally, the list of purposes given
as specific examples includes many that are not always pursued on
a membership basis. For example, an "athletic" organization might
be organized as an entrepreneurial rather than as a mutual nonprofit. If so, would it fail to qualify as type A?
Types A and B together contain most of the activities commonly included in the older statutes that limited permissible purposes. Type C is evidently intended to include purposes of a less
93
That type B is evidently influenced by I.R.C. § 5 01(c)(3) is of only minimal assistance in this regard, because the principles or policies that underlie that

provision of the tax code have never been clearly articulated.
5

Partly as a conse-

quence of this, the boundaries of I.R.C. § 01(c) (3) are themselves quite vague.
See Hansmann, Why Are Nonprofit Organizations Exempted from Corporate Income Taxation (forthcoming in 1981 in Tnm INTER Tco, OF Tkm PUBLIC, PRIvATE,
AND Nom, RoFrr SEcTons (M. White ed.)) [hereinafter cited as Exempted Nonprofit

Organizations]. Further, one New York court has held that a nonprofit organization's exemption under §501(c)(3) did not necessarily qualify it as a type B

corporation. Bodell v. Ghezzi, 50 A.D.2d 674, 375 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1975). Type
B, therefore, is obviously narrower than § 501 (c) (3).
94 N.Y. NoT-FoR-PAoFrr Corn'. LAw, comment to § 201 (McKinney 1970).
9- Id. § 201 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1979).

96 See text following note 100 infra.

1981]

REFORMING NONPROFIT CORPORATION LAW

traditional sort. The statutory commentary states, in particular,
that type C is designed to permit the formation of a nonprofit corporation "for a purpose normally carried on by business corporations for profit." 97 Presumably this is what the statute means by a
"business purpose." 98 Thus, the hypothetical shoe store we have
been using as an example would evidently be a type C nonprofit. 9
This leaves some unfortunate ambiguities, however. These ambiguities can be seen clearly if we consider whether the coverage
of type C would be different if it simply said "for any lawful purpose not covered by type A or type B." Two categories of purposes could conceivably be covered by the latter phrase but not by
type C as it is now defined: (1) organizations formed for a nonbusiness purpose not included in types A and B; and (2) organizations formed for a business purpose that does not meet the requirement of having a "public or quasi-public objective." The statutory
language and commentary leaves it quite unclear whether categories (1) and (2) are empty. If they are not empty-and this is a
9

7 N.Y. NoT-Fon-PIo'rr Coup. LAw, comment to § 201 (McKinney 1970).
98The special focus on "business purposes" in the new New York statute
evidently is an effort to deal with confusion that developed under the old nonprofit
corporation statute (entitled the Membership Corporations Law) and the old business corporation statute (entitled the Stock Corporation Law):
As these statutes were interpreted by court decisions and opinions of
the Attorney General, "any lawful business purpose" under Stock Corporation Law Section 5 meant a profit purpose, since business and profit were
synonymous and the quoted language of Section 10 of the Membership
Corporations Law excluded all business purposes whether the corporation
was to be formed for profit or not for profit. Thus a not for profit corporation could not be formed under the Stock Corporation Law. A not
for profit corporation could be formed under the Membership Corporations
Law unless it was to be formed for a business purpose. If to be formed
for a business purpose, it could not be formed under that statute because
it would be for a purpose for which a corporation could be formed under any other general law which phrase included the Stock Corporation
Law. The rather strange result of this cross-breeding of the concepts
of "for profit" and "not for pecuniary profit" and "for a business purpose" and "not for a business purpose" was that one could form under
the Stock Corporation Law a "for profit corporation" for a "business
purpose" and under the Membership Corporations Law a "not for pecuniary
profit corporation" for a non-business purpose but one could not form
a "not for pecuniary profit corporation" (non-profit corporation) for a
"business purpose" under either law. This condition began to cause problems when non-profit corporations in the business area became common.
Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation-A Neglected Stepchild Comes of Age, 22
Bus. LAw. 951, 953-54 (1967) (footnote omitted). Unfortunately, as the following discussion suggests, the new New York statute, rather than putting an end to
such pointless concern about what a "business purpose" is and what difference it
makes, simply perpetuates it in a slightly different form.
9
0 Whatever a "business purpose" may be, if a nonprofit corporation charter
includes any such purpose among its purposes the corporation must be type C.
N.Y. NoT-Foa-PnoFr Conp. LAw § 201(c) (McKinney 1970). See also Bodell v.
Ghezzi, 50 A.D.2d 674, 375 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1975).
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perfectly plausible reading of the statutory language-then the
types of nonprofits provided for in the New York statute, when combined, are less inclusive than the simple phrase "for any lawfil
purpose," and hence the New York statute must be included among
those that continue to place overall limitations on the purposes
for which nonprofit corporations may be formed.
It is apparent that much of the vagueness surrounding the
four-fold typology of the New York statute-and the similar vagueness that is to be found in all of the statutes, new and old, that
seek to define or categorize permissible purposes for nonprofit corporations-has its source in language that leaves it unclear which
attributes, or even what kinds of attributes, of an organization are
important. Sometimes, for example, the terms focus on the nature
of the services that the organization provides, such as "agricultural,"
"athletic," or "educational." At other times, the language points
more or less clearly to the structural features of the organization,
and in particular to the relationships among those who finance,
control, and obtain services from it; this is true, for example, of
the language quoted above from the official commentary that accompanies the statutory typology in the New York statute. 0 0
In yet other cases, the language employed refers to both types
of characteristics in some uncertain combination. The term "business purpose" is in this latter category. It appears from the context and commentary that this term is being used to refer to the
types of services that are normally provided by for-profit firms, such
as distribution of shoes, books, and pharmaceuticals. 'But it appears
that this term is also intended to convey something about the relationship between the organization and its patrons; in particular, it
seems intended to encompass, in general, only those nonprofits that
I have labeled commercial. Thus, our hypothetical shoe store
would presumably be engaged in a "business purpose" if it were
organized and operated strictly as a commercial entrepreneurial
nonprofit (as hypothesized), but perhaps would not be if it were
financed in part by donations and sold its shoes below cost to the
poor. Conversely, a private preparatory school would, one suspects, be categorized by the authors of the New York statute as
serving a "non-business educational" purpose (and therefore in
type B rather than type C) even if it were organized strictly as a
commercial entrepreneurial nonprofit, simply because secondary
school education (thought not infrequently organized on a forprofit basis) is not typically the sort of thing that one refers to as
100 See note 92 supra & accompanying text.
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a "business." But then, maybe this is not the interpretation that
was intended. Or maybe-most likely of all-the statute reflects no
clear intention at all. 01
3. The California Statute
The California Nonprofit Corporation Law' 0 2 is the most
recent of the important modern statutes, having been adopted in
1978 and having gone into effect on January 1, 1980. It is of
interest not only because it constitutes a wholesale replacement of
the pre-existing statutory provisions, but also because it represents
a rejection of the approaches taken in the two other major recent
efforts at statutory revision-the Model Act and the New York
statute-and because it is the most comprehensive and carefully
drafted of all the existing nonprofit corporation statutes.
Like the New York statute, the California statute divides nonprofit corporations into types. California's statute, however, has
only three types, and they are rather differently defined than in
New York. As in New York, the purpose of defining different types
is to apply different standards to them. The California act goes
further than the New York act in distinguishing the different types,
however, for it actually consists of three entirely separate corporation statutes, one for each type.
The first type under the California statute comprises what the
statute terms "nonprofit public benefit corporations." 103 Nonprofit corporations coming within this category are those that are
established "for any public or charitable purposes." 104 The statute,
which is not accompanied by commentary, gives no definition of
the purposes that qualify as "public." 105 The second type comprises "nonprofit religious corporations," 101 defined simply as nonprofit corporations established "primarly or exclusively for any
01

The one New York case to address this point apparently agrees: "nor have

we found any legislative history which is clearly dispositive of the issue." Bodell v.
Ghezzi, 50 A.D.2d at 675, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
See generally Fryer,
102 CAL. CoRni. CODE §§ 5000-10845 (West Supp. 1980).
New California Nonprofit Corporation Law: A Unique Approach, 7 PEPPEDmm
L. REv. 1 (1979); California Nonprofit Corporation Law: A Symposium, 13 U.S.F.
L. REv. 724 (1979).
1 03
CAL. CoRP. CoDE §§ 5110-6910 (West Supp. 1980).
104 Id. § 5111.
105 Indeed, the authors of the Act seem deliberately to have kept this term
vague. See Hone, California's New Nonprofit Corporation Law-An Introduction
and Conceptual Background, 13 U.S.F. L. REv. 733, 739 (1979).
10 6 CAL. CoRP. CoDE §§ 9110-9690 (West Supp. 1980).
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religious purpose." 107 Finally, the third type bears the label "nonprofit mutual benefit corporations"; 108 the statute provides that a
corporation of this type may be formed
for any lawful purpose . . . ; provided that a corporation
all of the assets of which are irrevocably dedicated to charitable, religious, or public purposes and which as a matter
of law or according to its articles or bylaws, must, upon dissolution, distribute its assets to a person or persons carrying on a charitable, religious, or public purpose or purposes may not be formed under this part. 10 9
Since the California courts have held that all of the assets of a
nonprofit corporation organized exclusively or primarily for charitable purposes (including religious purposes) are impressed with
a charitable trust, and therefore must be devoted solely to charitable
purposes upon dissolution of the organization, 110 such an organization would presumably be barred from incorporating as a mutual
benefit nonprofit. Conversely, it appears from the statutory language that a mutual benefit nonprofit may be formed for any lawful
purpose that is not primarily charitable or religious, so long as the
organization's articles do not expressly dedicate its assets irrevocably
to charitable, religious, or "public" purposes.
Because nonprofit mutual benefit corporations are defined as a
residual category, the California act has the advantage that, unlike
the New York statute and the Model Act,"' it unambiguously permits nonprofit corporations to be formed under it for any lawful
purpose. On the other hand, the boundaries of the three types of
nonprofits provided for in the California statute are vague and
confusing. One can only guess, for example, what a "public" purpose is, and thus how broad the category of public benefit nonprofits
is intended to be. 1 12 In fact, there appears to be considerable
107 Id. § 9111.
To some extent, New York also treats nonprofit corporations formed for religious

purposes as a separate category. Although such organizations are treated as type
B nonprofits under the New York Not-For-Profit Corporation Law, they are ex-

cused from some of the provisions applied to other type B nonprofits, and they are
in part governed by a separate statute for religious corporations. N.Y. RaEc. Coin.
LAw § 2b (McKinney Supp. 1979).
'o8 CAL. Corn,. CODE §§ 7110-8910 (West Supp. 1980).

§ 7111.
110 Lynch v. Spilman, 67 Cal. 2d 251, 431 P.2d 636, 62 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1967);
109 Id.

Pacific Home v. County of Los Angeles, 41 Cal. 2d 844, 264 P.2d 539 (1953).
111 That is, the Model Act with the initial § 4 defining permissible purposes,
rather than the alternative.
312 The California courts have cited with approval the RESTATEMmNT (ScoWND)
OF TRusTs § 368 (1959), which states that "'[elharitable purposes include (a)
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overlap in this typology. For example, because in California, as in
most American jurisdictions, religious purposes are considered to
be charitable purposes, 113 a religious organization evidently has the
option of forming either as a religious or as a public benefit nonprofit. Likewise, any organization dedicated to purposes that are
"'public" but not charitable-if there are such purposes-could evidently form either as a public benefit or as a mutual benefit nonprofit, and the same appears to be true of an organization formed
for purposes that are charitable only in part."14
Further, although the label "nonprofit mutual benefit corporation" suggests an intention-similar to the apparent intention of the
New York statute in creating that state's type A nonprofits-to create
a separate category for organizations designed essentially to serve
the private needs of their members (that is, commercial mutual nonprofits), the statutory definition for mutual benefit nonprofits is far
broader than this, apparently extending to all activities that are not
primarily charitable. For example, such commercial entrepreneurial nonprofits as our hypothetical shoe store would evidently
qualify as a mutual benefit nonprofit; indeed, unless selling shoes
falls within the undefined category of "public" purposes, it could
be formed only as a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation.
4. Summary
Whereas the Model Act appears simply to perpetuate the confusing practice, characteristic of the previous generation of nonprofit
corporation statutes, of offering a restrictive list of permissible purposes, the more recent New York and California statutes have compounded the confusion inherent in such a listing by creating not
just one, but several different restrictive categories of nonprofits,
the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of education; (c) the advancement
of religion; (d) the promotion of health; (e) governmental or munipical purposes;
(f) other purposes the accomplishment of which is beneficial to the community."'
Lynch v. Spilman, 67 Cal. 2d 251, 261, 431 P.2d 636, 642, 62 Cal. Rptr. 12, 18
(1967). It is not clear what, if anything, the term "public" adds to this definition.
313 See note 112 supra.
114 In contrast to the provision for nonprofit religious corporations, which states
that they must be formed "primarily or exclusively for any religious purposes,"
CAL. Corn'. CoDE § 9111 (West Supp. 1980), the provisions for nonprofit public
benefit corporations state simply that they may be formed "for any public or charitable purposes," id. § 5111. This suggests that an organization may be formed as a
nonprofit public benefit corporation even when its purposes are public or charitable
only in part. But, under the cases cited, note 110 supra, if the noncharitable purposes for which such an organization is formed are more than merely incidental,
the law will not impose a charitable trust on the organization's assets; consequently,
such an organization would presumably also have the option of forming as a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation.
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each of which is plagued by definitional ambiguities of the same
sort that infected the older statutes, such as the Illinois act quoted
earlier. 115 The difficulty with the categories created by the New
York and California statutes is not, however, simply that they have
added a new dimension of ambiguity. Rather, as shall be discussed
at length below, the whole notion of multiple categories of nonprofits is misconceived, reflecting fundamental confusion concerning the proper role and structure for nonprofit organizations.1 1
Before pursuing this issue further, however, it is instructive to
consider the corresponding restrictions that have been placed on the
functions served by for-profit organizations.
III.

LIMITATIONS ON FOR-PROFIT

AcrivrrY

Just as there are some services that nonprofits are prohibited
from providing, there are other services that, in some jurisdictions,
can be provided only by nonprofits-that is, services that cannot, by
law, be provided by profit-seeking firms. Moreover, whereas the
restrictions on the overall scope of nonprofit activity appear to be
in general decline, the restrictions on for-profit activity are evolving
in a more varied pattern; in some cases they are being eliminated,
while in other cases new restrictions are being enacted or proposed.
A. Sources of the Restrictions
The limitations on permissible activities that are often found
in nonprofit corporation statutes generally have no parallel in the
business corporation statutes, which typically allow the formation
of a business corporation "for any lawful purpose." 117 Rather, the
sources of the limitations on profit-seeking corporate activity are
varied, sometimes deriving from statutory law, sometimes from
common law, and sometimes from rules promulgated within particular professions.
1. Medical Care
Until quite recently, it was effectively impossible, in most states,
to organize the provision of medical treatment through the medium
of a profit-seeking corporation.
115 See text accompanying note 14 supra.
116 See text accompanying notes 267-318 infia.
117 See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (Purdon 1967).
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a. Corporatepractice rule
One source of this constraint has been the "corporate practice
rule," which derives from a combination of common law doctrine
and a tenuous interpretation of physician licensing statutes. 18 In
its usual application, this rule proscribes any arrangement whereby
a business corporation hires a physician as a salaried employee for
the purpose of providing medical treatment to people who contract
with the corporation for such treatment. Thus, the rule has been
applied to prohibit various forms of incorporated group medical
practice or prepaid health plans, as well as arrangements whereby a
physician, such as a radiologist or a pathologist, serves as an employee of a hospital rather than as an independent fee-for-service
practitioner with a hospital staff affiliation." 9 The reasoning that
underlies the rule is as follows: By statute, a state medical license is
required of every person who practices medicine. Because corporations are not granted medical licenses, they must be unlicensed
persons, and therefore not authorized to practice medicine. And,
the courts have decided, when a patient contracts with a corporation
for the purpose of receiving medical treatment from one of its
salaried physicians, rather than contracting directly with the physician, the corporation is practicing medicine.
Such logic might appear, on its face, to prohibit both nonprofit
and for-profit corporations from providing medical services through
salaried physicians. Yet the rule has generally been applied only
to for-profit corporations.120 When confronted with a nonprofit
corporation, the courts often put a policy gloss on the rule, arguing
that its purpose is to prevent laymen from interfering with the
physician-patient relationship, or to prevent "commercialization" of
the practice of medicine. And these evils are only likely to arise, it
is argued, when the physician is being supervised by a profit-seeking
8

The sources and applications of the corporate practice rule in medicine are
surveyed in Hansen, Laws Affecting Group Health Plans, 35 IowA L. REV. 209,
211-19 (1950); Willcox, Hospitals and the Corporate Practice of Medicine, 45
CoqEr. L.Q. 432 (1960); Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving
the Medical Care Crisis, 84 HAIv. L. REV. 887, 960-62 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Harvard Note]. See generally Hansen, Group Health Plans-A Twenty-Year
Legal Review, 42 Mnwx. L. REV. 527, 534-36 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hansen
II]; Comment, Prepayment Health Care Plan Enabling Acts-Are Their Restrictive
Features Constitutional?,7 DUQ. L. REV. 125, 128 (1968).
119 See Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners, 216 Cal. 285, 14 P.2d 67 (1932);
People ex rel. Kerner v. United Medical Service, Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157
(1936).
1 20
See Hansen II, supra note 118, at 534-36; Harvard Note, supra note 118, at
961. But see Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 F. Supp. 434
(W.D. Tex. 1974) (per curiam), aff'd mer., 421 U.S. 995 (1975); 1963 Ohio Att'y
Gen. Rep. No. 82.
"
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employer. 12 1 The result is that the corporate practice rule has
acted as a selective prohibition on the practice of medicine by for122
profit, but not nonprofit, corporations.
b. Blue Shield Laws
Another restriction on the provision of medical services by
profit-seeking corporations has its source in state "Blue Shield"
statutes. Such laws were passed in most states, largely at the urging
of the state medical societies, beginning in the 1930s. 123 Evidently
they were in large part a response to the development, during the
depression, of lay-controlled health service plans. 1 24 These statutes
typically required that any prepaid health services plan be formed
according to their terms. Further, they generally required, inter
alia, that the state medical society must approve the articles of incorporation, or have effective control over the organization's services.125 The result was commonly that profit-seeking prepaid group
practice arrangements were effectively barred in states with such
statutes, and that the only nonprofit group medical care plans that
developed were physician-dominated Blue Shield type plans that
simply insured the patient for the fee of the participating practi28
tioners.
21

E.g., Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Socy, 43 Cal.
2d 201, 272 P.2d 497 (1954); People ex rel. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v.
Pacific Health Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 160, 82 P.2d 429, 431 (1938), cert. denied,
306 U.S. 633 (1939).
122 In the wake of favorable developments involving federal taxation, many
states have adopted professional corporation statutes in recent years. These acts
specifically provide for the formation of business corporations that offer professional
services, including medical services, through licensed professionals who are salaried
employees. See Dunn, Professional Corporations: Their Development and Present
Status with Respect to the Practice of Medicine, 24 U. FLA. L. REv. 625 (1972);
Shores, Professional Corporations, 10 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 691 (1974); Note,
Professional Corporations, 9 IDA o L. REv. 219 (1972).
These acts, however,
create only a modest exception to the corporate practice rule, because they typically
restrict ownership and control of such professional service corporations to individuals who are licensed to provide the services rendered by the corporation.
E.g., Pennsylvania Professional Corporation Law, § 10, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§2910 (Purdon Supp. 1978). See Dunn, supra, at 636-37. In most respects, the
resulting corporations do not differ significantly from traditional professional partnerships.
123 See Hansen II supra note 118, at 531-32; Harvard Note, supra note 118,
at 962-63.
124 See Hansen II, supra note 118, at 531; Duquesne Comment, supra note
118, at 126-27.
125 See Hansen II, supra note 118, at 531-34; Duquesne Comment, supra
note 118, at 129-30; Harvard Note, supra note 118, at 963.
126The actual administration of the Blue Shield laws, and the various arrangements that have sometimes succeeded in avoiding the more restrictive features of the laws, are surveyed in Harvard Note, supra note 118, at 964-69.
1
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c. Federal HMO Legislation

With the precipitous rise in health care costs in recent years,
increasing concern has developed among health care planners over
the efficiency of the existing organization of medical care delivery.
One consequence of this has been considerable enthusiasm for the
development of "health maintenance organizations" (HMOs), which
are essentially prepaid group practice plans for physician services. 2 7
To help foster such organizations, Congress enacted the Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973.128 This act expressly preempts state Blue Shield and related legislation in so far as such
legislation interferes with the development of HMOs meeting the
standards of the federal act. 2 9 Because a for-profit HMO is not
disqualified under the federal act, 130 this legislation eliminates at

least some of the barriers to the formation of profit-seeking HMOs.
Yet the federal act in itself falls just short of equalizing the
positions of for-profit and nonprofit HMOs. First, the act does not
apply to HMOs that do not meet its standards, and those standards
are so strict that, it has been argued, it is quite difficult to establish
a viable HMO-for-profit or nonprofit-that meets them.' 3 ' Although the Health Maintenance Organization Amendments of
1976 132 relaxed those standards somewhat, they remain quite strict.
Further, the 1973 act does not explicitly override the corporate practice rule, and, although some commentators have argued that the
act can and should be interpreted to have that effect,1 33 organizers
of profit-seeking HMOs in some states will still face some uncertainty in this connection, even if they meet all of the federal standards.' 34 Finally, to qualify under the federal act, at least one-third
of the policymaking body of an HMO must be consumers of the
127

For a thoughtful survey of the issues, see Havighurst, Health Maintenance

Organizations and the Market for Health Service, 35 LAw & CoNTEZM.

PROB.

716 (1970).

128Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§300e to 300e-17 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
12942 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (1976).

See id. §§ 300e, 300e-1 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
See Star, The Undelivered Health System, PuB. INTEREST, Winter 1976,
at 66, 74-77.
132Pub. L. No. 94-460, 90 Stat. 1945 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 300e-1 to 3O0e-11, 300e-13, 300e-15, 300n-1 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
133 E.g., Kissam & Johnson, Health Maintenance Organizations and Federal
Law: Toward a Theory of Limited Reformmongering, 29 VNE. L. REv. 1163,
1218 (1976).
130
131

134 Some of this uncertainty may be removed through one of the 1976 amendments to the HMO act, 42 U.S.C. § 300e-10(c) (1976), which requires the Sec-

retary of Health, Education and Welfare to prepare a list of those state laws, regulations, and practices that appear to be inconsistent with the federal act.
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organization's services. 13 5 This requirement might act as a barrier
to the establishment of profit-seeking HMOs, although, because the
act does not specify how the members of the policymaking body
are to be selected, it would appear relatively easy to comply with
this provision without sacrificing the for-profit form.
d. State HMO Legislation
The federal HMO legislation apparently does not pre-empt all
state legislation affecting HMOs. 136 Rather, the federal act simply
defines particular types of HMOs that qualify for special benefitssuch as federal grants and loans, mandatory inclusion in the health
benefit options that employers offer to their employees, etc.-and
then explicitly pre-empts certain enumerated types of state laws
only to the extent that such laws restrict the formation and operation of HMOs meeting the federal standards. 8 7 As a consequence,
the passage of the federal act has been paralleled by the recent
enactment of HMO enabling acts in most states. 138 These state
statutes are generally more permissive than the federal act, in that
they authorize the formation of HMOs that do not meet the restrictive federal standards concerning types of services offered, permissible fee structures, and enrollment policies. 3 9
Most of the state enabling acts, like the federal HMO statute,
provide for the formation of for-profit as well as nonprofit HMOs.' 4
Moreover, most of the state statutes, unlike the federal act, do not
41
require consumer representation in the HMO governing body.'
As a consequence, the traditional restrictions on organizing health
care for profit have now been effectively eliminated in a large number of states. This trend has not been universal, however; at least
three states have passed HMO enabling acts that provide only for
142
the formation of nonprofit HMOs.
"3542 U.S.C. §300e(c)(6) (1976 & Supp. II 19173).

136 See Kissam & Johnson, State HMO Laws and the Theory of Limited Reformmongering, 25 U. KA&s. L. REv. 21, 29-30, 49-50 (1976).
13742 U.S.C. § 300e-10 (1976).
13 8 See Kissam & Johnson, supra note 136, at 21.
139 For a survey of the requirements established by the state statutes, see id.
36-56.
140 Id.

35-36.

141 Id. 49.
2
14 MIN. STAT. ANN. § 620.02(4) (West Supp. 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
40, § 1554(a) (Purdon Supp. 1980); S.D. CoDnFmD LAws ANN. § 58-41-2 (1978).

For-profit HMOs might, however, be able to organize under the insurance laws
of these states. See Kissam & Johnson, supra note 136, at 39.
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2. Legal Services
The constraints on the organizational forms that may be utilized
in the practice of law have paralleled those traditionally applied to
the practice of medicine. In law, however, as opposed to medicine,
those traditional constraints remain largely intact.
The corporate practice rule has been applied to lawyers, much
as it has been applied to doctors, to prohibit them from serving as
143
employees of corporations that sell legal services to the public.
The principal restraints on the organization of legal services have
not come, however, from either common law or statutory law.
Rather, they have been effected through the codes of ethics promulgated within the profession itself.
Why have doctors turned to the courts and to the legislatures
for regulation of their forms of practice, while lawyers have been
content to rely on their ethical codes? The reason is perhaps that
lawyers, in contrast to other professionals, have been uniformly
successful in giving their ethical codes the force of law. The
American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility 44
has been adopted in every state (sometimes with modifications) as
a statement of rules governing the practice of law. 145 Typically,
such adoption has been accomplished by means of pronouncement
of the highest court in the state, in the exercise of its authority to
supervise the conduct of attorneys. 46 Lawyers acting in violation
47
of the Code are subject to discipline or disbarment.
The current Code of Professional Responsibility, like its predecessor the Canon of Ethics, clearly proscribes any arrangement,
143 E.g., In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 91 N.E. 15, 120 N.Y.S.
1120 (1910). See Wormser, Corporations and the Practice of Law, 5 FowRHAm
L. REv. 207 (1936).

144ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSmILITY

(1977) [hereinafter cited as

ABA CODE].
145 A. KAmFMAN, PNoBLEMs 11 PRorEssioNAL RESPONSmLTY 29 (1976). The
current Code was adopted in 1969. The ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics,
which preceded the Code, had similar authority in many, though not all, states. Id.
146 See, e.g., PA. B. oF DiscI'uNARY
(Purdon Supp. 1980).

ENFORCEmENT

§ 103 (West Pa. R. Ct.)

147 See, e.g., PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILITY, preamble and preliminary statement (West Pa. R. Ct.) (Purdon Supp. 1980). In contrast, the
licensing and supervision of doctors is typically the responsibility of legislatively
created state boards, and the statutes creating these boards do not always include
violation of the state medical society's code of ethics as grounds for discipline.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Medical Practice Act of 1974, § 15, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
§ 421.15 (Purdon Supp. 1980).

544

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 129:497

other than a conventional law firm partnership or professional service corporation, whereby a lawyer serves as an employee of an
organization that sells legal services to the public on a profit-seeking
basis. 148 Yet the Code does explicitly permit lawyers to serve as
employees in a legal aid office "[o]perated or sponsored by a bona
fide nonprofit community organization." 149
These restrictions have evidently been effective in assuring
that any organization that provides legal services to the public, and
that is not controlled entirely by lawyers, is operated on a nonprofit basis. 150 Moreover, in law, as opposed to medicine, there has
to date been little debate about the wisdom of such restrictions.
Although there has been considerable discussion about, and even
experimentation with, prepaid group practice legal service plans
that parallel the HMO concept in medicine, it seems almost universally to be taken for granted that such plans will not be, and
ought not to be, operated by profit-seeking entrepreneurs. 151
1
48 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs No. 35; ABA CODE, supra note
144, D.R. 2-103(D). A recently proposed replacement for the Code takes a
somewhat less restrictive approach to lawyer ownership or management of law
firms, though it continues to reflect distrust of such arrangements. ABA MODEL R.
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 7.5 (Discussion Draft), reprinted in 48 U.S.L.W. 1,
27 (1980).

149ABA CODE, supra note 144, D.R. 2-103(D)(1)(b).
150Pfennigstorf & Kimball, Legal Service Plans: A Typology, 1976 A..
B.
J. 411, which surveys existing legal service plans, reports
no such plans organized as business corporations with salaried attorneys. Although
some insurance companies sell legal insurance, these companies simply provide
reimbursement for client-selected attorneys; none of them has tried instead to
provide direct service through attorneys employed by the company itself. Id. 488.
FOUNDATION REsEaRCH,

151 This issue has apparently never been raised in the course of the five annual
conferences on prepaid legal services sponsored by the American Bar Association
in the early 1970s. AMEaucAN BAR AsSOcIATION, TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEE IN S OF
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES (1971-75).
The topic
does receive brief consideration in B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF
MODERATE MEANS (1970), a study sponsored by the American Bar Foundation
and prepared for the American Bar Association Special Committee on Availability
of Legal Services. This study concludes, without much serious discussion, that
proprietary plans employing salaried attorneys "offer far too great a threat to the
professional independence of the lawyer in relation to whatever modest social
value they may have," Id. 280. But see Pfennigstorf & Kimball, Regulation of
Legal Service Plans, 1977 Am. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 357, 413-18, which
offers a more extensive and open minded discussion of the issues.
The four Supreme Court decisions establishing a constitutional right to make
collective arrangements for securing legal services, United Transportation Union v.
State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576 (1971); United Mine Workers District 12 v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963), all involved nonprofit organizations, and do not obviously extend to forprofit legal service plans.
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S. Nursing Care
At present, nursing homes can generally be organized freely on
a for-profit as well as a nonprofit basis. As of 1970, roughly eighty
percent of the nation's nursing homes were proprietary, about fifteen
percent were nonprofit, and the rest were governmental. 152 The
widespread abuses that seem to characterize that industry, 153 however, have sometimes been thought to be associated primarily with
its proprietary elements,15 4 and this has led to several recent proposals for the elimination of the profit motive from the industry. 55
Most prominent among these has been the 1975 report of New
York's Stein Commission, which called for an immediate moratorium
on the licensing of new proprietary nursing homes, together with
the adoption of measures "designed to gradually phase out proprietary nursing facilities in New York and to substitute voluntary,
nonprofit institutions as the mainstay of this industry." 16
4. Education
Like nursing homes, educational institutions generally are not
prohibited from being organized and operated on a proprietary
basis, whether at the primary, secondary, or higher level.'5 7 Accrediting organizations, however, commonly require that an insti152Hearings on Trends in Long Term Care Before the Subcom, on LongTerm Care of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
at 13 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Senate Long Term Care Hearings].
153

See generally M. MENDELSON, TENDrr LovmNGREED (1974).

'54 See Regan, Quality Assurance Systems in Nursing Homes, 53 J.Una. L.
153, 210-14 (1975); Shulman & Galanter, Reorganizing the Nursing Home Industry: A Proposal, 54 MILBANK MEmORIL. FUND Q. 129 (1976). But see M.
MENDEL.sON, supra note 153, at 195-212.

165
See

TSmPoRARI

STATE Coame'

ON LIVING COSTS

AND

THE

ECONOmy,

RELraTED FACIITIES IN NEw YORK
REPORT ON NURSING HoMEs AND HEA
STATE (1975) [hereinafter cited as TEmPoRARY STATE Comr'N REPORT]; Regan,
supra note 154, at 213; Shulman & Calanter, supra note 154; Senate Long Term
Care Hearings, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., supra note 152, pt. 11, at 905-06 (1971).
Presumably as a result of this association between financial abuse and proprietary motivation, one state has statutorily barred proprietary operators from the
particularly susceptible and risky form of nursing home care known as life care.
MICm. Comrp. LAws ANN. §554.805(5) (Supp. 1979). See Comment, Continuing-Care Communities for the Elderly: Potential Pitfalls and Proposed Regulation,
128 U. PA. L. REsv. 883, 918-19, 919 n.183 (1980).

isa TEsmpoany STATE CO.Ni'N REPORT, supra note 155, at 13.
' 5 7 Koerner, The Case of Marjorie Webster, PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1970,
at 40, 43-50.
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tution be nonprofit before it can be accredited, 158 and lack of ac159
creditation can be a substantial handicap.
The authority of accrediting organizations to refuse to accredit
a college solely on the grounds that it is proprietary was recently
attacked in federal court by Marjorie Webster Junior College, a
small two-year college for women in Washington, D.C. that is
organized as a closely held business corporation. Middle States
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., the regional
accrediting association responsible for accrediting schools in the
District of Columbia, had repeatedly refused even to consider
Marjorie Webster for accreditation. 160 The college therefore
brought suit against the Association, arguing, first, that the Association's action constituted a conspiracy in restraint of trade in
violation of the antitrust law, and second, that the Association's
activities were sufficiently governmental in character to subject it
to constitutional requirements of due process, and that the Association's refusal to consider the College for accreditation strictly
158
Thus, accreditation of colleges offering programs of general instruction is
presently in the hands of six regional associations whose nonoverlapping jurisdictions cover the entire country and its outlying possessions. Id. 41-43. These
associations are organized on a nonprofit basis and are controlled by their membership, which consists of the schools they have accredited. The six regional associations in turn have affiliated to form a national organization, the Federation of
Regional Accrediting Commissions of Higher Education (FRACHE), which, inter
alia, sets general policy on eligibility for accreditation. See generally id.; Comment, The Legal Status of the Educational Accrediting Agency: Problems in Judicial Supervision and Governmental Regulation, 52 CoRNrEa. L. REv. 104-06 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Cornell Comment]. See also Marjorie Webster Junior College,
Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 302 F. Supp.
459 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965
(1970).
The accrediting associations generally require that a college be nonprofit before
it can even be considered for accreditation. This policy is reflected in the standards
of eligibility established by FRACHE, which include the requirement that "[t]he
institution . . . be a nonprofit organization with a governing board representing
the public interest." 302 F. Supp. at 461-62.
159 Failure to receive accreditation from the appropriate regional association
need not be fatal to a college; under state law it may still have the authority to
grant degrees. See id. 460 (college chartered and authorized to grant degrees in
spite of lack of regional accreditation); Cornell Comment, supra note 158, at 118.
Lack of accreditation does, however, make it more difficult for the college's students to gain acceptance for their credits at other institutions to which they may
wish to transfer, undoubtedly lowers the status of the school in the eyes of potential
applicants and those who advise them, and may disqualify the college and its
students from participating in certain federal aid programs, such as National Defense Student Loans and the College Work-Study Program. 302 F. Supp. at 468,
478.
16OThe history of Marjorie Webster Junior College and its dealings with
Middle States is recounted in Koerner, supra note 157. Although the Association
had consistently refused to consider proprietary colleges for accreditation, it has
not been similarly restrictive in its accreditation of secondary schools and has in
fact accredited three proprietary secondary schools. 302 F. Supp. at 477.
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because of its proprietary character was sufficiently arbitrary, discriminatory, and unreasonable to constitute a denial of due
process.

161

The District Court ruled in favor of Marjorie Webster on
both counts, and ordered the Association to evaluate the college for
accreditation and to accredit it if it qualified under the Association's
criteria aside from the requirement that a school be nonprofit. 162
This decision was reversed on appeal, however, by the District of
Columbia Circuit. 16 3
Thus, in the area of higher education, the law has given its
blessing to a system that, though not as exclusive of proprietary
organizations as the legal and medical professions have traditionally
been, still places such organizations at a substantial disadvantage.
B. A Rationale for the Restrictions
The restrictions on for-profit activity just surveyed, and various
other similar restrictions that exist or have been proposed, 6 are
somewhat easier to rationalize than are the restrictions on nonprofit
activity that were the subject of section II. As noted in section I,
there may be certain goods and services that are so difficult for
consumers to evaluate accurately-even when purchased directly
from the provider for the consumer's own consumption-that consumers will generally be better off if they deal only with nonprofit
providers. 16 5 Yet some consumers, perhaps precisely because of the
difficulty they experience in evaluating the services in question,
might nevertheless be induced to patronize for-profit providers if
161

162

Id. 462.
Id. 471.

With
103432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
respect to the antitrust claim, the court of appeals held that the process of accreditation, "absent an intent or purpose to affect the commercial aspects of the profession"-which the court evidently thought absent here--did not fall within the scope
of the Sherman Act. Id. 654 (footnote omitted). As for the due process claim,
although the court was willing to assume, without deciding, that the Association's
activities constituted state action, and therefore were subject to the limitations of
the fifth amendment, the court ruled that, particularly in light of its conclusion
that accreditation was not absolutely essential to Marjorie Webster's continued
operation, see id. 656 n.32, Middle States's refusal to consider the College solely
on the basis of its proprietary character was not so clearly unreasonable as to
violate the constitutional standard. Id. 658-59.
164 See, e.g., Jencks, Should News Be Sold for Profit?, Womcusc PAI'zs roR A
NEw SociET, July/Aug. 1979, at 12 (suggesting that newspapers be required to
organize on a nonprofit basis).
165 For further discussion, see Hausmann, supra note 2, at 862-72.
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given the opportunity. Consequently, some might argue that forprofit firms should be excluded from some areas, thus eliminating
the possibility that consumers might make unwise choices.
Logic of this sort has been offered to justify the restrictions on
proprietary organizations that are found in each of the areas just
surveyed. For example, in defense of the existing restrictions on
proprietary law firms, it has been argued that
[t]here is no real community of interest between [an]
agency seeking to sell legal services and the prospective
recipients; there is considerable prospect that the agency's
interest in making a profit may conflict with the interests
of individual clients, if only to the extent that costs and
profits may curtail the amount of time a lawyer spends on
a particular client's problem or may encourage the professionally unwarranted substitution of 'ready-made' solutions for individual service ....
16
Similarly, in the Marjorie Webster case, the court of appeals concluded that "the desire for personal profit might influence educational goals in subtle ways difficult to detect but destructive, in the
long run, of that atmosphere of academic inquiry that, perhaps
even more than any quantitative measure of educational quality,
appellant's standards for accreditation seek to foster." 167
Such restrictions on the range of choice offered to consumers
need not reflect a patronizing attitude toward the capacity of consumers to look out for themselves. It might be perfectly reasonable
to delegate to a legislature, or to an accrediting organization, the
task of determining whether in a particular area contract failure is
likely to be so severe that virtually no wise consumer, if fully informed of the potential problems, would choose to patronize a forprofit firm. In such situations, there might be considerable economies in delegating choice to a collective body, rather than forcing
each consumer to gather and evaluate information concerning this
choice on his or her own, only to come to the same conclusion.
C. Some Objections
There are, however, some serious considerations that weigh
against such restrictions.
166

B. CmusT ,EN,

167 432 F.2d at 657.

supra note 151, at 280.
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1. Are Nonprofits Really Better?
To begin with, one must ask, for each service involved, whether
nonprofits can in fact generally be relied on to provide consumers
with significantly and consistently better service than their for-profit
counterparts. The answer might be expected to vary from one service to the next, depending on such considerations as the degree of
contract failure involved, the extent of the countervailing inefficiencies (such as cross-subsidization and poor incentives for cost
minimization) that accompany the nonprofit form, the vigilance
with which the authorities can and do enforce the nondistribution
constraint, and the extent to which informal normative constraintssuch as professional ethics and the involvement of religious institutions-have developed to reinforce the probity of the nonprofit
firms. For example, even the harshest critics of the nursing home
industry have not universally been of the opinion that nonprofit
homes as a class are clearly superior to proprietary homes; many
proprietary homes provide outstanding service, and many of the
worst offenders are incorporated as nonprofits. 16 s
Moreover, forcing an industry to be organized exclusively on a
nonprofit basis may create particularly strong incentives to evade
the nondistribution constraint. If a profit-seeking entrepreneur
should see an opportunity to make a large return in such an industry-perhaps because supply of the service is not keeping pace with
demand owing either to lack of capital or lack of entrepreneurial
initiative among the existing nonprofit providers-he or she could
seek to exploit that opportunity only through the nonprofit form.
Thus, the amount of policing required to maintain a given level of
fiduciary integrity among nonprofits in a given sector may increase
substantially as for-profit firms are forced out of it.
2. Inadequate Supply of Capital
Forcing an industry exclusively into the nonprofit form necessarily deprives that industry of access to equity capital. As a consequence, the sector is likely to be hampered in its ability to attract
needed capital, and may frequently be unable to expand sufficiently
quickly to keep pace with growth or shifts in demand. Thus, a
prohibition against proprietary firms, particularly in a rapidly growing area such as nursing care or prepaid group medical practice,
might well cripple the development of the industry unless public
168 See M.

MmNELsoN, supra note 153, at 195-212.

550

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 129:497

programs are established to assure an adequate supply of capital.
Such programs might involve direct governmental grants or loans,
or alternatively could provide subsidies or guarantees for private
loans. 1 9 Whichever of these mechanisms is chosen, a governmental
agency will be required to undertake the function otherwise served
by the market in allocating capital. The direct costs of administering such a program, as well as the efficiency losses that result from
any misallocation of capital to which it leads, must therefore be
given serious consideration before outlawing for-profit firms.170
3. Protection of Special Interests
Another serious problem with limitations on proprietary firms
is that often they seem designed not to protect the interests of consumers, but rather to protect the interests of the professionals who
derive their living from the service in question.
To some degree this appears to be the case in both medicine
and law. Until recently, both professions have consisted almost
exclusively of licensed professionals who practice either alone or in
small partnerships and who operate on a fee-for-service basis. The
advent of incorporated enterprise in these fields, financed and perhaps controlled by investors from outside the profession, threatens
the welfare of the existing practitioners in several respects.
First, this new form of organization could prove more efficient
than the existing arrangements, thus driving down the price that
can be charged for a given quality of service, and reducing the
return to those practitioners already committed to the existing
arrangements.
Second, if, as tends to be the case when nonprofessionals are
barred from any degree of control, only licensed professionals are
169 As one example, the Health Maintenance Organizations Act of 1973 makes
provision for grants, contracts, loans, and loan guarantees for the benefit of nonprofit HMOs to cover start-up costs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e-2 to 300e-8 (1976 &
Supp. II 1978). Actual appropriations and disbursements under the Act, however,
have been far too small to support the formation of any substantial number of
new nonprofit HMOs. See Starr, supra note 131, at 75.
170 The federal government has devised a series of programs seeking to improve the allocation of capital to nonprofit hospitals, beginning with the Hill-Burton
program of capital grants that was established in 1946. A survey of these efforts,
which have culminated in the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.), appears in the Senate Report on the latter act, S. REp. No.
1285, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-66, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEWs
7842, 7842-7905. An econometric study of hospital capital allocation, including
an effort to judge the effectiveness of Hill-Burton grants in correcting misallocations, is offered by P. Ginsburg, Capital in Non-Profit Hospitals (Dec. 1970) (unpublished doctoral thesis submitted to Harvard University).
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in a position to invest equity capital in the provision of services (as
they can in medicine and law through solo practice, partnerships,
and professional corporations), 171 then they can capture all of the
returns from capital for themselves. And if, as is likely, this means
that professional services in some areas are characterized by a shortage of capital because the professionals involved are unable or unwilling to provide sufficient resources out of their own pockets, then
the capital that they have invested may provide them with monopoly
returns. Admitting investors from outside the profession (by permitting the development of proprietary firms controlled by lay
investors), would therefore be likely to lead to increased overall
levels of invested capital, and could eliminate those monopoly
returns.1 7 2
Third, the development of incorporated enterprise controlled
by laymen could lead to the result that many professionals serve as
salaried employees rather than as managers of their own practice.
To the extent that such an arrangement is more efficient than current practices, existing practitioners accustomed to the conventional
arrangements would be forced to choose between abandoning those
arrangements in favor of the new form, and thus sacrificing aspects
of their practice that they may have come to enjoy such as autonomy,
small scale, and extensive personal dealings with clients, or continuing those arrangements and suffering a loss of business. Similarly, many professionals might fear a loss of prestige for the profession as a whole if many of its members should come to occupy
positions as salaried employees rather than independent practi1 73
tioners.
Similar concerns might help to explain the strong opposition of
accrediting associations-which are controlled by the nonprofit in171

See note 122 supra.
Suppose that the aggregate amount of a given type of professional services
produced, Q, is a function of the number of professionals, L, and the amount of
invested capital, M. Let there be L--L professionals. Suppose that the cost of
capital is r, and that the market demand price for the services is P(Q), ' <0.
Aggregate net income for the professionals will then be I = PQ-rk, which will be
maximized at that level of K for which
dQ
dP
dq
r -P + Q
dx
dQ
dK
If outside investors were permitted to invest freely in the industry, however, they
would, under conditions of competition, presumably invest to the point where
dQ
r = P-,
which represents the social optimum given L-_-, and which involves
dK
a larger amount of capital.
173 See, e.g., B. Cmusm=sEN, supra note 151, at 284-91.
172
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stitutions they have accredited-even to consider accrediting proprietary colleges. In large part, nonprofit colleges are controlled by
their faculties, both directly through representative bodies and
committees and indirectly through the established custom of selecting administrators almost exclusively from among the professoriate.
One would not expect these professionals to be eager to encourage
the development of new forms of organization that would threaten
that control.
Nor need professionals have a direct financial nexus with an
institution for them to have a strong personal stake, and in particular a financial stake, in its nonprofit status. For example, as has
been noted elsewhere, 174 doctors probably benefit considerably from
affiliation with nonprofit hospitals. This may be an important reason why the nonprofit form has continued to predominate in the
hospital sector.
4. Alternative Forms of Regulation
Finally, before prohibiting proprietary activity in any sector, it
is wise to consider whether other forms of regulation might effectively curb abuses and, at the same time, avoid many of the disadvantages of exclusive reliance on nonprofit firms.
One such approach is to legislate minimally acceptable standards of services, enforceable by public inspection. Another is to
create an agency that will evaluate the quality of service provided
by firms and publish its ratings for use by individual consumers;
such an agency could be either private-such as Consumers Union
and the educational accrediting organizations-or public. Of course,
these approaches are likely to be more workable with some types of
services than with others.1'7 5
D. Conclusions
On balance, it is difficult to justify any of the existing or proposed prohibitions on proprietary firms. They make sense only on
a clear showing that proprietary firms are seriously inferior to nonprofit firms in providing a given service, that consumers are quite
likely not to recognize this difference, and that any advantages that
might otherwise be gained by prohibiting proprietary firms will not
174 Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HA1v. L.
REv. 1416 (1980); Hansmann, supra note 2, at 866-68; Pauly & Redisch, The Not-

For-Profit Hospital as a Physicians' Cooperative, 63 Am. ECON. REv. 87 (1973).
116 See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 868-72.
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be outweighed by the constraints on capital investment and the
dominance of professional interests that are likely to accompany
such a prohibition. Absent such a showing, the better policy is
probably to leave consumers free to choose between nonprofit and
for-profit suppliers, and concentrate instead on policies designed to
keep both kinds of firms as responsible as possible and to provide
consumers with reliable information about them.
IV.

REFINING THE NONDISTRIBUTION

CONSTRAINT

The prohibition on distributions of net earnings to controlling
individuals is the essential defining feature of a nonprofit organization. If nonprofits are to fulfill their appropriate role, this constraint must be well defined and well policed. Unfortunately,
current law in this area is often misguided, reflecting the prevailing
confusion concerning the function of the nonprofit form. In some
respects, the nondistribution constraint has been applied too strictly,
and in others far too loosely. As a result, the effectiveness of the
nonprofit corporate form in serving its essential functions has often
been severely impaired. The following discussion focuses on several important areas in which the law in this respect is in particular
need of clarification or reform.
A. OrganizationsFormed to Advance the FinancialInterests
of Their Members
Many nonprofit organizations provide services that directly or
indirectly serve the financial interests of their members. It might at
first appear that such activity is tantamount to profit seeking and
thus necessarily violates the nondistribution constraint. The courts
exhibit considerable confusion on this point; in some states such an
argument has been more or less clearly rejected, while in others it
has been invoked to deny or revoke nonprofit corporate status for
17
various types of organizations. '
1. Some Examples
Trade associations, for example, are obviously formed in large
part for the purpose of making their members' businesses more
profitable. With this in mind, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
176 The commentators, too, have shown confusion on the issue.
N.Y.U. Note, supra note 3, at 768-71.

See, e.g.,
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1929 sustained the refusal of a nonprofit corporate charter to an
association of Chevrolet dealers despite the fact that the existing
statute provided for the incorporation, as nonprofits, of organizations "[f]or the encouragement and protection of trade and commerce." 177 The court reasoned that the statutory language applied
to "associations which are primarily helpful to the trade and commerce of the locality, like civic organizations, rather than to bodies
whose chief aim is to increase the business and profits of those
engaged in a certain limited branch of an industry who might become its members." '1s The Pennsylvania statute was subsequently
amended, in 1933, to permit incorporation as a nonprofit for "any
purpose or purposes which are lawful and not injurious to the
community," 179 while defining a nonprofit corporation as one established "for a purpose or purposes not involving pecuniary profit,
incidental or otherwise, to its members." 180 Again, the courts
found that associations of businesspersons with a common trade did
not fall within the statutory language. Thus, an association of
businesspersons owning automatic phonograph machines was denied
nonprofit incorporation on the grounds that:
[c]learly, the "improvement of the . . . economic conditions," the "extension of markets," and the promotion of
"the general welfare of the industry and [to] stimulate
public interest in the products of its members," must be
regarded as intended for the pecuniary profit of the members of the association. Further, what is intended in the
"study [of] each other's problems for their mutual welfare
and well-being" or the taking of "action for the betterment
of the members of the corporation and the industry in
general" if not the pecuniary benefit, incidental or otherwise, of the members of the proposed corporation? 181
77
1
1n re Pittsburgh Chevrolet Dealers' Ass'n, 296 Pa. 431, 433, 146 A. 26,
26 (1929).
178 Id. 433, 146 A. at 26.

179

Law of May 5, 1933, art. II, § 201, 1933 Pa. Laws 289 (repealed 1972).

180 Id. art. I, §22(3) (repealed 1972).

181 In re Incorporation of Automatic Phonograph Owners Ass'n, 45 Pa. D. & C.
551, 553 (Phila. County C.P. 1942). Accord, In re Application for Charter of
Fayette & Greene County Beer Distribution Ass'n, 13 Fayette Legal J. 39 (C.P.
1949); In re Fayette Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 1 Fayette Legal J. 21, 32 Pa. D. & C.
165 (C.P. 1938). Interestingly, the Pennsylvania courts did not extend the same
reasoning to labor unions, which were freely granted the right of nonprofit incorporation. See In re Independent Garment Workers' Union of Valley View, 335
Pa. 209, 6 A.2d 775 (1939) (per curiam); In re Elkland Leather Workers' Ass'n,
330 Pa. 78, 198 A. 13 (1938) (per curiam); In re Independent Children's Dress
Workers, 45 Dauphin County Rep. 392 (C.P. 1938).
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This line of cases has never been disapproved, although its
continuing validity is doubtful under Pennsylvania's new nonprofit
corporation statute, which, while retaining the prohibition on purposes "involving pecuniary profit, incidental or otherwise," 182 specifically allows nonprofit incorporation "for any lawful purpose or
purposes, including, but not limited to, ....professional, commercial, industrial, trade, service or business associations." 183
Some states have also denied nonprofit incorporation to various
organizations established to provide services directly to their members, reasoning that the value of such services constitutes profit or
pecuniary gain. In Washington, for example, an organization established by a group of businesses to provide low-cost medical services
to their employees was denied nonprofit status on the grounds that
[p]rofit does not necessarily mean a direct return by way
of dividends, interest, capital account, or salaries. A saving of expense which would otherwise necessarily be incurred is also a profit to the person benefited. If respondent renders to its incorporators or members, or to
businesses in which they are interested and in whose profits
they share, a service at a cost lower than that which would
otherwise be paid for such service, then respondent's
operations result in a profit to its members. 184
In Ohio, this principle has been extended to include not only
services rendered directly to members, but also benefits of a more
general sort that members might enjoy. Thus, the Supreme Court
of Ohio sustained the Secretary of State's refusal to grant a nonprofit
corporate charter to a homeowner's association which devoted funds
to general community planning and development, citing the "clear
purpose to confer both direct and indirect benefits to members of
the corporation." 185

It is, indeed, difficult to find cases that clearly hold to the contrary. In spite of the large number of membership organizations
in virtually every state that are incorporated as nonprofits, and that
provide services that obviously benefit their members, judicial
opinions holding that such benefits to members need stand as no
182 15 PA. CONS. STAT.

183 Id.

ANN. § 102 (Purdon Supp. 1979).

§7311.

184 State ex reL. Troy v. Lumbermen's Clinic, 186 Wash. 384, 394-95, 58 P.2d
812, 816 (1936).
185 State ex rel. Russell v. Sweeney, 153 Ohio St. 66, 72, 91 N.E.2d 13, 16
(1950). But see Snyder v. Chamber of Commerce, 53 Ohio St. 1, 41 N.E. 33
(1895).
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impediment to nonprofit incorporation are rare. What seems to
be the clearest and most forthright decision of this type appears in
a 1922 Delaware case holding that an association of coal shippers
could form a nonprofit corporation for the purpose of taking various
measures to expedite the sorting and shipping of coal at major East
Coast ports."' The court reached this result by concluding, in
essence, that a nonprofit firm is defined simply by adherence to the
nondistribution constraint: "a corporation is for profit when its
purpose is . .

.

to make a profit on the business it does which in

reason belongs to it and which if its affairs are administered in good
faith would be available for dividends." 187 Were the beneficial
services that the corporation rendered to its members tantamount
to a distribution of profits? The court thought not, though its
reasoning here becomes a bit muddled: "Profit furthermore must
be something of a tangible or pecuniary nature. Intangible benefits not capable of measurement in definite terms, though of value
to the recipients, cannot be called profits."

188

It is in areas such as this that one feels most acutely the lack
of any conception of the proper role of the nonprofit corporation.
Not only do none of the cases that deal with the subject at hand
base their holding on some such conception, but in fact they even
fail to ask what is at stake-that is, who would stand to benefit and
who would stand to lose, and how, as a result of a ruling in one
direction or the other.
2. A More Reasoned View
There is no reason why a nonprofit corporation should be forbidden to render services to its members, or for that matter make
such services its sole raison d'tre. But the reason for this is not
that such services are "intangible" or not capable of measurement
in definite terms. Rather, it follows from the nature of the fiduciary
function that nonprofits are designed to perform. As was argued in
section I, the purpose of establishing an organization as a nonprofit
is to assure its patrons that the funds that they pay to it will be
devoted in their entirety to financing the services that the organization claims to provide.18 9 It follows that the nonprofit form is
1886Bead v. Tidewater Coal Exch., Inc.,

904 (1922).
187 Id. 209, 116 A. at 904.
188 Id. 210,
189

116 A. at 904.
See text following note 6 supra.

13 Del. Ch. 195, 209, 116 A. 898,
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abused only when a patron's payments are instead used for some
other purpose, such as the personal enrichment of those who control
the organization (beyond reasonable compensation for services
rendered). The mere fact that the organization is providing services that are of benefit to controlling individuals, such as members,
is not in itself an indication that such abuse is occurring. Rather,
the question is whether such services are being financed in whole or
in part by profits gained from the provision of services paid for by
other patrons. Some examples may help to make this clear.
Consider, first, a trade association whose members are businesses
and businesspersons engaged in a common trade. The purpose of
the organization, as in most such organizations, is to collect and distribute information of common interest to its members, to engage
in collective advertising to promote their common product, to lobby
for legislation favorable to the trade, and so forth. All of these
activities are public goods so far as members of the trade are concerned, and therefore, for the reasons suggested in section I, the
nonprofit form is well suited to their needs. That is, because it is
not easy for a member to see accurately the increment in the organization's services that is financed with the member's individual
contribution, the member needs to rely on the nonprofit form to
assure that all contributions will be devoted to the services that the
organization was formed to provide. The fact that the organization's patrons are all members and thus exercise some control over
it-that is, that the organization is a mutual nonprofit rather than
an entrepreneurial nonprofit-is presumably simply a response to
such considerations as (1) that the entrepreneurial activity necessary
to establish such an organization is likely to come only from among
members of the industry; (2) that this form gives the organization's
patrons even more assurance that their contributions are being used
exclusively for their benefit; and (3) that the patrons are relatively
easy to organize, being established businesses with an ongoing interest in the affairs of the trade association and with both the means
and the opportunity to communicate with each other relatively
easily. 110
In such a case, it is absurd to prohibit the association from
using the nonprofit corporate form on the ground that it provides
services to its members. The whole point of using the nonprofit
form in such a situation is precisely to assure its patrons that they
will receive the highest quality services possible in return for their
contributions to the organization. Denying them the use of the
190 See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 890-91.
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nonprofit form would simply handicap them in their endeavor,
with no gain whatsoever to anyone else. No one is being abused
or deceived. Rather, the purpose of the nonprofit form in such a
case is precisely to prevent any opportunity for abuse or deceit. 91
Nor does this conclusion depend on the fact that the trade association is providing its members services in the form of public goods
that improve the conditions for profitability in the trade as a wholethat is, providing only "indirect" benefits. For example, take the
case of a nonprofit day care center controlled by the parents who
purchase its services for their children-a commercial mutual nonprofit. The services that such an organization provides are private
consumption goods for the members. The nonprofit form is presumably used here, as elsewhere, in large part because it assures the
parents that there is nobody who, by virtue of their ownership interest in the organization, has an incentive to minimize the quality
of care in order to increase the organization's profitability. And
the mutual rather than the entrepreneurial form for the nonprofit
has presumably been chosen, in part, to provide the parents with
even further assurance in this regard by giving them the authority
to exercise ultimate control over the organization. 1 92 Again, as in
191 Labor unions and business leagues, if organized as nonprofits, are exempt

from federal income taxation.

I.R.C. §501(c)(5), (6).

In Bittker & Rahdert,

The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85
YALnr L.J. 299, 353-57 (1976), it is suggested that this in inappropriate, because
such organizations do not adhere to the statutory provisions requiring, as a condi-

tion of exemption, that the net earnings of an organization not inure to the benefit
of private persons such as members.

Bittker and Rahdert's reasoning follows the

same lines sketched above: because the purpose of such organizations is to assist

their members in increasing the profitability of their income-producing activities,
the income of these organizations is clearly being used in ways that inure to the

benefit of their members.
A more consistent and appropriate view of the non-inurement rule of section
501(c), and the view that has generally been taken by the Internal Revenue
Service, see text accompanying notes 330-44 infra, is to consider that rule as
roughly equivalent to the nondistribution constraint as interpreted in this Article.
Thus, labor unions and business leagues should not be denied exemption on the
grounds that they are really profit-seeking ventures in violation of the non-inurement rule, just as their activities should not generally be considered in violation
of the nondistribution constraint. There might, however, be other reasons for

denying tax exemption to organizations of this type: for example, their benefits

might not flow to a sufficiently large segment of the public (which may be the

thought that actually motivates Bittker and Rahdert's objections), or, because their
close relationship with their membership gives them a ready source of capital, they
might not suffer from the capital constraints that appear to offer the strongest

justification for corporate income tax exemption for nonprofits.

See Exempted

Nonprofit Organizations,supra note 93.
192 In many cases, patron control over an organization is itself sufficient to
protect the patron's essential interests, and the additional fiduciary constraints of the
nonprofit form are therefore unnecessary. In such cases, the cooperative form may
be just as convenient and somewhat more flexible than the nonprofit form. See
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the preceding example of the trade association, the use of the nonprofit form serves to abuse or deceive no one. On the contrary,
refusing to permit such organizations to incorporate as nonprofits
would simply increase the chances that somebody-in particular,
the patrons of the organization-would be exploited.
On the other hand, there are certainly circumstances in which
the provision of services that benefit controlling individuals could
constitute a violation of the nondistribution constraint, and therefore subvert the nonprofit form. An obvious example would be the
case of a director of a nonprofit nursing home who used a substantial fraction of the organization's income to provide himself or herself with extensive personal services such as luxurious free housing,
travel, automobiles, club memberships, and so forth, in addition to
an already perfectly adequate salary. Nor need the illicit services
be something other than the services that the organization was
formed to provide. Our nursing home operator, for instance, would
presumably be just as much in violation of the nondistribution constraint if, instead of using the organization's income to obtain such
unrelated services as personal travel, he or she used it to provide
expensive free care at the home for some aging members of his or
her family, again in addition to an already adequate salary.
Much the same result can arise when the services are provided
to members rather than to officers or directors. For example, suppose that a membership-controlled health maintenance organization were to allow nonmember patrons to use its services, and that
admission to membership were not a matter of right for all of the
organization's patrons but rather required the acquiesence of the
existing members. Suppose further that the organization were to
either (I) charge lower fees for members than for nonmembers for
the same services, or (2) charge both members and nonmembers the
same annual fee, but arrange for superior service for those patrons
who are also members. In such a case, the organization would
effectively be providing services to nonmembers at a price in excess
of cost, and using the profit thus obtained to subsidize services for
members. As in the preceding example, such behavior would,
except in unusual circumstances to be discussed below, constitute
a violation of the nondistribution constraint, and there would be
Hansmann, supra note 2, at 891-94; text accompanying notes 267-318 infra. But
formal control is not always equivalent to actual control, as many shareholders in
business corporations are aware, and therefore the additional constraints of the
nonprofit form may be of significance to the organization's patrons. This is most
obviously true for donative mutual nonprofits, such as the National Audubon Society, but it might also be true for some organizations, such as a day care center,
of an essentially commercial character.
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good reason to refuse nonprofit status to such an organization. For
in such circumstances the organization would be failing to fulfill
its fiduciary role, which is to assure all of its patrons that the payments they make are being used exclusively to provide them with
health services, and in particular that those who control the organization have no incentive to provide services that are worth less
than the amount the patron pays for them.
The essence of the problem, therefore, lies not in providing
services that are of value to officers, directors, or members, but
rather in financing such services out of profits derived from payments made by other patrons, without the knowledge and consent
of those patrons. The latter qualification concerning knowledge
and consent is, however, important. For example, an individual
who is kindly disposed to the labor movement might make a contribution to a local union that has gone on strike, even though that
individual is not a member of the union, and will receive none of
the strike benefits that the union will provide to its members with
the aid of the contribution. Yet, in this context, although services
are being financed for members by means of payments received from
nonmember patrons, there is no corruption of the nonprofit form
involved. It is precisely the intent of the nonmember contributor
in this case to provide services for the members. And the nonprofit
form serves the salutary purpose of assuring the contributor that
all of his or her contribution will be devoted to providing the intended services. 193
A more difficult case is presented by organizations that derive
profits from serving one class of patrons in order to subsidize another class of patrons, but in which neither class of patrons exercises any control over the organization. Such cross-subsidization is
evidently fairly common, for example, in nonprofit hospitals, in
which profits derived from services provided to private-room patients and to patients with relatively routine problems may be used
193A related example is provided by United Way.

That organization, which

solicits donations from the public on behalf of a large number of charitable organizations, is controlled by the organizations to which it distributes the funds it

collects. In formal terms, United Way clearly violates the nondistribution constraint, for it distributes virtually all of its net earnings (that is, income in excess
of its operating costs) to those who control it. If we are to consider United Way

as being legitimately organized and operated as a nonprofit-which appears, on
balance, to be a reasonable result-then it must be because we are willing to deviate
from a literal application of the nondistribution constraint in situations in which
(1) the controlling persons are themselves nonprofit corporations that adhere
closely to the nondistribution constraint, and (2) the individuals who contribute
to the organization are fully aware of the ultimate use being made of their donations.
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to help cover the costs of teaching, research, unusually expensive
10 4
forms of treatment, and services provided to indigent patients.
Yet most hospitals are entrepreneurial nonprofits in which none of
the patients exercise any formal control. Is such cross-subsidization
therefore inconsistent with the fiduciary role that the nonprofit
form is designed to serve?
That the patrons who benefit from cross-subsidization also do
not exercise control obviously makes it less troublesome than it
would otherwise be. For in this situation, at least, the patrons as
a whole are not being exploited. Moreover, because those who
control the organization do not benefit directly from such crosssubsidization, they have less incentive to push the cross-subsidization to such an extreme that the patrons who are the source
of the subsidy are actually being badly abused. For example, in
the case of hospital care, it appears likely that the profits that are
the source of the subsidies are derived not from cutting the quality
of care provided to a class of patients while still charging them the
full price, but rather from simply charging a higher price than is
required to cover the cost of the (generally quite adequate) services
provided to those patients.
Those who control a nonprofit might, to be sure, still receive
considerable indirect benefits from such cross-subsidization. For
example, doctors, who exercise substantial formal or informal control over hospital goverance, may benefit in several ways from crosssubsidization among classes of patients. For instance, by taxing one
class of patients whose demand is fairly inelastic to subsidize treatment for another class of patients whose demand is more elastic
(perhaps because of poverty or because the services involved are quite
costly in comparison to the benefits derived from them), doctors
might manage to increase the overall effective demand for their
services, and thus increase their incomes. Or, alternatively, doctors
may choose to tax certain classes of patients in order to subsidize
services that have more personal appeal to the doctors, such as research or treatment of exotic or difficult cases. Similar concerns
might affect hospital administrators. For example, the prestige associated with a hospital administrator's job may increase if his or her
hospital has an open heart surgery unit, and this in turn might lead
the administrator to place a surcharge on the more lucrative types of
treatment in order to subsidize such a unit, which otherwise might
not be able to support itself.
'94 See Clark, supra note 63, at 1468-69, 1480; Harris, Pricing Rules for Hospitals, 10 BELL J. ECON. 224 (1979).

562

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 129:497

On the other hand, cross-subsidization may serve legitimate
purposes as well. For example, it has been argued that cross-subsidization within nonprofit hospitals can be, and perhaps is, used to
compensate for distortions and inequities in existing health insurance coverage. 195
Whatever the motivation of those who control the organization
involved, such cross-subsidization is arguably more consistent with
the fiduciary responsibilities of nonprofits if the patrons who are
the source of the subsidy are aware of its existence and have some
choice about contributing to it. For example, such choice would
exist if the patrons were aware of alternative sources of the same
service that did not levy a surcharge on it. Of course, in the case of
hospitals, patients probably exercise little effective choice. This is
because (1) they commonly delegate this decision to their doctor,
(2) third-party payment schemes eliminate most of the incentive
for comparative shopping based on price, and (3) as discussed
above, 196 only proprietary hospitals are likely to offer patients the
possibility of avoiding cross-subsidization, yet, perhaps in part because of legal constraints, they are relatively scarce in many areas.
In the absence of knowledge or effective choice on the part of
patrons, those who control a nonprofit should bear the burden of
demonstrating that a cross-subsidization scheme is in the overall
best interests of patrons as a class, and, in particular, that it has not
been undertaken primarily with the object of serving the self-interest
of controlling persons. Absent such a showing, cross-subsidization
can appropriately be considered inconsistent with the fiduciary obligations of the nonprofit form and therefore enjoinable as a violation of the nondistribution constraint. Whether the cross-subsidization currently undertaken by nonprofit hospitals can pass this test
remains open to dispute. 197
195 See Harris, supra note 194.
196 See text accompanying notes 118-42 supra.

197 Professor Clark, after arguing that cross-subsidization in nonprofit hospitals
is a serious abuse, proposes that every payor for a nonprofit hospital's services be
given standing to seek an injunction against provision of services by that hospital
below marginal cost. Clark, supra note 63, at 1481-83. Professor Clark evidently

does not, however, see this proposed cause of action as being founded on the
obligations imposed on hospitals by the nondistribution constraint currently embodied in the nonprofit corporation law, though the thrust of his article as a

whole suggests strongly that he feels that such cross-subsidization is inconsistent
with whatever fiduciary obligations hospitals may have toward their patients by

virtue of their nonprofit form. Rather, Professor Clark appears to propose that his
suggested cause of action be expressly created by legislative enactment. If we
take the view, suggested in this Article, that cross-subsidization can constitute a
violation of the nondistribution constraint, and combine it with the liberalized view
of patron standing suggested in the text accompanying notes 345-83 infra, we can
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Museum gift shops provide another interesting example in this
connection. Such shops are commonly operated at a profit, and the
returns thus obtained are used to help finance the museum's regular
exhibits. In this context, the cross-subsidy is from those who
patronize the gift shop to those who view the exhibits. Again,
neither class of patrons exercises any appreciable control over the
organization. Yet a strong argument exists that there is nothing
improper about operating such a profit-making gift shop within the
museum's nonprofit corporate entity. The reason is that those who
patronize the gift shop undoubtedly know, in general, just what is
going on. Moreover, most of the gift shop patrons are probably
perfectly happy to be subsidizing the museum's exhibits with their
purchases. And finally, there are plenty of other proprietary shops
that sell items that are reasonably close substitutes for the merchandise carried by museum shops, and customers can turn to them
should they not wish to serve as the source of the museum's internal subsidy.
Thus, such gift shops, like the many other nonprofit operations
involving payments from patrons that are part purchase and part
contribution, need not be seen as an abuse of the nonprofit corporation's fiduciary role. On the contrary, that such a shop is operated
by a nonprofit provides some assurance to the customers that any
profit derived from their purchases will be used to help finance the
museum rather than go into somebody's pocket.198
B. Return to Capital
The term "profit" is popularly associated with returns to invested capital. Perhaps for this reason, there has sometimes been
confusion as to whether or when a nonprofit can pay a return
to capital without violating the nondistribution constraint.
There is, in general, no reason why a nonprofit organization
should not be permitted to pay a reasonable return on the capital
achieve something like Professor Clark's proposed remedy without need for legislation (although Professor Clark's proposal would presumably condemn a broader
range of cross-subsidization practices than would the more flexible rule proposed
here).
198 It does not necessarily follow, however, that the advantageous tax treatment
afforded to a nonprofit organization such as a museum should necessarily be extended to its gift shop operation as well. That is a separate question, and to answer it one needs to consider, inter alia, the reasons why special tax treatment is
provided for the museum itself and the consequences that special tax status for the
gift shop will have on competition between it and proprietary shops offering similar wares. Unfortunately, to explore such issues would require a major digression
from the matters that are the central focus of this discussion.
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that it uses, just as it may pay reasonable salaries in return for labor
services and reasonable prices for supplies and equipment. Capital,
like these other factors of production, is necessary to produce the
organization's services, and must be paid for in the absence of
sufficiently generous gifts of capital. The difficulty lies in the need
to ensure that the return paid to capital is no more than is necessary
to obtain it. In theory, this problem is no different from that of
dealing with excessive salaries or prices paid for services and supplies. Yet, in practice, it is often the case that the only way for an
unscrupulous operator of a nonprofit to tap truly substantial profits
out of the organization is through devices involving capital transactions; inflated salaries and self-dealing supply contracts are often
too inflexible and obvious for the purpose. 199 Consequently, restrictions on the permissible returns to capital deserve special
attention.
In considering returns to capital, two considerations are of
particular importance: first, whether the contributor of capital is a
controlling person; and second, whether the rate of return to be
paid is variable.
In general, capital contributions by noncontrolling individuals
present few problems. Such arrangements usually involve a fixed
interest rate, as in the case, for example, of a loan from a commercial bank or a bond issue sold to the public. Also possible are
variable-return arrangements in which the organization sells a security, somewhat analogous to nonvoting preferred stock, that entitles
its holder to a stated maximum interest rate payable only if the
organization's finances permit, and that may or may not provide for
accumulation of missed payments. Both New York and Pennsylvania law now provide explicitly for such financing, which the
statutes refer to as "subventions." 200
The terms of such arrangements presumably need not be carefully regulated, because the managers of a nonprofit have no strong
incentive to agree to an interest rate that exceeds what is necessary
to attract the needed amount of capital. To be sure, because the
managers of a nonprofit have no direct financial stake in the residual
earnings of the enterprise, they may be willing to agree to a more
199 This is not to say, however, that these latter devices cannot occasionally be
terribly lucrative. For some examples of the many ways to loot a nonprofit, through
capital transactions and otherwise, see M. MErnDxnsoN, supra note 153, at 195-212.

See also text accompanying notes 209-66 infra.
200 N.Y. NoT-FoR-PrtoFrr Corn'. LAw § 504 (McKinney 1970); 15 PA. CoNs.
STAT. ANN. § 7542 (Purdon Supp. 1979). Unfortunately, as discussed below, these
states do not limit subventions to noncontrolling persons.
note 208 infra.

See text accompanying
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generous interest rate on borrowed money than necessary, simply to
avoid the personal effort involved in seeking out a better deal. But
this is a problem of managerial incentives that may be endemic to
the nonprofit form, and will affect not just loans, but all of a nonprofit's operations; when one eliminates the profit motive, one must
sacrifice the benefits as well as the evils that accompany it.201
In theory, one could also imagine a nonprofit selling to a noncontrolling person a variable-return security with no interest ceiling
or, what is the same thing, with an interest ceiling so high that the
organization's expected earnings would never be sufficiently large
to reach it. Such an arrangement would essentially involve a pledge
to the securityholders, in return for a contribution of capital, of all
of the organization's future net earnings. The securities would
therefore have the character of nonvoting common stock. Again,
the managers of the corporation would have no incentive to agree
to unfavorable terms for the organization in such a security issue;
thus, presumably they could be trusted to sell such securities only
for the maximum amount that the market would bear.
Yet it is extraordinarily unlikely that such securities would ever
be purchased by rational investors. There would obviously be no
incentive for the managers of a nonprofit to operate the organization
in a manner that would yield any net earnings with which to pay
dividends on such securities, because neither the managers nor the
organization could benefit by doing so. Rather, the managers would
have every incentive to cut prices and raise costs and quality, maximizing the prestige, size, and stability of the organization at the expense of the investors.20 2 Indeed, if such securities were to be
encountered one would naturally be suspicious, particularly about
the possibility that the securityholders in fact have some influence
on the organization's management.
As it is, state law is generally in conformity with these conclusions regarding money loaned to a nonprofit by noncontrolling persons. The corporation statutes commonly give the organization explicit authority to borrow money and to sell bonds, and leave the
See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 877-79.
To be sure, it has been frequently argued, at least since the publication
of A. BE= & G. MEANs, THE MoDERN ComonRwoN AND PRivATE PRoPERTY
(1932), that common shares in many large publicly held business corporations have
the qualities described in this context-namely, a claim to residual earnings, but no
effective participation in control. Yet, as others have noted, the management of
even large corporations continues to be disciplined, at least to some extent, by the
threat that some individual or company will acquire enough of the corporation's
stock on the market to take it over and oust the management if they pay too low
a return on the securities. See, e.g., Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110 (1965).
201

202
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negotiation of the interest rates on these obligations to the discretion of management. 2 3 And, of the two states that expressly authorize subventions, one places no limit on the interest that can be
paid,2 0 4 though the other establishes a ceiling tied to the state's
usury rate. 205
More difficult problems are presented by capital contributions
from controlling persons. A variable-return security without an
interest ceiling is, of course, out of the question in this context; it
would effectively turn the organization into a proprietary firm,
giving the controlling person involved both the means and the
incentive to distribute net earnings to himself. Not surprisingly,
the existing statutes generally proscribe such an arrangement more
or less clearly, at least so far as distributions of current earnings are
concerned,20 6 as opposed to the distributions on dissolution discussed below.2 0

7

The subventions provided for in New York and

Pennsylvania, however, which essentially have the qualities of variable-return securities, are not confined to noncontrolling persons;
indeed, the statutes in both states explicitly provide that such subventions may be held by members of the corporation. 20 8 Because
the New York statute places a low ceiling on the maximum interest
that can be provided for in a subvention, there appears to be no
real chance that in a New York nonprofit corporation the nondistribution constraint will be breached by converting this instrument into the effective equivalent of voting common stock. The
203 E.g., CAL. Coin. CODE § 5140(i) (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. NoT-FoR-Pon'r
Cori.
LAw §§202(a)(9), 506 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1979); MoD L ACT,
supra note 19, § 5(h).
204 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7542 (Purdon Supp. 1979).

205 N.Y. NoT-Fon-INonrr Corp. LAw § 504(d) (McKinney 1970).
As suggested below, such a ceiling might be appropriate given that such subventions are
not limited in New York (or in Pennsylvania) to noncontrolling persons. See text

following note 208 infra.
201 For example, § 26 of the Model Act provides that:

A corporation shall not have or issue shares of stock.

No dividend

shall be paid and no part of the income or profit of a corporation shall be

distributed to its members, directors or officers. A corporation may pay
compensation in a reasonable amount to its members, directors, or officers
for services rendered, may confer benefits upon its members in conformity
with its purposes, and upon dissolution or final liquidation may make
distributions to its members as permitted by this Act, and no such payment,
benefit or distribution shall be deemed to be a dividend or a distribution of
income or profit.
Moner. ACT, supra note 19, § 26. See also N.Y. Nor-Fo-PRo=T Cor'. LAw § 501
(McKinney 1970).
2 07

See text accompanying notes 241-66 infra.
Cor. LAw § 504(a)
STAT. ANN. § 7542(a) (Purdon Supp. 1979).

208 N.Y. Nor-Fon-Paosrr
CoNs.

(McKinney

1970); 15 PA.
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same cannot be said for Pennsylvania, however, which imposes no
limit at all on the maximum rate of return on subventions.
Money contributed to a nonprofit by a controlling person at a
fixed interest rate offers less opportunity for abuse. Once the interest rate has been set, it makes little difference whether the right
to that interest is held by a controlling or a noncontrolling person;
both have the right and the means to see that the stated interest,
but nothing more than the stated interest, is paid. The problem,
obviously, is in setting the interest rate. Because the controlling
person is on both sides of the deal, he has the incentive to use his
control to establish a more generous interest rate than he would
otherwise insist upon as a lender, and thereby tap pure profits from
the corporation.
The issues presented by such self-interested capital transactions
are much the same as those presented by self-dealing transactions in
general, including such transactions as purchases made by a nonprofit from a company in which a controlling person has an interest,
or loans made by a nonprofit to members of a controlling person's
family. In fact, current law generally does not distinguish among
such transactions. Consequently, the following discussion will
focus on problems of self-dealing in general.
C. Self-Dealing and Conflicts of Interest
In the law of business corporations, the modem rule is that a
transaction between a corporation and one of its directors or officers,
or between a corporation and another organization in which one
of its directors or officers has an interest, is neither void nor voidable
if either (1) the conflict of interest is disclosed to the other members
of the board of directors and the transaction is approved by a
majority of the disinterested directors; (2) the conflict of interest is
disclosed to the shareholders and the transaction is approved by a
majority of the disinterested shareholders, or (3) the transaction is
"fair" to the corporation. 20 9 The same standard has now been
adopted in many jurisdictions, either in the statutory or the decisional law, to apply to nonprofit corporations, the only difference
being that in the case of nonprofits, ratification of self-dealing by
shareholders is replaced with ratification by members. 210
209 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1975); ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. ConP.
AcT §41 (1974). See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and
CorporateMorality, 22 Bus. LAW. 35 (1966).
210 E.g., Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974); N.Y. NoT-FoR-Po=r Cons,. LAw
§ 175 (McKinney 1970).
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1. The Differing Needs of Nonprofit and
Business Corporations
Whatever may be the case with respect to business corporations, 21 ' this standard of conduct is too weak for nonprofits. In a
business corporation, the fiduciary obligations imposed on the organization's directors, officers, and controlling shareholders are designed to protect noncontrolling shareholders. In a nonprofit, on
the other hand, the fiduciary obligations imposed on controlling
persons are for the benefit of the organization's patrons-that is, its
donors and customers. And the patrons of a nonprofit are generally
much less able to look out for themselves than are the shareholders
in a business corporation.
To begin with, shareholders have the ability to exercise direct
control over their corporation in general, and over its directors in
particular, through their voting power. Beyond this, they have
available the device of the derivative suit to force corporate managers to account for their malfeasance. And, to make both of these
mechanisms more effective, shareholders also have the benefit of
the extensive disclosure requirements that have been imposed on
business corporations. The patrons of a nonprofit, in contrast,
212
often have no voting power at all. Moreover, as discussed below,
patrons of nonprofits generally lack standing to sue the corporation's
directors and officers for breach of their fiduciary duties; rather,
the authority to bring such suits is given exclusively to state officials, who seldom make much effort to use it. And finally, nonprofits are seldom obliged to disclose substantial information about
their financial affairs, either to patrons or to the state officials nominally responsible for overseeing the organizations.2

13

Indeed, the

Internal Revenue Service has generally been the only effective
mechanism for sanctioning self-dealing by the managers of nonprofits, and even that agency has, at least until recently, made only
limited efforts in this direction, evidently in part because the sanc21 4
tions available to it have not been well suited to the task.
Such weakness in the mechanisms available for policing the
managers of nonprofits, and especially in the mechanisms directly
available to patrons, argues for a stronger, clearer rule of fiduciary
conduct for the managers of nonprofit corporations than for the
2 11

See Marsh, supra note 209, for a suggestion that this standard is too weak
even for business corporations.
2 2
See text accompanying notes 319-84 infra.
213

See text accompanying notes 385-406 infra.
214 See text accompanying notes 330-44 infra.
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managers of business corporations. For if the managers of nonprofits are subject to only minimal oversight, then it is important
that they be held to a rule of conduct that both leaves them with
few opportunities to indulge their self-interest and is easily policed.
2. A Stricter Rule for Nonprofits
An attractive alternative to the currently prevailing doctrine
would be a flat prohibition against all self-dealing transactions involving controlling persons in nonprofit organizations. Such a rule
would simply forbid any transaction between a nonprofit organization and any controlling person, or any other organization in which
such a person has a financial interest, subject only to necessary
exceptions for such things as reasonable salaries and expenses, and
the purchase of services from the organization on the same terms as
are available to all others with whom it deals. 215 This is, in essence,
the rule that is applied in the law of trusts,2 10 including charitable
trusts.217 Lest this be thought too restrictive for organizations that

are more complex in their structure and activities than is a simple
trust, it should be noted that such a flat prohibition on self-dealing
was the universal rule in this country even for business corporations
until the turn of the century,21 and evidently remains the norm for
business corporations under British law. 219 Moreover, under the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, a detailed, clear, and workable set of rules
along these lines has been promulgated by the Internal Revenue
Service and applied to all nonprofits designated as private foundations, 220 a class primarily comprised of those donative nonprofits
215 Rules for transactions between the organization and its members, if any,
would presumably need to be carefully spelled out The principles involved are

discussed in the text accompanying notes 176-98 supra and the text accompanying
notes2 213-56
infra.
:0 Any transaction between the trust and trustee involving trust property,
unless consented to by the beneficiaries, is voidable no matter how reasonable and
fair. See 2 A. ScoTr, ThE LAw oF TRuSTS § 170 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SCOTT oN TirusTs]. This prohibition extends to dealings between
the trust and a third party with whom the trustee has some substantial relationship.
See id. §§ 170.6, 170.10. Cf. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), § 4 04(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1) (1976) (duty of loyalty under
ERISA); id., §406(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §1106(a)(1) (1976) (ERISA prohibitedtransaction
rules).
217
See M. F mso-r-SMrr, FOUNDATIONS AND GovmunNT 136 (1965).
That a charitable trust has no beneficiaries able to ratify an otherwise voidable
transaction necessarily makes this prohibition against self-dealing absolute. See also
note 218
216 supra.
See Marsh, supra note 209, at 36-39.
2
19E. Ivmy, ToPxm_ AND IvAmvr's CoawANY LAw 221 (15th ed. 1974).
22 0
See I.R.C. § 4941; Treas. Reg. § 53.4941 (1973); notes 330-37 infra &
accompanying text.
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that derive the bulk of their income from a small number of (often
controlling) donors. Indeed, under the prompting of regulations
adopted by the IRS, 221 most states have now incorporated into their
nonprofit corporation statutes the same prohibitions against selfdealing for private foundations that appear in the 1969 Act.2

22

All

that remains to be done is to extend these prohibitions to all other
nonprofits as well.
Such a straightforward prohibition of self-dealing could have
an enormously salutary effect. At present, much of the questionable
activity in the nonprofit sector appears to involve fairly overt forms
of self-dealing. An instructive example is provided by a nursing
home facility that was constructed in New York by a proprietary
real estate firm solely owned by a doctor and his wife. The same
couple formed a nonprofit nursing home corporation, establishing
themselves as members of the board and also as its salaried administrators, and arranged for this nonprofit organization to lease the
facility from the couple's real estate company on extremely lucrative
terms.223 This arrangement, not unexpectedly, created precisely
the kind of unfortunate trade-off between profits and patient care
that the nonprofit form is presumably designed to avoid. Although
the rental payments per bed in the home were sixty percent higher
than the maximum rent agreed on for Medicaid reimbursement
purposes by the state health department and the nursing home association, the state health department found dietary expenditures and
24
nursing services to be substantially underbudgeted.
At present, such an arrangement is not clearly illegal. To attack the deal under current New York nonprofit corporation law
would require a suit by the state attorney general 225 seeking to
challenge the lease terms as "unfair" to the corporation. If the
lease had been approved by a majority of the nursing home's "dis221

I.R.C. §508(e) provides that a private foundation shall not be exempt
from taxation unless its governing instrument includes provisions prohibiting the
foundation from engaging in self-dealing as defined in I.R.C. § 4941. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.508-3(d) (1972) provides that this requirement shall be deemed to have been
met if provisions of state law have been enacted which either prohibit such selfdealing directly or treat such restrictions as being contained in the governing instruments of private foundations.
222E.g., N.Y. NoT-FoR-lto=r Coup. LAw §406 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
See H. OLECK, supra note 1, at 632-34.
223
M. MwxrsoN, supra note 153, at 203-07.
224 Id.
22

5 See N.Y. NoT-FoR-PNorr Coup. LAw

1979).

§ 112 (McKinney 1970 & Supp.

Generally, private persons have no standing to sue a nonprofit corporation.

See note 340 infra & accompanying text.
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interested" directors,2'2 8 the courts would place the burden of prov-

ing unfairness on the state. 22 7 And given the deference which the
courts accord the "business judgment" of the directors, 22 8 such a
suit would be nearly impossible to win.229 Even if the state were
to obtain a ruling that the lease terms were excessive, the remedy
might well be simply a judicially mandated lowering of the rental
payments to some more customary but still profitable level, and a
recapture by the corporation of the "excessive" profits realized by
the realty firm.2 0 At worst, the individuals involved in the selfdealing would have to settle for a reasonable return on their transaction. Thus, such suits can not be expected to be an effective
remedy for self-dealing, nor the threat of them to be much of a
deterrent.
In contrast, a simple prohibition against all self-dealing, such
as that presently applied to private foundations, would unambiguously forbid transactions of this type altogether.
It might be thought that such a strict prohibition on selfdealing could have the undesirable effect of preventing nonprofits
from entering into a variety of transactions that clearly would be to
their advantage, and that the present weaker standard is therefore
to be preferred. For example, suppose that a nonprofit day care
center finds itself badly in need of furnishings on credit. A member
of its board of directors happens to own a controlling interest in a
local firm that deals in such furnishings. After the center has unsuccessfully sought credit from other suppliers, the director uses his
or her influence at his or her firm to obtain the furnishings there,
under credit terms that are quite favorable to the day care center.
In making this deal the firm and its director are motivated in part
by a sense of charity, heightened by their intimate involvement
with the affairs of the center, and in part by their conclusion, also
derived from involvement with the center, that the center in fact is
220 Interested directors may be present at the meeting during which the transaction is ratified, see N.Y. Nor-FoR-Phosn LAw §715(c) (McKinney 1970), and
can therefore bring their influence to bear on the disinterested directors.
22 7
See id.§715. Cf. Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-41 (7th Cir. 1979)
(interpreting a virtually identical provision in the New York business corporation
statute).
22
8 Cf. Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d at 739-40 (discussing the "business judgment"
rule in the context of for-profit corporation law).
229 Cf. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YAI.E LJ. 663, 670-84 (1974) (discussing the application of the business judgment
rule as formulated by the Delaware courts).
23
0 Cf. Mann v. Luke, 44 N.Y.S.2d 202, aff'd, 272 A.D. 19, 68 N.Y.S.2d 313
(1947) (under New York for-profit corporation law, a faithless director must return
unfair profits extracted from his corporation).
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a solid organization involving less risk than the other merchants in
town might have feared. Such a scenario is by no means implausible, and may occur quite commonly. Why adopt a rule that
might prohibit such transactions? 231
It would appear, however, that most benign transactions of
this type could easily be restructured so that they involve no conflict of interest whatever. In the example just described, for instance, the director's firm could, instead of providing the furnishings and credit itself, simply offer to guarantee the center's
repayment of credit extended by another merchant, without seeking
any reimbursement for the guarantee. Such a guarantee would, in
effect, be a simple gift to the center, and therefore would not violate even the strictest of rules proscribing conflicts of interest and
23 2
self-dealing.
To be sure, some flexibility in the application of such a strict
rule would undoubtedly be appropriate. Most importantly, it
would probably be best to apply such a rule in its strictest form
only prospectively, either by grandfathering transactions entered
into prior to the adoption of the rule, or more restrictively, by requiring the explicit sanction of a court of equity for the continuation, after the adoption of the rule, of self-dealing arrangements
entered into before the adoption of the rule. It might even be
appropriate to provide some latitude in the prospective application
of the rule by allowing self-dealing transactions to be entered into
if the interested parties can obtain prior consent from a court of
equity by showing that prohibition of the transaction would result
in substantial disbenefit to the organization's patrons as a whole.
Should the strict rule on self-dealing proposed here prove infeasible, either practically or politically, then at the very least some
intermediate rule, stronger than the rule generally imposed on
business corporations, should be imposed on nonprofits. One possibility along these lines is the rule embodied in the new California
statute applicable to public benefit nonprofits, which provides that
a transaction involving self-dealing or a conflict of interest is valid
only if the person asserting the validity of the transaction proves
that:
231If the nonprofit involved were a private foundation under the Internal
Revenue Code (as a day care center generally would not be), a transaction like this

would presumably be in violation of the Code's rules concerning self-dealing if the
director in question owned more than a 35% interest in the firm with which the

center contracted. See I.R.C. §§ 4941, 4946(a) (1) (B), (F).
232See, e.g., I.R.C. §4941(d)(2)(B), (C) (specifically excluding gifts from
the strict prohibition against self-dealing imposed on private foundations).
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(A) The corporation entered into the transaction for
its own benefit;
(B) The transaction was fair and reasonable as to the
corporation at the time the corporation entered into the
transaction;
(C) Prior to consummating the transaction or any
part thereof the board authorized or approved the transaction in good faith by a vote of a majority of the directors
then in office without counting the vote of the interested
director or directors, and with knowledge of the material
facts concerning the transaction and the director's interest
in the transaction

....

; and

(D) Prior to authorizing or approving the transaction
the board considered and in good faith determined after
reasonable investigation under the circumstances that the
corporation could not have obtained a more advantageous
arrangement with reasonable effort under the circumstances or the corporation in fact could not have obtained a more advantageous arrangement with reasonable
233
effort under the circumstances.
This rule is superior to the rule currently in force in the
majority of jurisdictions because, first, the burden of persuasion
regarding the fairness of the transaction remains with the party
accused of self-dealing, and second, the party attacking the transaction may prevail merely by demonstrating the existence of a more
advantageous alternative of which the directors should have been
aware.2 4 Nonetheless, the difficulty of determining whether a
transaction was "fair" or whether an available alternative was more
or less "advantageous" militates in favor of the simpler rule of
flat prohibition.235
3. Different Standards for Different Types
of Nonprofits
In general, neither the courts nor the statutes distinguish
among different types of nonprofit corporations in establishing rules
233
234

CA.. ConPi.
Id.

CODE

§5233(d)(2) (West Supp. 1980).

235 The rule, found both in trust law, see 2 Scorr oN ThusTs, supra note 216,
at § 170.9, and in British corporation law, see E. IvAmY, supra note 219, at 222,
that the strict prohibition against self-dealing can be avoided by express provisions
in the entity's governing instrument, would of course be improper for nonprofits,
because the individual patrons for whose protection the nle is designed would not
in most cases be parties to the adoption of the governing instrument.
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of conduct for corporate managers; the same rule is applied to all,
including charitable organizations, and, as already noted,23 6 it is
essentially the same rule that is applied to business corporations.3
The new California act, however, establishes different standards
for managers of mutual benefit nonprofits than for managers of
public benefit nonprofits. In particular, whereas public benefit
nonprofits are governed by the relatively strict standard quoted
above, 238 the managers of mutual benefit nonprofits are governed
by a lower standard 23 9 roughly equivalent to that which is generally applied to business corporations.
This is, as we shall see, only one of the ways in which California, and some other jurisdictions as well, apply different standards to different categories of nonprofits. The rationale for such
varying standards, and the problems that they create, will be treated
240
at length below.
D. Distribution of Assets on Dissolution
The nonprofit corporation statutes commonly place few or no
limits on the distribution of a corporation's assets in dissolution.2 1
More particularly, in many circumstances, the statutes explicitly
recognize the right to have the organization's assets distributed to
members. Further, where such authority exists, it is generally
unlimited, extending not only to those assets that were originally
contributed by the members, but also to assets representing net
income that the organization has accumulated.
I. The Potential for Abuse
Such authority for distribution of assets to members on dissolution creates an enormous loophole in the nondistribution constraint, for it means that, if members of a nonprofit organization
wish to derive profits from its activities, they need only wait until
the organization is dissolved.
To take an extreme example, under such a statute, a group of
individuals could presumably form a nonprofit nursing home-or a
2 36

See text accompanying notes 209 & 210 supra.
See W. Cny & C. BmGcTr, supra note 41, at 20-27.
238 See text accompanying note 233 supra.
239 CAL. CornP. CODE § 7233 (West Supp. 1980).
237

See text accompanying notes 267-318 infra.
For a detailed discussion of representative statutes, see the text accompanying notes 242-66 infra.
240

241
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medical services laboratory, a family counseling service, or a day
care center-with themselves as its only voting members, run the
organization at a profit for several years by selling services to nonmembers at prices exceeding cost, accumulate the net earnings each
year within the organization (perhaps, for the sake of subtlety, by
investing in new buildings and equipment, or by paying off debt
used to acquire the original buildings and equipment), and then,
once a sizable surplus has been accumulated, sell the organization's
assets and liquidate the corporation, distributing to themselves the
cash that remains.
Moreover, this game could presumably be repeated on a regular basis with the same underlying organization by selling the corporation's assets, at the time of liquidation, to a new nonprofit
corporation that is controlled by the same members, and that uses
borrowed funds for the acquisition. The result would be an ongoing organization that earns profits and distributes them to the
individuals in control of the organization at regular intervals, all
within the nonprofit corporate form.
2. Current Statutes
Such an organization would of course be nonprofit in name
only. Yet the law in many states seems to countenance precisely
this result.
For example, the Model Act places no meaningful restrictions
on distributions in dissolution whatever, beyond the ambiguous requirement that assets "held by the corporation subject to limitations
permitting their use only for charitable . . . or similar purposes"

must be transferred to other organizations "engaged in activities
substantially similar to those of the dissolving corporation." 242 It
is difficult to determine how broad this restriction is intended to be.
The most natural reading would confine its application to assets
acquired by the corporation subject to explicit donor-imposed limitations on the purposes for which the corporation can use the
assets, as in the case of a capital gift to an educational institution
that the donor specifies is to be used only for the purpose of endowing a chair of Oriental studies in perpetuity. 243

A somewhat

supra note 19, § 46(c).
243 A requirement of this nature would probably be imposed by the courts in
242 MODEL ACT,

most states even in the absence of such statutory language. The courts have
generally held, often on the basis of vague trust or contract theories, that assets
given to a "charitable" nonprofit corporation are subject to donor-imposed restrictions permitting their use for only certain charitable purposes by the corporation. See W. C.ny & C. BmcH-, supra note 53, at 14-17, 78. Presumably,
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broader reading would extend the restriction to assets acquired by
the corporation by virtue of donations to the organization-such as
simple contributions by members of the public to the March of
Dimes-which, while not accompanied by explicit donor-imposed
restrictions, presumably were made by the donors with the intention that the donations would be devoted in their entirety to
charitable "or similar" 244 purposes. Finally, the restriction might
be read more broadly yet to apply to all assets held by a nonprofit
corporation organized for charitable or similar purposes, however
acquired (including assets purchased with the use of net earnings
derived from services provided by the organization); such a reading
might be supported by the theory that any organization that holds
itself out as serving charitable purposes is impressed with a constructive trust, and therefore holds its assets "subject to limitations."
In any case, the Model Act makes it clear that, except for the
foregoing restriction, a nonprofit corporation may provide freely
for the distribution of its assets, on dissolution, to its members, or
among classes of its members, or, for that matter, to anyone, as specified in its articles of incorporation 245 or plan of dissolution. 246
Lest there be any doubt that the license established by this provision in the Act is intended to extend to accumulation and distribution schemes of the type described in the nursing home example
above, 247 the authors of the Act state in the preface that, under
the Act,
a corporation may be organized to help its members make
profits or to make profits itself through earnings or capital
this means that the restrictions on the use of such assets continue to be binding on
the corporation even in dissolution. Thus, these assets must be disposed of consistently with the implied restrictions, such as by turning them over to another
organization serving similar purposes. In particular, the assets cannot simply be

distributed to controlling individuals such as members of the dissolving corporation.
244 One can, of course, only speculate as to the intended meaning of the "or
similar" category of purposes.
245 See MoDnL ACT, supra note

19, §46(d).

246 Id. § 46 (e).
2 47
See section IV(D)(1) supra. It is possible that the nursing home in our
example would be classified as a "charitable" organization by the courts, see Rev.
Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145 (exempting nursing homes from federal taxation as
"charitable" organizations even if they are operated as commercial entities rather
than nonprofits, so long as certain conditions are met), and therefore would be

subject to the vague restrictions that the Model Act imposes on distributions of
assets held subject to limitations for charitable purposes. If, on the other hand, the
organization were, say, a family counseling service or a medical services laboratory,

such a categorization is less likely. Moreover, if the profit motive of the managers
of the nursing home in the example were made known, it is unlikely that the courts
would deem the organization charitable (on the basis that the motivation of those
who operate it is obviously not charitable), and therefore, paradoxically, the

organization, under the Model Act, would be freed of limitations on distributions.
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gains for eventual distribution to its members in liquidation, subject of course to any charitable restriction. But
the Act does not contemplate . . .a corporation to make

profits for current distribution to its members. 248

In other words, if you wish to form a for-profit corporation under
the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act you are free to do so; you
need only be a bit patient about taking your profits home.
Most states have taken an approach to terminating distributions similar to that found in the Model Act (indeed, many states
have adopted the Model Act provision verbatim).249 Thus, the right
of a nonprofit to distribute its assets on dissolution to whomever it
pleases, and, in particular, to its members, is generally recognized,
subject only to an exception, of greater or lesser breadth and clarity,
0
for organizations of a charitable nature. 25
The New York statute follows this general pattern. It provides, with an ambiguity quite similar to that found in the Model
Act,2 51 that "[a]ssets received and held by the corporation for a
purpose specified as Type B" 252 must be distributed to other organizations "engaged in activities substantially similar to those of the
dissolved corporation"; 253 otherwise, assets may be distributed in
dissolution as the corporation chooses, and, in particular, may be
divided up in any way among the organization's members.2- 4 Thus,
organizations of types A and C, and perhaps to some extent organizations of type B as well, are free to do with their assets as they
wish.25 5 To this slight distinction among organizations concerning
the authority to distribute, there is added, under the New York
statute, a distinction concerning procedure: type B and C nonprofits
248 MODEL

ACT, supra note 19, at ix.

The draftsmen do maintain, however, that such a profit-makdng plan would be
permissible only under the alternative purposes clause of the Act. Id. See text
accompanying notes 71-84 supra.
249 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-3-161 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-3103 (1977);
MnNw. STAT. ANN. § 317.57 (West 1969); Or. REv. STA-T. § 61.530 (1979); WAsH.
RBv. CODE ANN. § 24.03.225 (1969).
250
See text accompanying notes 242-44 supra.
251
See note 255 infra.
252 See text accompanying notes 86-101 supra.
253 N.Y. NoT-FoR-PnoFrr CoRP. LAw § 1005(3) (A) (McKinney 1970).
254Id. § 1005(3)(B).
255 The commentary to the New York statute does not clarify what is meant by
assets "held . . .for a purpose specified as Type B." Presumably this phrase is
subject to much the same range of interpretations suggested above, see text accompanying notes 243-46 supra, for the similar Model Act provision. In particular,
it may or may not be intended to extend to all assets held by type B nonprofits.
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must secure the approval of a judge for their plan of distribution,
2
while type A nonprofits generally need not.

56

The new California act, like the New York statute, uses its
statutory categorization of nonprofit types to apply and refine the
dual approach to terminating distributions found in other states,
explicitly extending to all mutual nonprofits the authority to make
distributions to members, while clearly denying to public benefit
nonprofits the authority to make distributions to any controlling
7
person.2
The license provided by the statutes in this respect is further
enhanced by their loose use of the term "member." The New York
statute and the Model Act, for example, offer no meaningful definition of "member" at all, but instead provide that a corporation's
articles or bylaws may designate anybody or nobody as members, or
may designate different classes of members, and may freely specify
the rights, if any, of the corporation's members or classes of members.2 8 The California act is a bit more carefully drawn in this
regard, defining a member, essentially, as anyone entitled to vote
in elections either for the corporation's board of directors or for
certain fundamental corporate changes. 259 Nevertheless, nothing in
the California statute stands in the way of the nursing home scheme
described above, 260 because voting rights, and therefore membership,
261
can be granted to anyone that the incorporators designate.
3. The Source of the Problem
A fall analysis of the considerations that have led most states
to provide that nonprofit corporations, or some large subset of them,
256 N.Y. NoT-FoR-PRoFrT CoRP. LAw § 1003(b) (2) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
Even a type A or D nonprofit, however, will require judicial approval for its plan
of dissolution if it "holds assets . . . legally required to be used for a particular
purpose." Id.
257The manner in which the California statute accomplishes this is somewhat
oblique. In the definitional section of the statute, distribution is defined to include "distribution of any gains, profits or dividends to any member." CAL. Corn'.
CODE § 5049 (West Supp. 1980) (emphasis added). The part of the statute dealing with public benefit nonprofits mandates that "[n]o corporation shall make any
distribution," id. § 5410, but the corresponding provision in the mutual nonprofits
section is not so absolute: "no corporation shall make any distribution except upon
dissolution." Id. § 7411(a). See also id. § 8717 (method of dissolution).
258 N.Y. NoT-FoR-PaoFrr Corn,. LAw §§ 102(9), 601 (McKinney 1970 & Supp.
1979); MODEL ACT, supra note 19, §§ 2(f), 11.
259 CAL. CoRP. CODE § 5056(a) (West Supp. 1980).
260

See section IV(D) (1)supra.

261 Moreover, the California statute provides that the corporation's bylaws may

also confer some or all of the rights of members on any person who does not have
voting rights. See CAL. CoRP. CODE § 5056(b) (West Supp. 1980).
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may distribute their assets on dissolution to controlling individuals
such as members must await the discussion below of the confused
efforts that the law has made to accommodate the perceived needs
of commercial nonprofits and of membership organizations. 62 For
the moment I shall anticipate that discussion with the observation
that all such provisions for distribution of net earnings to controlling persons on dissolution appear misguided. So long as such
authority exists, the controlling individuals involved can lawfully
play accumulation and distribution games such as that in our nursing home example-which is to say that they can, and have an
incentive to, operate the enterprise as a proprietary business. Such
an organization is obviously unsuited to the fiduciary roles for
which, as argued above, the nonprofit form has evolved, and which
it should properly be designed to serve. To call such an organization "nonprofit" is to deprive that term of its essential meaning.26 3
4. What Constraints Should Be Imposed on
Terminating Distributions?
If, on dissolution, a nonprofit with net assets is prohibited from
distributing those assets to any controlling person, then it must, of
course, find some other recipient for them. It remains to ask, then,
whether any further restrictions should be placed on this choice.
One alternative is to leave the decision entirely to the discretion of the organization itself, as provided for in the organization's
articles and bylaws, subject only to the nondistribution constraint.
This is the approach taken, for example, in the provisions of the
California statute applicable to public benefit nonprofits. 264 The
other obvious alternative is to apply a more restrictive rule, analogous to the cy pres rule in trust law, 265 requiring that the organiza262

See text accompanying notes 267-318 infra.
Here, as elsewhere, the Internal Revenue Code is more carefully and restrictively drawn than the state corporation statutes. For at least some types of
organizations, tax exemption is available only if the organization's assets are irrevocably dedicated to an exempt purpose. This condition is deemed not to be met
if either state law or the organization's articles would allow the organization's assets
to be distributed to members on dissolution. See Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)1(b)(4) (1959).
264 CAL. CoR. CODE § 6716(a) (West Supp. 1980). Note, however, that the
only organizations that must be formed as public benefit nonprofits rather than as
mutual benefit nonprofits are apparently those whose assets are, by virtue of decisional law in California that predates the new statute, impressed with a constructive
trust for charitable purposes, and therefore subject to a cy pres-like rule that governs any effort to alter the purposes to which they are committed. See note 110
supra & accompanying text
265
See note 269 infra & accompanying text.
263
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tion's net assets on dissolution be contributed to other organizations
engaged in similar activities. Both the Model Act and the New
York statute take this latter approach in those cases in which they
impose limitations on distributions. 66
Both of these approaches have their redeeming virtues. When
a patron gives money to a nonprofit, it is presumably with the intention that the funds will be used to finance services of the sort
that the organization was formed to provide. Or, put differently,
the implicit contract that a nonprofit makes with its patrons is not
just that the patrons' funds will not be used for the personal profit
of those who control the organization, but more particularly that
those funds will be dedicated to the organization's chartered purposes. If the organization could, on dissolution, direct those funds,
or assets purchased with them, to some entirely different use, that
implicit contract would then be broken and the patrons' intention
would be frustrated.
On the other hand, the dissolution of a nonprofit will often
occur because its services are no longer in need. And in such situations, it could be a considerable waste to seek to continue expending the organization's remaining funds for the same unproductive purposes, rather than rededicating them to some different,
but more useful purpose.
On balance, the less restrictive approach probably has most to
recommend it, although much the same result can probably be
reached as well by taking a liberal view of the "similar purpose"
requirement under the narrower approach.
V. SHOULD THERE BE DIFFERENT CATEGORIES
OF NONPROFITS?

As the preceding discussion suggests, the statutory and decisional law often applies different standards of conduct to different
types of nonprofits. Moreover, this is a tendency that is evidently
on the rise, finding its clearest embodiment in the recently enacted
New York and California statutes with their explicit categorizations
of nonprofits according to purposes.
A. The ConsiderationsMotivating Categorization
This development, though understandable, is unfortunate. To
see how it has come about, and what is at stake, it helps to con266

See text accompanying notes 242 & 253 supra.
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sider briefly the evolution of nonprofit organizations and of the
statutes that govern them.
1. Charitable Organizations
With respect to organizations having purposes of the type that
traditionally have been classified as charitable, the nonprofit corporation statutes, and the judicial interpretation of those statutes, have
obviously been strongly influenced by the law of charitable trusts.
Organizations with charitable purposes were commonly formed
as charitable trusts before the advent of the general nonprofit corporation statutes.2 67 Trustees of charitable trusts have always been
subject to a strict rule against self-dealing and conflicts of interest,
as befits their status as fiduciaries. 268 Further, the assets of a charitable trust are irrevocably dedicated to the purposes of that trust.
If those purposes at some point become impracticable, the trustees
may receive permission, via the doctrine of cy pres, to devote the
assets to some other purpose of similar character; but at no point
are the trustees of a charitable trust free to dissolve the trust and
269
simply appropriate the assets for themselves.
Now that organizations with charitable purposes are commonly
formed as nonprofit corporations rather than as charitable trusts,
the law in many states has transferred to such organizations some
of the same fiduciary standards that would be applied if they were
formally established as trusts. Thus, most states impose restrictions
of some form on terminating distributions by nonprofit corporations organized for charitable purposes, typically providing that
some or all of such assets may not be distributed to members, and
often requiring further that the assets be turned over to another
organization pursuing similar purposes. In particular, the recent
New York and California statutes, as well as the Model Act, apply
270
rules of this sort.
In developing rules of conduct concerning self-dealing and
conflicts of interest on the part of corporate managers, however, the
courts and the legislatures have been less ready to apply to nonprofit corporations the standards developed for charitable trusts,
26
7 Although the nonprofit corporation statutes are the product of the nineteenth
century, the law of charitable trusts was well developed by the beginning of the
seventeenth century. Charities were sometimes incorporated by special legislative
acts prior to the nineteenth century, but often such corporations were considered
simply trustees of charitable trusts. See M. FREmoNT-Slmr, supra note 217, at
40-43.
26
8 See text accompanying notes 215-17 supra.
269 See BOGEaT ON TRusTs, supra note 39, at § 399.
2 70
See text accompanying notes 242-61 supra.
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even when the organization is dedicated to charitable purposes. 2 71
Still, nonprofit corporations serving charitable purposes are sometimes singled out for more rigorous regulation than other nonprofits. Most notable in this regard is the new California act, with
its especially demanding standards for the managers of public bene272
fit nonprofits.
2. Social Clubs and Other Mutual Nonprofits
There are other types of organizations that have commonly
been formed as nonprofit corporations, but that do not serve purposes falling within the traditional concept of charity, and for which
relatively relaxed fiduciary standards have generally appeared appropriate. This category includes, in particular, social clubs and
various similar membership organizations. Typically, these organizations would be classified as commercial mutual nonprofits; their
patrons are essentially customers who purchase services for their
personal consumption from the organization for a fee, and control
over the organization is lodged in their patrons, who comprise the
organization's voting members.
Interestingly, although these organizations commonly incorporate as nonprofits, little evidence exists that the services they provide
are strong examples of contract failure. For the most part, these
services, consisting of such items as food, drink, and recreational
facilities, are simple and easy for the consumer to evaluate. And,
because these services are consumed directly by the patron, rather
than by a third party, plenty of opportunity exists for the patron
to police their quality. Further, because the patrons, as members,
exercise direct control over the affairs of the organization, they have
an additional means of assuring that they are never exploited by
the organization. Thus, organizations such as social clubs are evidently an exception to the contract failure theory of the role of
nonprofits outlined in section I. Social clubs-and similar commercial mutual nonprofits such as automobile service clubs-have
far more in common with consumer cooperatives than they do with
traditional charities and other nonprofits that provide services in
273
which contract failure is an obvious problem.
271 See, e.g., Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses
& Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1013-14 (D.D.C. 1974).
272 See text accompanying notes 209 & 210 and 236-40 supra.
273 See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 892-94; Hansmann, Externalities, Exclu-

sivity, Stratification, and Cooperation: A Theory of Associative Organizations
(1978)

(Working Paper No. 807, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale

University) [hereinafter cited as Externalities].
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Why do these organizations incorporate as nonprofits rather
than as cooperatives? One reason is that the cooperative corporation statutes often place narrow limitations on the purposes for
which cooperatives may be formed, restricting them to activities
such as agriculture or housing, and making no provision for such
purposes as social clubs. 274 Further, clubs often do not have a
strong need for the full financial flexibility afforded by the cooperative corporate form, such as the power to make regular cash distributions to patrons. Finally, to the extent that clubs do need
greater flexibility in managing their affairs than would be appropriate for other nonprofits, such as charities, the nonprofit corporation law has generally been adjusted to meet these needs.
Just what powers are appropriate for social clubs and similar
organizations? Owing to the absence of contract failure, and because the patrons, as members, have direct control over the organization's management, social clubs have little need for the high
standards of fiduciary conduct that are appropriate in donative
entrepreneurial nonprofits such as traditional charities. For the
same reasons, and because most of the assets held by social clubs
are commonly derived either from capital contributions made by
their members or from accumulated earnings from transactions with
members, there is good reason to grant such organizations the right
to distribute their assets to their members on dissolution.
As discussed above, the statutory or decisional law in most
states makes provision, in one way or another, for social clubs and
other similar nonprofits to take advantage of permissive rules of
precisely this sort.276 Indeed, such flexibility is generally granted to
a far larger class of nonprofits than private membership organizations alone. The prevailing practice is to grant freely to all nonprofits that are not charitable, and perhaps as well to some that are,
the right to distribute assets to members on dissolution without
restriction, 276 and to extend to all nonprofits, not only clubs, the
generally low standards of fiduciary conduct for corporate managers
277
that have been developed for business corporations.
The recent California and New York statutes are somewhat
more discriminating. Both statutes seek to place organizations such
as social clubs in a separate category governed by a special set of
standards. In the California statute, this function is served by the
274 E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 357.010 (Vernon 1966); N.Y. Coop. Conp. LAw

§ 13 (McKinney 1951). See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 893.
275 See text accompanying notes 238 & 239 and 196-210 supra.
276 See text accompanying notes 242-49 supra.
2 77

See text accompanying notes 209 & 210 supra.
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provisions for mutual benefit nonprofits, as the name suggests. The
following comments regarding the statutory classification, offered
by one of the authors of the California act, make clear that it was
precisely with such entities as social clubs in mind that California's
twofold classification for nonreligious nonprofits was created:
We [the authors of the statute] became persuaded
. . . that the nonprofit world in fact did divide into two
categories which likely were quite different in ways broadly
relevant to rules contained in a corporations code. The
two categories are charitable, or public benefit corporations, and noncharitable, or mutual benefit corporations.
MasterCharge, the Berkeley Tennis Club, and the AAA are
mutual benefit corporations-for the mutual benefit of
their members. The members are its owners. They are
entitled to its assets upon dissolution, and they ought also
to be the ultimate authority during its life as to its purposes, scope of activities, or composition of its management. They reasonably may have the authority to ratify
self-dealing transactions by the board of directors, just as
in the business corporation, since it is only their interest
2 78
which is at stake.
In keeping with this conception of the role of the mutual benefit
category, mutual benefit nonprofits are given explicit authority to
distribute assets to members on dissolution, a power that is denied
to public benefit nonprofits. 279 Similarly, the standards applicable
to self-dealing and conflicts of interest involving managers of mutual
benefit nonprofits, which are delineated in the statute, are notably
more lenient than those that are established for public benefit
nonprofits.28 0
In the New York statute, the category of type A nonprofits
-was evidently created with social clubs and similar organizations in
mind.28' Of the three primary statutory types, type A is subjected
to the least restrictive standards. For example, type A nonprofits,
as opposed to type B nonprofits, are given permission to distribute
assets to members on dissolution and, as opposed to both type B
and type C nonprofits, need not seek judicial approval for a terminating distribution, 28 2 are not subject to judicial visitation and in278 Elman, On Developing a Law of Nonprofit Corporations, 1979 Anm. ST.

L.J. 153, 154. See Hone, supra note 72a.
279

See text accompanying note 257 supra.

28oSee text accompanying note 210 supra.

281 See text accompanying note 94 supra.
282 See text accompanying notes 255 & 256 supra.
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spection, 28 3 and are free of the exercise, by the attorney general, of
certain special enforcement powers.2 8
3. Commercial Entrepreneurial Nonprofits
Until recently, most nonprofit corporations could be roughly
classified either, on the one hand, as charities, or, on the other hand,
as membership organizations that served almost exclusively the interests of their own members. Thus, it was sufficient for the courts
and for the legislatures to consider the needs of only these two
broad types of organizations in developing doctrine concerning the
application of the nondistribution constraint, and, in particular,
concerning such matters as self-dealing on the part of corporate
managers, or the distribution of assets on dissolution.
In recent years, however, there have developed substantial
numbers of nonprofits, commonly of a commercial entrepreneurial
type, that do not fit comfortably into either of these categories.
This new class of nonprofits includes day care centers, nursing
homes, performing arts groups, counseling services, contract research
firms, publications, and various other kinds of service organizations.
In some cases, the legal concept of charity has been broadened
to include organizations of this type. For example, nonprofit hospitals and nursing homes qualify as charities for federal income tax
purposes even when they provide no subsidized care for the poor,
but rather operate strictly as commercial nonprofits that provide
285
service only to those who can pay.

To the extent, however, that the newer types of commercial
nonprofits have not been assimilated in the charity category, they
are commonly treated with much the same leniency that is typically
accorded social clubs and related membership organizations. Thus,
under the California statute, such organizations are lumped together
with clubs and other mutual nonprofits in the category of mutual
benefit nonprofits, with its minimally restrictive standards concerning fiduciary duties and terminating distributions.2 8s Similarly, the
N.Y. Nor-FoR-PnoFrr Cons. LAw § 814 (McKinney 1970).
Id. § 112(7)-112(9).
2 85
See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (hospitals), upheld in Eastern Ky.
Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278, 1286-90 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (concept of "charity"
should be revised to reflect increasingly commercial nature of hospital care); Rev.
Rul. 72-124, 1972-1 C.B. 145 (nursing homes).
286 Perhaps the notion of a "public" purpose will be sufficiently broadly interpreted under the California Act to permit many types of noncharitable commercial
nonprofits to form as public benefit nonprofits. But because it appears that only
283
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Model Act applies the same minimal standards to commercial nonprofits as it does to clubs and other mutual nonprofits, confining
exclusively to charities its few restrictions on distributions of assets.
The New York statute, in turn, is somewhat more refined in its
classification, in that it actually contains a separate category, designated as type C, evidently intended precisely to include the newer
forms of commercial nonprofits. 8 7 Type C nonprofits are subjected
to standards intermediate between those of type A and type B, being
permitted, like type A, to distribute assets to members, but, like
28
type B, requiring judicial approval for such distributions.
Why has the nonprofit corporation law, and particularly the
newer statutes, taken such a permissive approach to commercial
nonprofits? An important reason, perhaps, is that such organizations appear in many ways similiar to business firms: commercial
nonprofits often provide services similar to those provided by forprofit firms; their income, as with for-profit firms, comes largely or
entirely from the sale of the goods and services they produce; and
frequently they operate in direct competition with for-profit firms.
It may therefore have seemed to those who drafted the nonprofit
corporation statutes that such commercial nonprofits should be
treated somewhat as if they are for-profit firms, and, in particular,
that they should be given some of the same license to manage their
affairs that is typically provided by the business corporation statutes,
rather than being held to the stricter fiduciary standards that are
28 9
sometimes imposed on charities.

B. The Proper Treatment of Commercial Entrepreneurial
Nonprofits
It immediately follows from what has been said in section I
concerning the role of nonprofits that it is a serious mistake to
apply the nondistribution constraint less rigorously to commercial
entrepreneurial nonprofits than to donative nonprofits such as
charitable organizations must form as public benefit rather than as mutual benefit
nonprofits, noncharitable commercial nonprofits will presumably retain the right to

form, if they wish, under the less strictly regulated mutual benefit provisions. See
text accompanying notes 103-10 supra.
2 87
See text accompanying notes 97-101 supra.
288

See text accompanying notes 251-56 supra.

This is suggested, for example, by the use of the term "business purposes"
in connection with the definition of type C nonprofits in the New York statute. There
is also a hint of such reasoning in Lesher, The Non-Profit Corporation-ANeglected
Stepchild Comes of Age, 22 Bus. LAw. 951 (1967), which argues that different
types of nonprofits have different needs, and that the nonprofit corporation law
should be shaped accordingly.
289
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charities. Commercial nonprofits serve a fiduciary role quite analogous to that served by the more traditional donative organizations.
In a nonprofit nursing home or family counseling service, just as in
the case of CARE or the March of Dimes, patrons need to be able
to rely on the nondistribution constraint for assurance that the
organization is providing the best service possible with their funds.
Thus, it is a mistake to conclude that, because commercial nonprofits in some respects look similar to their proprietary counterparts, the management of commercial nonprofits should be given
some of the same license that is given to the management of business corporations. Rather, the essential role of a commercial nonprofit is precisely to provide patrons with an alternative to for-profit
suppliers, and, in particular, an alternative in which the patrons
are protected by higher fiduciary standards. Obviously, nonprofit
firms can provide such an alternative only if they are held to a
much higher standard of fiduciary conduct toward their patrons
than are their proprietary counterparts.
C. The Proper Treatment of Mutual Nonprofits
In contrast to commercial entrepreneurial nonprofits, some
organizations that are commonly formed as mutual nonprofits, and
in particular commercial mutual nonprofits such as country clubs,
do not need to be subject to the high fiduciary standards that are
appropriate for entrepreneurial nonprofits. As noted above, 290 commercial mutual nonprofits generally have much more in common
with consumer cooperatives than they do with other types of nonprofits. Typically, the patron-members of such organizations are in
a good position to look after their own interests, and might stand
to benefit in many cases from the greater flexibility afforded by a
less rigid application of the nondistribution constraint.
Current efforts to deal with such private membership organizations by creating a separate and more loosely regulated category
for them within the nonprofit corporation statutes, however, constitute poor policy. A far superior approach would be to provide
for the formation of such organizations under the cooperative
corporation statutes, and at the same time to reform the nonprofit
corporation law to provide for only a single class of nonprofit corporations that would all be held to a strictly defined nondistribution
constraint. Because cooperative corporation statutes are generally
designed to provide precisely the type of organizational features
290 See

text accompanying notes 273-82 supra.
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that are needed by social clubs and similar organizations-such as
control by patron-members and the right to make distributions to
members on appropriate occasions 291-this alternative approach
should serve their interests well.
Such an approach has a number of other important advantages
as well.
1. Avoiding the Necessity for Ambiguous Classifications
To begin with, this approach avoids all of the ambiguities that
characterize the current efforts to define different categories of nonprofits that are subject to different standards.
We have already seen that the efforts, in New York and California, to develop a statutory classification of those mutual nonprofits that are to be subject to more lenient standards are awkward
and ambiguous, and do a highly imperfect job of demarcating
precisely those organizations for which such loosened standards are
appropriate. 292 Some of the difficulties with these statutes arise
from their attempt to define the relevant category in terms of the
purposes served by the organizations in question. 293 As a first approximation, such a category should be confined to strictly mutual
nonprofits-that is, nonprofits that derive their assets and income
almost exclusively from transactions with their voting members.
Otherwise, an opportunity exists for members to take advantage of
the reduced standards of fiduciary conduct to exploit nonmembers
who unwittingly patronize the organization in the belief that its
nonprofit status provides them with some form of protection.
Yet, even an effort to confine this permissive category to mutual
nonprofits would leave it too broadly defined, because there are
many mutual nonprofits for which stricter standards are appropriate. This is most obviously true of donative mutual nonprofits,
such as Common Cause and the National Audubon Society. The
patrons of these organizations, though voting members, have little
more opportunity to police the performance of the organizations'
managers than do the patrons of a donative entrepreneurial nonprofit such as CARE. Nor do such patrons have any particular need
291 See, e.g., N.Y. Coop. Corp. LAw §§ 44 (voting), 46 (proportionate voting),
5 (dividend distributions, incorporating by reference the provision of the for-profit
corporation statute governing dividend distributions), 17 (distributions at dissolution) (McKinney Supp. 1979). This is not to imply, however, that a social club
could be organized as a cooperative under New York law. See id. § 13.
292 See text accompanying notes 94-96 supra & notes 107-14 supra.
293 See id.
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for the flexibility that a less restrictive application of the nodistribution constraint would bring; for example, a distribution of assets on
dissolution to members in such an organization would serve little
purpose, and would simply raise the possibility that those who were
members at the time of the organization's dissolution would profit
at the expense of those who had been members, and had made contributions, in earlier years. 29 4
Reduced fiduciary duties to patrons are therefore appropriate,
if at all, only for commercial mutual nonprofits. But even within
this category there are likely to be cases in which a strict application
of the nondistribution constraint is appropriate. It is questionable whether the management of a nonprofit nursing home, for
example, should be permitted considerably more freedom to engage
in self-dealing merely because the corporation's charter grants nominal voting control over the corporation to its enfeebled patients.
In short, although it would be relatively easy to improve on the
existing statutes in defining a class of organizations for which a
weakened form of the nondistribution constraint appears appropriate, it would be extremely difficult to construct a definition that
would be truly workable. Much can be said, therefore, for designing the nonprofit corporation statutes in a manner that avoids the
need for such classification.
2. Avoiding Confusion on the Part of Patrons
The awkwardness involved in defining the appropriate categories, however, is by no means the most serious objection to making
special provision for social clubs and other such membership organizations under the nonprofit corporation statutes. Much more
important is the fact that any such attempt to define different categories of nonprofits that are subject to substantially different standards of fiduciary responsibility toward their patrons must necessarily lead to confusion in the minds of patrons and potential
patrons as to just what it means for an organization to be "nonprofit." Such confusion, in turn, will undermine the effectiveness
of the nonprofit form in general.
For all types of organizations other than the relatively narrow
class of membership organizations in question here, the essential
294 Compare Lynch v. Spilman, 67 Cal. 2d 251, 431 P.2d 636, 62 Cal. Rptr.
12 (1967), in which the Supreme Court of California evidenced its willingness to
countenance the efforts of a small number of individuals, who constituted the membership of a nonprofit corporation at the time of dissolution, to distribute to themselves the organization's substantial assets, seemingly at the expense of those who
had been members in previous years and perhaps even at the expense of individuals

who had made contributions intended to be used for charitable purposes.
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role of the nonprofit corporate form is to serve as a response to contract failure. If, for such organizations, the nonprofit form is to
serve this function well, it is important not only that the organizations in question be subjected to a rigorous nondistribution constraint, but also that patrons understand that they can rely upon
this. In other words, it is important that an organization be able
to communicate to potential patrons, simply by informing them
that it is nonprofit, that it is pledged to behave toward them with
notably higher fiduciary standards than is the case with a proprietary firm.
If, however, the term "nonprofit" means different things for
different organizations, then it can no longer serve this function.
Both the California and New York statutes provide clear illustrations of this. Neither requires that a nonprofit corporation make
known to prospective patrons the category of nonprofit to which it
belongs. 295 Consequently, a nonprofit corporation may simply hold
itself out to the public, without qualification, as being "nonprofit"
or "a nonprofit corporation." Imagine, for the sake of illustration,
that an organization-say, a family counselling service incorporated
under the California statute-does just this. What is a prospective
patron of the organization-who is perhaps considering making a
contribution, or becoming a client-to infer from such a declaration of nonprofit status, even in the unlikely case that he or she is
familiar with the California nonprofit corporation statute? Perhaps the organization is a public benefit nonprofit corporation, and
thus the managers of the organization are subject to severe constraints on their capacity to operate the organization for their own
financial interest. Or perhaps the organization is merely a mutual
benefit nonprofit, and the managers of the organization, without
295 A New York nonprofit corporation must file a certificate declaring its statutory type, N.Y. NoT-FoR-PRoFIT CoRp. LAw § 113 (McKinney Supp. 1979), but it

need not disclose this declaration of type to its patrons or to the public.
The California act requires that a nonprofit declare in its articles of incorporation whether it is a public benefit or a mutual benefit nonprofit.

CAL. CORP. CODE

§§ 5130, 7130 (West Supp. 1980). There is no further requirement that a corporation give notice to the public of its statutory type, however, beyond a directive that
mutual benefit nonprofits, if they choose to issue membership certificates, must state
on the certificates that "[the corporation is a nonprofit mutual benefit corporation
which may not make distribution to its members except upon dissolution, or, if
the articles so provide, that it may not make distributions to its members during its
life or upon dissolution." Id. § 7313(b) (1). Presumably the purpose of this disclosure is to prevent prospective purchasers of memberships in mutual benefit nonprofits from believing that the membership certificate carries with it the full rights
of an ordinary share of stock, including the right to current distributions. Thus, in
this context, disclosure is aimed at preventing the defrauding of investors rather
than patrons, which again shows the strong influence of the image of the business
corporation model on the drafting of this and other modern nonprofit corporation
statutes.
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being in obvious violation of the nonprofit corporation law, have
arranged for the organization to rent its quarters at an exorbitant
rate from a for-profit corporation that is owned by some of the
officers, or have even begun playing the accumulation and distribution game described earlier.296 Knowing only that the organization
is "nonprofit," the prospective patron has no way to tell.
Of course, if the organization has been formed as a public
benefit nonprofit, the managers of the organization are presumably
free to advertise that fact in order to inspire trust in potential
patrons. But because the term "public benefit" and the category
of nonprofits it denotes are unique to California, and because few
nonlawyer patrons can be expected to comprehend quickly the
intricacies of California's nonprofit corporation law, such an effort
on the part of the corporation to distinguish itself from other legal
types of California nonprofits appears unlikely to be particularly
effective. Indeed, even if the California statute were to be amended
to require all nonprofits to qualify the term "nonprofit" with the
term "public benefit" or "mutual benefit" whenever it is used by
an organization, it would undoubtedly be a long time before the
public came to grips with the distinction-and this would presumably be true even if the mutual benefit category were much
more narrowly and coherently defined than it is presently.
In short, so far as the public is concerned, the establishment of
such a categorization of nonprofits is likely just to breed confusion.
Some individuals, unaware of the distinction, may encounter abuse
at the hands of mutual benefit nonprofits in which they have unwittingly placed the kind of trust that is appropriate only for organizations in the public benefit category. Other individuals, aware that
the term "nonprofit" is not always a guarantee of high standards
of fiduciary conduct, may come to be suspicious of nonprofits of
all types, including those that are in fact public benefit nonprofits.
And, so far as nonprofit organizations themselves are concerned,
there will always be an incentive to adopt the less rigorous mutual
benefit category wherever there is a choice, because patrons will
generally be unaware of the difference (or, if they are, will suspect
the worst), and there will therefore be no point in imposing on the
organization the burden of higher legal standards of conduct, no
matter what may be the designs of those who control the organization. Thus, a kind of Gresham's Law can be expected to lead the
297
mutual benefit form to supplant the public benefit form.
296

See section IV(D) (1) supra.

297 To be sure, organizations whose purposes are exclusively or almost exclu-

sively charitable arguably do not have the option of forming as mutual benefit
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The likely consequence of all this is that the nonprofit form will
be notably weakened in its essential role as a means by which an
organization can communicate to potential patrons that it is committed to higher fiduciary standards than are its proprietary counterparts, and that therefore it may serve them better in circumstances
characterized by contract failure.
3. Providing for Current Distributions
At present, as we have seen,298 commercial mutual nonprofitsand many other types of nonprofits as well-are typically given the
power to distribute their assets, including accumulated profits, to
members on dissolution. All of the leading statutes, however, more
or less clearly prohibit current distributions of profits to members of
nonprofit corporations, regardless of the category of nonprofit involved. 299 Cooperative corporations, on the other hand, generally
have the power to make current, as well as terminating, distributions of net earnings to their members. 00
Under the revision of the nonprofit corporation statutes that I
am proposing, there would no longer be a category of organizations
that are empowered to make terminating distributions but not current distributions to members. Rather, there would exist, on the
one hand, the option of forming an organization under the nonprofit corporation statute, in which case neither current nor terminating distributions of profits to members (or any other controlling persons) would be permitted, or, on the other hand, the
option of forming the organization under the cooperative corporation statute, in which case the organization would have the power
to make both terminating and current distributions of profits to
members.
This is not, however, a liability, for there appears to be no
need for a category of organizations that is barred from making
nonprofits under the California statute. See note 110 supra & accompanying text.
Tax considerations might also leave an organization no attractive alternative to forming as a public benefit nonprofit. For example, to qualify for an exemption under
I.R.C. § 501(c) (3), a nonprofit in California would presumably need to have a provision in its articles of incorporation dedicating its assets to an exempt purpose,
and, in particular, prohibiting any distribution of assets to members on dissolution.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (1959). Such a provision would preclude
the organization from incorporating as a mutual benefit nonprofit. See CAL. Corp.
CODE § 7111 (West Supp. 1980).
2 98
See text accompanying notes 242-61 supra.
299 Except, perhaps, for the New York statute in its provision for type D nonprofits. See text accompanying notes 87-90 supra.
300 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 185.45 (West 1957).
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current, but not terminating, distributions of profits to members.
The capacity to make distributions on dissolution provides sufficient opportunity to tap profits out of an organization to make the
nondistribution constraint essentially meaningless in terms of the
protection it affords patrons. 301 As a consequence, this power is
appropriate only for commercial mutual organizations, in which
the patrons are in a position to look out for themselves, and in
which they may gain from the flexibility that this right provides.
But, if the member-patrons in such organizations are able to protect
their interests with respect to terminating distributions, why can
they not also protect their interests with respect to current distributions? It is not obvious that there is anything about the power
to make current distributions that is any more threatening to the
interests of member-patrons than the power to make terminating
distributions.
Moreover, if the members of an organization find it convenient
to be able to make terminating distributions to themselves, they are
also likely to find it convenient to make current distributions. Consider, for example, a country club incorporated as a nonprofit. Suppose that, in order to provide the capital that the club needs, new
members are required to make a substantial capital contribution.
On leaving the club, it might be reasonable to permit the member
to have this capital contribution returned. If such a payment to
a terminating member does not exceed the original contribution,
arguably it would not violate the nondistribution constraint. But
suppose that the club's assets had increased significantly in value in
the interim, perhaps owing to development in the surrounding community, or perhaps owing to improvements financed through annual
operating surpluses (representing an excess in members' fees and
payments for services over annual expenses). Would it not then
be proper to make a payment to the departing member roughly
proportionate to his or her current share in the firm's assets? Disallowing such a payment would essentially involve a transfer of part
of the departing patron's share in those assets to the other, remaining members-ultimately to be realized by that group of individuals
who are members at the time of dissolution. A payment of this
sort, however, presumably would be, and certainly should be, interpreted as a violation of the nondistribution constraint as it applies
30 2
to current distributions.
See section IV(D) (1) supra.
The capacity of a member to extract a pro rata share of an ongoing organization's assets on withdrawal is facilitated by the California statute which provides that memberships in mutual benefit nonprofits can be made salable. See
301
302
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In short, an organization either needs the power to make distributions to its member-patrons or it does not. It makes little
sense to permit an organization to make such distributions on some
occasions and not on others. And, if an organization is to have
the power to make distributions to its member-patrons, the cooperative corporation statutes are well designed to provide it.30
4. Providing Adequate Safeguards for Distributions
Well-drafted cooperative corporation statutes are much better
designed not only to permit, but also to place appropriate controls
on, distributions to members. The leading nonprofit statutes all
simply permit distributions to "members" on dissolution, without,
as we have noted, placing substantial restrictions on what constitutes a "member." Indeed, the New York statute and the Model
Act provide no meaningful definition of "member" at all, but simply let each organization define its membership, if any, as it
chooses. 04 And the new California act is only slightly more careful in this regard, defining a member as any person who, by virtue
of the organization's articles or bylaws, has voting rights in the
305
organization.
More particularly, these statutes impose no requirement that
distributions on dissolution go only to members who are also
patrons, much less impose safeguards to prevent patrons who are
members from exploiting nonmember patrons through such a distribution. Indeed, as we have seen, under these statutes it would
apparently be perfectly lawful for the managers of an entrepreneurial nonprofit to define themselves as its members, and then to
dissolve the organization when they choose and to divert its assets
Corn'. CODE § 7320 (West Supp. 1980). This, of course, is simply a step
toward legalizing current distributions, as well as terminating distributions. Under
this statutory scheme, individuals who want to extract their shares of the accumuCA.

lated profits out of an organization prior to its dissolution need only sell their mem-

berships in the organization, with its accompanying claim (in dissolution) on the
organization's accumulated earnings, to another individual; the price received will
reflect (among other things) the value of those accumulated earnings.
303 If the members of the organization, for whatever reasons, wish to have the
organization structured so that it has the authority to make distributions to members on dissolution but not currently, they are apparently free to do so under the

cooperative statutes in many states. See, e.g., N.Y. Coop. CoRP. LAw §§ 14(h),
17 (McKinney 1951 & Supp. 1979). In some states, however, the cooperative statutes place limits on the corporation's power to accumulate earnings, requiring in-

stead that most net earnings be distributed annually.
§ 185.45 (West 1957).
304 See note 258 supra & accompanying text.
305 See note 259 supra & accompanying text.

See, e.g., Wis.

STAT.

ANNwr.
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to themselves. 30 6 Of course, the authors of these statutes presumably had no such thing in mind; 207 rather, they were probably thinking of organizations in which the membership consists only of
patrons-as in a typical country club or trade association-so that a
terminating distribution would be more or less just a return of the
assets plus accumulated earnings to the people who had contributed
the assets. Yet none of the statutes require that members in general, or even the members who participate in a terminating distribution, also be patrons.
The cooperative statutes are generally much more carefully
drawn in this regard, for they typically confine distributions,
whether on dissolution or otherwise, to the organization's patrons.30 8
Moreover, these statutes often contain provisions to ensure that such
distributions will not become a means by which one class of patrons
exploits another-for example, by requiring that distributions be
made in proportion to each individual's patronage, 30 9 or even that
such distributions be made to all patrons who can be identified regardless of whether they are members. 310 Thus, although the cooperative corporation statutes provide more occasions for distributions than do the nonprofit corporation statutes, they actually
provide more protection for patrons when such distributions take
place. This, therefore, is yet another reason why mutual organizations that desire the power to make distributions, even if only on
dissolution, should be formed under the cooperative statutes rather
than under the nonprofit statutes.
5. Reforming the Cooperative Corporation Statutes
To implement the reforms just suggested would not only require some changes in the nonprofit corporation statutes-notably
eliminating the right to distribute net assets to members and estab306 See text accompanying notes 258-61 supra.
307 Although perhaps the authors of the Model Act did have something like this
in mind. See text accompanying notes 83 & 84 supra.
308 See, e.g., IowA CODE ANx. §§ 499.2, 499.30 (West 1949 & Supp. 1980);
MicH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. §§ 450.99, 450.106 (1973 & Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 185.45 (West 1957). Distributions to investors (who need not be patrons)
are also generally permitted, however, up to a statutorily prescribed maximum rate
of return. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. §§ 499.23, 499.24 (West 1949 & Supp.
1980); MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 450.106 (Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 185.21(1)(c), 185A5(2)(c) (West 1957 & Supp. 1980). See generally Hansmann, supra note 2, at 889-90.
309 See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. §§ 499.2, 499.30 (West 1949 & Supp. 1980);
OR. REv. STAT. §62.415(1) (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §185A5(3)(b) (West
1957).
310 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 185.45(3) (West 1957).
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lishing stricter standards against self-dealing-but would also require
some modification of the cooperative corporation statutes in many
states. In particular, many state cooperative corporation statutes,
like the nonprofit statutes, contain restrictions on the purposes for
which a cooperative corporation can be formed, typically confining
such organizations to agricultural pursuits, housing, operation of
public utilities, and so forth. 311 In many cases, these restrictions,
on their face, would preclude formation of cooperatives for the
purposes with which we are concerned here, such as social clubs
and trade associations. Thus, the purposes limitations in the cooperative statutes would have to be loosened. Yet this is not a
serious objection, since the restrictions on purposes that appear in
the cooperative statutes seem to have even less justification than
those that appear in the nonprofit statutes,3 1-2 and it would be wise
to eliminate them in any case.
Beyond this, many of the cooperative corporation statutes are
simply not well-drafted, being either too vague or too specific about
the rights of patrons, members, and investors, 313 or containing arbitrary restrictions on such things as the permissible life span of the
organization. 314 Again, such difficulties in the cooperative statutes
should be rectified in any case, regardless of what is done with the
nonprofit statutes. The reform of the nonprofit corporation statutes
can therefore serve the further function of providing a helpful
stimulus to a long overdue reform of the cooperative corporation
statutes as well. 315
311 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 357.010 (Vernon 1966); N.Y. Coop. CoRP.
§ 13 (McKinney 1951).
312 There is almost no form of enterprise that, in the appropriate circumstances, might not usefully be organized as either a producers' or a consumers'
cooperative, including, for example, a shoe store (see text following note 38
supra). Moreover, so long as the applicable cooperative corporation statute is well
designed, so that an ordinary investor-controlled business firm cannot set itself up
under the guise of a cooperative, there is unlikely to be substantial opportunity to
use the cooperative form as a means of deceiving and abusing either patrons or
investors, regardless of the type of activity involved.
313 Some states have no general cooperative corporation statute at all. For
example, the Idaho statutes make provision only for the formation of cooperative
agricultural marketing associations. IDAHo CoDE §§ 22-2601 to 2628 (1977 &
Supp. 1979).
314E.g., ABE. STAT. ANN. § 64-1504 (1966) (cooperative corporations limited
to 50 year duration); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 12003 (X) (Purdon 1967) (cooperative corporations limited to 30 year duration).
315 In considering the need for such a simultaneous rationalization of the nonprofit and cooperative corporation statutes, we should keep in mind, too, that the
prevailing confusion between these two organizational forms has not been confined to such understandable cases as social clubs. Often the nonprofit statutes are
used to form organizations that belong even more clearly in the cooperative class.
For example, as we saw in section II, the purposes clause of the Illinois statute
LAw
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D. The Three Types of Corporations
In sum, I am suggesting that only three fundamental types of
corporation need to be provided for in the general corporation
statutes, each of which is characterized by a different relationship
between the organization and its patrons. First, for those situations
in which simple individual contracts provide an adequate means by
which patrons can police the producer's price and performance,
there is the business corporation. Second, for situations-such as
those involving natural monopoly 3 1 -in which simple contractual
devices are inadequate to protect the interests of patrons, but in
which direct patron control over the organization is sufficient for
this purpose, there is the cooperative corporation. And third, for
situations-such as those characterized by contract failure-in which
neither simple contractual devices nor direct patron control provide
adequate and workable means by which patrons can police producers, there is the nonprofit corporation.
Each of these corporate types should be covered by a separate
statute and designated by a clear label. Because these corporate
types represent, in a sense, ascending levels of protection for the
patron, efforts to permit the less constrained corporate types to be
formed under the more restrictive statutes will only confuse the
purpose of these statutes and hamper their ability to function as
they should. In particular, any adjustment to a nonprofit statute
that permits organizations to be formed under it that are essentially
cooperatives undermines the effectiveness of the nonprofit statute,
just as adjusting a cooperative statute so that it can also accommodate ordinary joint-stock companies would severely weaken the
cooperative statute, and would deprive the term "cooperative" of
any coherent meaning.
Once the essential structural features of the corporations that
can be formed under each of these types of statutes has been clarified, there should be no need to restrict the purposes for which
organizations can be formed under any of them. A shoe store, a
country club, a health maintenance organization, or an organization that provides low-cost housing for the poor subsidized by private contributions should all have the option of adopting any of
the three different corporate forms. So long as the different corpomakes explicit provision for the formation under it of various types of public utilities
organizations "on a cooperative basis." See note 14 supra & accompanying text.
316 Even social clubs-which, as noted at text accompanying notes 273-82
supra, have rather more in common with cooperatives than they do with other
nonprofits-seem, in a sense, to involve problems of natural monopoly. See Hans-

mann, supra note 2, at 892-94; Externalities, supra note 273.
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rate forms are well defined and clearly differentiated, individuals
who deal with an organization-whether as patrons, investors,
officers, or employees-will be in a position to know, by virtue of
the type of corporation involved, roughly what to expect of it, and
what it expects of them.
E. More Modest Reforms

The reforms suggested above are by no means revolutionary.
Nevertheless, there would be problems to overcome.
First, there would be the necessity for changes in the cooperative statutes as well as in the nonprofit statutes. Moreover, people
would need to become accustomed to applying the term "cooperative" to social clubs and other mutual organizations that have not
traditionally been thought of as such, but that, under this proposal,
would have to incorporate as cooperatives if they wished to have
more freedom than the strict nonprofit form recommended here
would allow. Finally, there would be the problem of dealing with
cooperative-type organizations that already have charters under the
older and looser nonprofit corporation statutes. Presumably, it
would be necessary either to require that they revise their articles
of incorporation to conform to the newer, more restrictive terms of
the nonprofit statute (or, more simply, just impose the new standards on all existing nonprofit corporations by the direct operation
of the statute, as do the new rules for private foundations established by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 317), or to require that they
reincorporate under the cooperative statute.
None of these difficulties is particularly serious, and they are
significantly overshadoweded by the benefits to be expected from
reform. Nevertheless, even such minor obstacles as these, together
with simple inertia and conservatism, can be expected in many cases
to hinder the adoption of the proposed statutory revisions. Consequently, it is worthwhile to consider some more modest reforms
that can be implemented with less effort.
One such compromise approach would involve the creation of
a separate statutory category for those cooperative-type organizations that have in the past commonly been formed as nonprofits.
This would be similar to the approach taken in the new California
statute, except for a few important changes.
First, the organizations in the new category should not be
labeled "nonprofit," but rather should be given a distinct title,
3 17

See notes 221 & 222 supra & accompanying text.
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such as "membership corporation," 318 "mutual corporation," or
"mutual benefit corporation," in order to prevent confusion with
true nonprofits.
Second, all limitations on the purposes for which true nonprofits-that is, those that are subject to relatively strict fiduciary
standards-can be formed should be eliminated, as should any restrictions on the purposes for which membership corporations can
be formed.
Third, the right of membership corporations to distribute assets to members on dissolution should be limited to members who
are also patrons. Moreover, protective provisions should be adopted
to prevent such distributions from benefiting one group of patrons
at the expense of others. For example, such a distribution might
be permitted only for those corporations that either offer membership to all patrons on equal terms or derive only an insubstantial
portion of their income from nonmember patrons.
Even this approach, of course, would require a substantial
amount of new legislation in any state that adopted it, and such
action might be a long time coming. Interim reforms that are even
simpler and less controversial are therefore worth mentioning. One
such reform would be a revision of the provisions in the existing
nonprofit statutes that govern distributions of assets on dissolution,
so that these provisions authorize such distributions to members
only when those members are also patrons, and only when the contemplated distribution will not unreasonably benefit one group of
patrons at the expense of another. Indeed, in many states, the
existing statutory provisions governing distributions on dissolution
are so vague that a court could reasonably apply-and should apply
--criteria such as these as a gloss on the language of the statute,
supported by the perfectly reasonable argument, which has been
made throughout this Article, that without such a gloss, the statute
as a whole makes no sense. Similarly, the existing statutes can be
revised to place much more stringent constraints on self-dealing
for at least those nonprofits other than commercial mutual nonprofits. Again, even in the absence of such statutory revision, the
courts can exercise their considerable discretion, relying on the
vague language of most of the statutes, to impose such standards on
their own.
318 Interestingly, the term "membership corporation" used to be applied in New

York to nonprofits of all forms. See Membership Corporations Law, ch. 722, § 2,
1926 N.Y. Laws 1308, 1309 (1926) (repealed by Not-For-Profit Corporation Law,
ch. 1066, § 2, 1969 N.Y. Laws 2683, 2850 (1969) (current version at N.Y. NOTFoR-PorTr Cor,. LAw H 101-1515 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1979))).
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CONSTRAINT

Promulgating appropriate rules of conduct for the managers of
nonprofit organizations is only the first step; it is also necessary to
provide for the enforcement of those rules. Unfortunately, to date
the law has been even more deficient in the latter respect than it
has been in the former.
A. Enforcement by the State Attorney General
Virtually all states authorize the attorney general, either by
common law or by statute, to ensure that the managers of charitable
organizations fulfill their fiduciary obligations. 319 This authority
commonly extends not only to charitable trusts, but also to charities
organized as nonprofit corporations. The extent of the attorney
general's powers to police the affairs of nonprofit corporations that
do not fall within the vague category of "charities" is less clearly
established, although some such authority can presumably be based
on the provisions found in most nonprofit corporation statutes that
permit the attorney general to bring an action to dissolve a cor32 0
poration for exceeding or abusing its corporate powers.
Here, as elsewhere in the organizational law, it is difficult to
discern any good reason for distinguishing between nonprofits that
3 21
are classed as charities and those that are not. As argued above,
all types of nonprofits play, or should play, an important role as
fiduciaries vis-a-vis their patrons. Moreover, patrons of all types of
nonprofits are commonly in a poor position to ensure that this fiduciary role is being well-performed-which, of course, is why the
patrons turn to a fiduciary institution in the first place. Indeed, as
discussed below, the law generally denies the patrons of a nonprofit
even the right to bring suit against a nonprofit or its managers for
breach of the fiduciary duties owed to the organization's patrons,
and this is as much or more the case for patrons of noncharitable
nonprofits as for patrons of charities. 322 Oversight by state authorities can therefore serve an important purpose throughout the
nonprofit sector, and not just in those areas that have come to be
319 See Office of the Ohio Attorney General, The Status of State Regulation
of Charitable Trusts, Foundations, and Solicitations, in 5 Commssio ON PuVATE
PmLANTRopy AND PUBLIC Ns--s, RESEARCH PAs'us 2705, 2710-25 (1977) [here-

inafter cited as Status of State Regulation].
320 E.g., MODEL ACT, supra note 19, § 51.
note 217, at 200.
321 See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
322

See text accompanying notes 145-56 infra.

See M.

FnxMoNrT-Smxr,

supra
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classified as charitable. It should be made clear, either by statute
or through the decisional law, that the attorney general's authority
to police the affairs of nonprofits extends equally to all nonprofit
organizations.
Unfortunately, in most states there has been little effort to
exercise even the substantial powers that the attorney general already has. Commonly, little or no staff in the attorney general's
office is assigned to look after the affairs of nonprofits, 323 and no
effective system of financial reporting by nonprofits exists in any
state. 324 Moreover, among the few states that make some organized
effort in this area, policing often is largely confined to charitable
trusts.3

25

This sad state of affairs has, at various times, been prom-

inently noted and loudly bemoaned,3 26 but with little effect.
Perhaps part of the reason for such inactivity on the part of
state authorities has been that the fiduciary standards imposed on
nonprofit corporations by state law have generally been so low and
so ambiguous827 that there has been little point in attacking any
but the most grotesque cases of fraud. 323 And perhaps, too, this
relaxed attitude toward nonprofits has derived from a lack of understanding of the role played by nonprofits, and of the importance of
high fiduciary standards in assuring that this role is performed
effectively. If so, perhaps the suggestions made above for more
rigorous fiduciary standards, and the observations offered here and
elsewhere 329 concerning the general role of nonprofits, will help
fuel the movement for more vigorous enforcement efforts by state
authorities. In the meantime, however, it may be well to look elsewhere for effective means of policing the nonprofit sector.
B. Enforcement by the Internal Revenue Service
For those nonprofit organizations that are exempt from the
federal corporate income tax, a class that includes most substantial
323
324

Status of State Regulation, supra note 319, at 2726-33.
See text accompanying notes 319-84 infra.
32 See Beeney, Effectiveness of States Policing Non-Profits (Oct. 3, 1977)
(unpublished memorandum prepared for the author, reporting results of a telephone survey of enforcement activities in selected states).
326 M. FMEmONT-Sm-rH, supra note 217, at 194-318; Status of State Regulation, supra note 319; Karst, The Efliciency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled
State Responsibility, 73 HAnv. L. BEv. 433 (1960); Comm. on Charitable Trusts
& Foundations of the ABA Section of Real Property, Probate & Trust Law,
Report,
100 TA. &EST. 895 (1961).
32
7 See text accompanying notes 176-266 supra.
328
See text accompanying note 223 supra. This may also partially explain
why charitable trusts, which are generally subject to clearer and more rigorous
fiduciary standards, are a more popular target of enforcement efforts.
329 See Hansmann, supra note 2.
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nonprofits, the Internal Revenue Service constitutes another mechanism for ensuring that the managers of nonprofit organizations
adhere to their fiduciary duties.
The Internal Revenue Code explicitly imposes its own nondistribution constraint on exempt organizations, limiting exemption in most cases to organizations "no part of the net earnings of
which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." 330 As noted earlier, for private foundations, this general
"non-inurement" rule is supplemented by an extensive and detailed
set of prohibitions against self-dealing by foundation managers and
other controlling persons. 31 In addition, a slightly weaker set of
prohibitions against self-dealing is explicitly applied to another
small class of exempt organizations comprising certain trusts and
332
unemployment benefit plans.
Violation of the strict statutory standards of conduct applied
to private foundations makes the individuals involved, including
foundation managers, subject to a special "excise tax," as3which is
in effect a fine that is proportionate to the size of the prohibited
transactions. 3 4 The very existence of such strict and clear rules,
supported by severe sanctions and backed by at least a moderate
IRS enforcement effort,3 35 may have had a salutary effect on the
330

This language, or its equivalent, appears in the definition of most of the
21 categories of exempt organizations provided for in the Internal Revenue Code,
and is implicit in most of the others, except for those covering organizations formed
on a cooperative basis. See I.R.C. § 501(c). See P. TREuscH & N. SuGABmAN,
supra note 34, at 129-40.
Treasury regulations define "private shareholder or individual" as referring to
"persons having a personal and private interest in the activities of the organization," Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-(1)(c) (1958), which is presumably a vague effort
to denote that class of persons that has been referred to in this Article as "controlling persons."
331 See text accompanying notes 220-22 supra.
332 See I.R.C. § 503.
333
Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(a)-1(a)(1) (1973).
334
I.R.C. § 4941. Both the foundation manager and the entity on the other
side of the deal, the so-called "disqualified person," see id. §4946(a)(1), are
subject to the tax, equal to 2.5% and 5%, respectively, of the transaction amount.
Id. §4941(a)(1) (disqualified person); id. §4941(a)(2) (foundation manager).
Further, if the transaction is not "corrected," preferably by recission, see id.
§4941(e)(3), within the "correction period," see id. §4941(e)(4), then the
foundation manager and disqualified person are liable for further taxes of 50%
and 200%, respectively, of the transaction amount. Id. §4941(b)(1) (disqualified
person); id. § 4941 (b)(2) (foundation manager).
335 After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the IRS established a program of auditing all private foundations at least once every five years, with the largest and
most complex being audited once every two years. Private Foundations: Hearings
on the Role of Private Foundations in Today's Society and a Review of the Impact
of Charitable Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 on the Support and Operation of Private Foundations Before the Subcomm. on Foundations of the Senate
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fiduciary behavior of those who control the affairs of private foundations. 336 Most exempt nonprofits, however, including the great
bulk of operating nonprofits such as schools and hospitals, are not
covered by special rules such as those applied to private foundations.
Rather, for these organizations, the simple non-inurement language
quoted above represents the only express statutory statement of the
limits to which a nonprofit can serve the self-interest of controlling
persons. And, as many observers, including the IRS itself, agree,
the IRS has never been terribly zealous in enforcing this general
33 7
non-inurement provision.
One reason for the limited effort at policing is presumably the
vagueness of the statutory language. That language, unlike the
provisions applicable to private foundations, does not explicitly
forbid self-dealing per se. Consequently, it has been interpreted to
forbid only those acts of self-dealing that actually involve excessive
payments to the controlling persons involved. 338 All but the most
obvious cases of profiteering therefore involve messy factual issues
concerning the reasonableness of compensation. Another disincentive to active enforcement lies in the nature of the available remedies. Withdrawal of exemption, which is the principal threat that
the IRS can offer in such cases, will often hurt rather than help
those innocent individuals whom the organization is designed to
serve. And finally, in all but the most flagrant cases, little revenue
can be gained from attacking self-dealing transactions, and revenue
is the main goal of the IRS.
Considerably more effective policing by the IRS in this area
might result if the special rules established for private foundations
in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, including, in particular, the strict
and clear prohibitions against self-dealing and the special monetary
sanctions created by that Act, were extended to cover all tax-exempt
Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 2 Sess. 113 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hearings] (background paper submitted by Donald C. Alexander, Comm'r of the IRS).
336
See Private Foundations: Hearings on the Role of Private Foundations in
Today's Society and a Review of the Impact of Charitable Provisions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 on the Support and Operation of Private Foundations Before
the Subcomm. on Foundations of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 195 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings] (statement of Malcolm
Sein, Esq., former staff member in the Office of the Ass't Sec'y of the Treasury for
the Tax Policy).
337
For example, although substantially all private foundations were audited in
the period 1969 to 1974, only 9,000 of the total 80,000 public charities filing
returns during that same period were audited. 1974 Hearings, supra note 335, at
115 (background paper submitted by Donald C. Alexander, Comm'r of the IRS).
See also 1973 Hearings, supra note 336, at 272 (statement of Sheldon Cohen, former Comm'r of the IRS).
338See Trmuscr & SuGcAmviA_,

supra note 34, at 133.
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nonprofits. As already suggested, the extension of such high fiduciary standards to all nonprofits would be a salutary development.3 39
Yet substantial considerations weigh against relying primarily on
the federal taxing authorities to establish and enforce rules of
fiduciary conduct for the managers of nonprofit organizations.
First, many nonprofit organizations, because of the purposes
they serve, do not qualify for exemption regardless of whether they
adhere strictly to high fiduciary standards, and these nonprofits
would be unaffected by any requirements established as a condition for exemption. 340 Thus, even the most vigorous policing by
the IRS could never ensure that all nonprofits adhere closely to the
nondistribution constraint.
More important, however, federal revenue agents have, at best,
only an indirect interest in policing fiduciary behavior in nonprofits. The primary rationale for the nondistribution constraint
is to protect a nonprofit's patrons, and enforcement of that constraint is therefore for their benefit. But the federal income tax
is not levied and collected primarily for the sake of promoting
honesty and fair dealing among individuals in their transactions
with each other, but rather to produce revenues to finance the
government. To be sure, the IRS must necessarily police transactions of all sorts to ensure that those upon whom taxes are levied
actually pay them. But strict enforcement of the nondistribution
constraint among tax-exempt nonprofits will generally not lead to
an increase in federal revenues; rather, it will simply ensure that
less of a nonprofit's income goes to its managers and more goes to
further the purposes for which the patrons have contributed their
funds. Burdening the revenue system with such nontax objectives
threatens to confuse its mission and dilute its effectiveness.
The establishment and enforcement of rules of conduct for the
managers of nonprofit organizations is a responsibility that is most
appropriately entrusted to that body of law that is specifically designed to govern the general affairs of private organizations, in particular the law of corporations and trusts. The incongruity of using
the tax law for this purpose is nowhere better illustrated than in the
special Internal Revenue Code rules for private foundations. Those
statutory provisions, together with their accompanying regulations,
essentially constitute a detailed corporation statute for foundations.
339 See text accompanying notes 215-32 supra.
340 For example, automobile service clubs, though formed as nonprofit corporations, are not exempt. Chattanooga Auto. Club v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d
551 (6th Cir. 1950); G.C.M. 23688, 1943 I.R.B. 283, as modified by Rev. Rul.
69-635, 1969-2 C.B. 126.
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This fact is explicitly recognized in the Treasury Regulations,
which essentially force the states to incorporate large sections of the
federal statutory provisions verbatim into their nonprofit corporation statutes.r1 It is also reflected in the elaborate system of special
fines (denominated "excise taxes") that has been legislated to ensure
compliance with the private foundation rules, 342 and that represents
an unusual exception to the normal system of penalties that is used
to secure compliance with virtually all other provisions of the tax
code.
To be sure, federal tax law does effectively make the government a patron of many nonprofits, and to this extent the government has an interest in policing the behavior of nonprofits that is
much like that of any other patron. The degree of this interest
varies considerably, however, among different types of nonprofits,
and often is not closely correlated with the interest of the public at
large in the fiduciary integrity of the organizations in question.
For the limited group of organizations that both qualify for the
charitable deduction 343 and receive considerable donative support,
the government is in effect a substantial contributor. Moreover,
for those organizations within this group that are categorized as
private foundations, the government is often the only contributor
that does not exercise direct control over the organization, and
therefore the only patron that is likely to be abused by a breach of
fiduciary duty on the part of the organization's managers. This
therefore provides a rationale for the particularly close IRS scrutiny
of private foundations that is now provided for in the tax code.
By the same reasoning, however, members of the public at large
have virtually no stake in the probity of private foundations-aside
from the tax avoidance issue-because they are not among its
patrons.
On the other hand, the federal interest in the behavior of organizations that are merely exempt, but do not qualify for the deduction, is fairly modest. Although exemption for nonprofits can
be viewed as a contribution of the amount of tax that would otherwise be due," the potential corporate income tax liabilities of
341 See text accompanying notes 221 & 222 supra.
3 42

See notes 333 & 334 supra& accompanying text.

343

I.R.C. § 170 permits individuals to deduct from their taxable income amounts

that they contribute to nonprofit organizations

(principally

charities)

that fall

within a group designated by that section of the Code. This group is in turn a
subset of the class of nonprofits, defined in I.1LC. § 501(c), that is exempt from
the taxes levied on for-profit corporations.
344But see Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 191; Exempted Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 93.
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most nonprofits are probably so small that this is a relatively insignificant source of financial support. Yet organizations in this
class may often be in a position seriously to defraud private patrons.
It may be that all efforts to assure adequate policing of the
nondistribution constraint through reform of state corporation law
and its associated enforcement mechanisms will ultimately prove
unavailing, and that there will therefore be no place to turn for
such policing other than to the federal taxing authorities. As it is,
however, there still remain natural agents for enforcement at the
state level that have been largely untried-namely individual
patrons.
C. Enforcement by Patrons
Because the nondistribution constraint under which a nonprofit
corporation operates is for the protection of the organization's patrons, it seems natural to provide for patrons to participate in the
enforcement of that constraint by giving them a cause of action
against anyone who violates it. As it is, however, the nearly universal rule is that patrons generally have no standing to bring such
a suit.
1. Current Doctrine
The doctrine in this area is largely judge made. The nonprofit corporation statutes, including the Model Act, are, with a few
exceptions to be discussed below, 45 generally silent on the subject.
The courts have borrowed the rules on standing largely from the
law of charitable trusts; both the courts and the commentators for
the most part continue to speak in terms of standing to sue "charities" rather than nonprofit corporations." 6 Although this might
suggest that a different rule of standing would be applied in the
case of a nonprofit corporation that does not qualify as charitable,
the courts apparently do not pay much attention to the distinction,
and apply the same doctrine to any nonprofit corporation or charitable trust." 7
The general rule is that, in the case of a breach of fiduciary
duty by a nonprofit or its officers or directors, only the attorney
345

See text accompanying notes 355 & 356 and 378-84 infra.

346 See M. Fsmo NT-SMITH, supra note 217, at 202-08; Karst, supra note
326, at 433 n.2, 445-60.

347 See Wiegand v. Barnes Foundation, 374 Pa. 149, 97 A.2d 81 (1953).
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general has standing to bring suit.348 In particular, the courts have
explicitly denied standing to the two groups most likely to take an
interest in the affairs of a charitable organization-the organization's donors and beneficiaries.
At one time, founding donors were granted a right of "visitation" over a charity, which permitted them to inspect the charity's
affairs and ensure that the managers of the charity were fulfilling
their obligations. This right, which was evidently recognized well
into the nineteenth century, appears to have fallen into disuse and
3 49
disfavor in more recent times, and its status is now doubtful.
In any case, it is clearly established that donors who are not
founders have no standing. 0° A reason sometimes given for this
is that the gift to the charity is absolute, and leaves no remaining
right in the hands of the donor.3 1 Another common justification
352
is that standing for donors would lead to excessive litigation.
Although the courts appear more willing to concede that beneficiaries and potential beneficiaries of a charity have an interest in
its enforcement, standing for this group is also generally denied,
largely on the ground of avoiding "vexatious" and "harassing"
litigation.53 A related justification is that the beneficiaries of a
charity constitute a large and indefinite group, and it is difficult to
35 4
determine which individuals clearly come within that group.
There are, to be sure, some exceptions to the general denial of
standing to beneficiaries. In particular, courts have sometimes
been willing to grant standing to individuals who have a "special
interest." A commonly cited example is the case of a charitable
trust created for the benefit of the minister of a church; in this
context, the current minister is considered to have a special interest sufficient to justify standing to sue for enforcement of the
348Id. See BoGERT ON TRusTs, supra note 39, at §§411, 414 (2d ed. 1964
& Supp. 1980); M. FmavsoNT-Srri-, supra note 217, at 198-202; Karst, supra
note 326, at 445-49.
349
See BoGERT ON TRUSTS, supra note 39, at § 416; Karst, supra note 326, at
446.
350 See CrmAnxr. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 57, at § 717; Karst, supra note
326, at 445-46.
35 1
See BoCERT oN TauSTs, supra note 39, at § 415, at 348-49; CHsAurnLE
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 57, at § 717.
35 2
See Karst, supra note 326, at 447.
35 3

BorEnT ON TRUSTS, supra note 39, at § 411, at 324, at § 414, at 340 (2d
ed. 1964 & Supp. 1980); Cn
zmrr
LE FoUNDATIoNs, supra note 57, at § 720; M.
FAE oNT-SMrrH, supra note 217, at 200; 4 ScoTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 216, at
§ 391; Karst, supra note 326, at 449.
s'4 See BOGERT ON TRUSTS, supra note 39, at § 411, at 324 (2d ed. 1964 & Supp.

1980).
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trust. 55 This exception, which has not been very well defined,
has, however, usually been narrowly construed.s 6
This restrictive attitude toward standing has received general
approval from the commentators, including some who have been
quite critical of the sorry state of enforcement of the fiduciary responsibilities of nonprofits and their managers.5 7 These commentators, like the courts, all invoke the specter of "harassment,"
and either argue that the attorney general is an adequate agent for
enforcement, or that if he is not, then the appropriate remedy is
to expand the capabilities of his office so that he will be (or to
create a new state agency, such as a state board of charities, that will
undertake the task 358).
2. The Case for Patron Standing
Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that the attorney
general, or any other agency, will become an adequate instrument
of enforcement in most states in the foreseeable future. Efforts
at reform in this direction have been underway for forty years, 359
and there is still rather little to show for them. In the meantime,
patrons should at least be given the opportunity to try to look out
for themselves.
I refer here to enforcement by "patrons" rather than by donors
and beneficiaries for the same reasons that I have been concerned
with patrons as a class throughout-namely, because this is a more
useful analytic category when dealing with nonprofits in general.
It is easy and perhaps useful to divide the interested parties into
donors and beneficiaries when analyzing simple charitable trusts.
But once the full range of nonprofit corporations is considered,
this categorization breaks down, because we encounter many individuals whose relationship to a given nonprofit is essentially that of
a purchaser of services, and as such has something in common with
the interests of both donors and beneficiaries. In such cases, the
interests of customers appear to have most in common with those of
355 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
DATioNS, supra note 57, at § 719, at 562-63.
356
35

§ 391 (1959);

CHA_=ABLE

FouN-

But see cases cited and discussed note 364 infra & accompanying text.

See M. FREmONT-SMrrH, supra note 217, at 200; 4 ScoTT ON TRusTS, supra
ON TRUSTS, supra note 39, at § 411, at 324.
But see CHAlT ABLE FOUNDATIONS, supra note 57, at § 720, at 564; Karst, supra
note 326, at 445-49.
358 See Karst, supra note 326, at 476-83.
-59 The history of these efforts is briefly described in Status of State Regula7

note 216, at § 391. See also BooERT

tion, supra note 319, at 2705.
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donors, and hence I consider donors and customers together under
the heading of "patrons."
As suggested in section I, the elements of a nonprofit's charter,
and particularly its nondistribution constraint, can be viewed as
terms in a contract between the organization's managers and its patrons. Under the terms of that implicit contract, the patron contributes funds to the organization and grants the managers the right
to take reasonable compensation for themselves out of those funds,
while the management pledges to devote all of those funds, beyond
reasonable compensation, to the organization's general purposes,
or to the particular services requested by the patron. It follows
that a patron has much the same interest in having the nonprofit's
managers adhere to its charter as he or she has in having an ordinary profit-seeking merchant adhere to the terms of a contract of
sale. To characterize a contribution to a nonprofit as a mere gift
in which the donor no longer retains an interest is simply to define
away these important elements of the transaction.
But whatever legal metaphor is used-whether gift or contract
-it is clear that patrons will commonly feel a strong interest in seeing that the managers of nonprofits adhere to their fiduciary duties.
Thus, it makes sense to deny standing to patrons only if the consequence would be large numbers of spite suits, strike suits, or suits
filed through sheer idiocy-which are presumably what the courts
and commentators have in mind when they raise the specter of
"harassing" litigation-or of suits that, though based on a real
grievance, are feebly litigated and thus do more harm than good.
Yet it appears extraordinarily unlikely that suits of this nature
would ever become a sufficiently significant problem to outweigh
the benefits of enlisting patrons into the enforcement effort.
First, in the few jurisdictions that have taken a relatively liberal
attitude toward standing, no evidence exists of a flood of problem
suits. Wisconsin, for example, adopted a statute in 1945 permitting
suits to enforce charitable trusts to be brought by any ten or more
donors and/or members or prospective members of the class for the
benefit of which the trust was established if, upon demand, the
attorney general refuses to act.s 60 Yet there appear to be no reported cases between 1945 and the apparent replacement of the
360 Wis. STAT. ANN.

§ 231.34 (West 1957). Although this statute continues

to appear in the West compilation as being in force, it was apparently replaced in
1969 by Wis. STAT. ANN. §701.10(3)(a) (West Supp. 1980). See id. §701.10,
committee comment. But see Estate of Sharp v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 254, 261-62,
217 N.W.2d 258, 262 (1974) (discussing § 231.34 as if still in force without mentioning § 701.10(3)).
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statute in 1969 361 in which donors or beneficiaries invoked the
statute.3 62 Similarly, by the late 1960s, the New Jersey courts had,
by taking a broad view of the "special interest" exception to the
prevailing doctrine, 36 3 extended standing to bring suit to enforce a
364
charitable trust to members of the benefited class in general.
Yet, in the intervening decade, there appear to have been no reported cases in New Jersey in which private parties have brought
suit against a charity or its managers. Indeed, the real problem
appears to lie in creating sufficient incentives to lead individuals
to bring suit rather than in creating roadblocks to hold them back.
Further, a whole armory of procedural devices is available to
discourage frivolous litigation short of refusing all suits indiscriminately. Aside from simply dismissing for failure to state a
claim, these include (1) requiring the plaintiff to post security for
defendants' costs in cases that, after a preliminary hearing, seem
tenuous, (2) requiring that any recovery in such suits go to the
organization and not to the plaintiff personally, and (3) refusing to
countenance a settlement in which the plaintiff receives any amount
beyond actual costs in bringing the suit. 36 Such suits by patrons
are quite analogous to shareholders' derivative suits, which have long
been subject to analogous constraints. 366 As with shareholder suits,
suits by patrons would presumably seek recovery for all amounts deflected from the organization's purposes, and not just for those
amounts traceable to the plaintiff's own contribution. Thus, these
suits would essentially be class actions, and would be subject to the
usual controls on such actions, such as the requirement that the
361 See note 360 supra.

The new provision restricts those who may sue to, besides the attorney general, "[aln established charitable entity named in the governing instrument to,

which income or principal must or may be paid under the terms of the trust;"
"[a]ny settlor or group of settlors who contributed half or more of the principal;"
and "[a] cotrustee." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 701.10(3)(a) (West Supp. 1980). Given
the virtual absence of "vexatious" and "harassing" litigation, it is not immediately
apparent why the earlier, more permissive statute was replaced.

The attorney

general of Wisconsin's office, when contacted on the matter, was quite cooperative,
but unable to offer a reason.

Telephone Interview with George Schuahm, in Madi-

son, Wis. (Sept. 6, 1979).
362 There was, however, one attempt by the heirs of a settlor to enforce the
terms of a charitable trust. See Fairbanks v. City of Appleton, 249 Wis. 476, 24
N.W.2d 893 (1946). The attempt failed on standing grounds.
363
See text accompanying notes 355 & 356 supra.
3 64
See Township of Cinnaminson v. First Camden Natl Bank & Trust Co., 99
N.J. Super. 115, 238 A.2d 701 (Ch. Div. 1968); Paterson v. Paterson Gen. Hosp.,

97 N.J. Super. 514, 235 A.2d 487 (Ch. Div. 1967).

365 See Karst, supra note 326, at 447-49 (similar procedural suggestions).
366 See, e.g., ABA-ALI Monxr Bus. CoRP. Acr § 49 (1974).

1981]

REFORMING NONPROFIT CORPORATION LAW

plaintiff be an adequate representative of the class, and, when ap367
propriate, that other patrons be given notice of the suit.

3. Nonpatron Beneficiaries
Standing for patrons need not be accompanied by standing for
those who benefit from a nonprofit's activities but are not among
its patrons, such as those who receive disaster aid from the Red
Cross, or a free night's lodging from the Salvation Army. The reason for this is that the nondistribution constraint is not designed
primarily for the benefit of such nonpatron beneficiaries. Rather,
it is designed to protect patrons who wish to use the nonprofit as an
intermediary in assisting these beneficiaries. Or, put differently, it
is primarily the organization's patrons, and not its nonpatron beneficiaries, who rely on the nondistribution constraint in dealing with
a nonprofit. The disaster victim who receives first aid, food, and
shelter from the Red Cross does not base his or her decision to
accept such assistance on the organization's nonprofit status; he or
she would presumably be just as willing to accept the same free
assistance from a business corporation.
Nevertheless, nonpatron beneficiaries will benefit if nonprofits
adhere to their fiduciary duties, and thus have interests parallel to
the organization's patrons. Moreover, such beneficiaries might
often be in a better position than patrons to determine whether the
nonprofit is fulfilling its obligations, and to bring suit if it is not.
This is obviously true, for example, in the case of a nonprofit that
provides free services financed exclusively by an endowment from
a single donor who is now deceased. 3 8 Consequently, there is a
good case to be made that standing should exist for beneficiaries
as well as patrons.3 9
367 See, e.g., FED. P. Crv. P. 23.

Thus, in Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and
Missionaries, 367 F. Supp. 536, 540 (D.D.C. 1973), see also text accompanying notes

315-18 infra, patients of a hospital who brought suit against the hospital's trustees
for malfeasance were certified as a class under FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) (2) for purposes of seeking injunctive relief and an award of damages to be paid into the
hospital's funds, but were denied certification as a rule 23(b)(3) class for pur-poses of seeking monetary recovery to be paid to the hospital's patients.
368Nor would granting the right to sue to the heirs of the donor be a complete solution. Not all heirs will have the donor's charitable incentive to enforce
the terms of the gift, given the fact that the gift may have been carved out of
their inheritance or that they may hold a reversionary interest in the gift. See
generally M. FnEmoNT-Sadrm, supra note 217, at 206-07.
309 Such a rule would be in keeping with the modem American rule that an
intended third-party beneficiary of a contract may bring suit for its enforcement.
See 4 A. Coru, , Connur oN CoNRAcrs § 810 (1957 & Supp. 1971).
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To be sure, it seems less imperative to extend standing to nonpatron beneficiaries than to patrons. Most nonprofits of any significance, including schools, hospitals, and public charities, have
a large class of patrons that is constantly being replenished. Moreover, many of the nonprofits that do not have a large class of
patrons qualify as private foundations under the Internal Revenue
Code, and consequently are subject to the special restrictions and
oversight that the Code imposes on such organizations.37 0 A liberal
approach to standing for beneficiaries is, however, probably the
better wisdom. As with patrons, there is no reason to believe that
the announcement of such a rule will immediately lead to a mass of
nuisance litigation, despite the constant litany from courts and
commentators to this effect. And, in any case, the bother of coping
with an occasional frivolous lawsuit is far preferable to leaving
nonprofit organizations largely free of effective oversight.
4. The New Statutes: Standing for Members
As noted above, the nonprofit corporation statutes are generally silent on the question of standing.37 1 This is not true,
however, of the recent New York and California statutes. Unfortunately, both of these statutes take a narrow and misguided
view of the matter.
The problem here, as elsewhere, results from uncritical imitation of the business corporation statutes. This is most obvious in
the New York statute, which grants standing only to members and
holders of capital certificates.3 72 These groups were evidently
chosen because they appear most analogous to shareholders in a
business corporation, who have the right to bring a derivative suit. 373
370

See text accompanying notes 340-44 supra.
See text accompanying notes 345-47 supra.
3 2N
7 .Y. NoT-FoR-lhoFr Cop. LAw §§623(a), 720(b)(3) (McKinney 1970
& Supp. 1979). Standing to sue directors and officers for misconduct is also given
to holders of subvention certificates and contributors of cash or property in excess
of $1000, but only if the organization's certificate of incorporation or by-laws so
provide. Id. §720(b)(4) (McKinney 1970).
This grant of standing to members but not to other patrons appears especially
illogical because the statute gives no definition for the term "member" and thus
presumably allows each nonprofit to decide whom it will call its members, if anyone, see note 258 supra & accompanying text, and therefore who, if anyone, will
have standing to bring suit
373 Indeed, the legislative commentary to the statute expressly notes that the
standing provisions were modeled after these sections. See N.Y. NoT-FoR-PRoFIT
Corp. LAw, comments to §§ 623, 720 (McKinney 1970); N.Y. Bus. Corn. LAw
§ 626 (McKinney 1963); N.Y. GEN. Corn. LAw §§ 60, 61 (McKinney 1943 &
Supp. 1973).
371
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Similar logic appears to have guided the California statute, which
likewise explicitly grants standing only to members and creditors,
regardless of whether the organization is a public benefit nonprofit
or a mutual benefit nonprofit.37 4
Apart from these statutes, the standing of members to sue has
been problematic. Some state courts have themselves followed the
shareholder analogy and given members standing.3 7 5 But other
courts have withheld standing from members just as from other
private parties on the ground that the attorney general has exclu37 6
sive authority to sue.

Members are almost always patrons, and therefore the argument above for granting standing to patrons extends to members as
well. But there is no reason to confine standing to those patrons
who are also members, for among nonprofits in general there is no
sharp demarcation between the interests of members and those of
other patrons.37 7 In particular, although shareholders and customers of business corporations have little in common, members
and customers of nonprofits often have analogous interests. To be
sure, members of a nonprofit may sometimes be in conflict with
nonmember partons of the same nonprofit, just as different classes
of shareholders in the same business corporation can be in conflict. But all patrons of a given nonprofit, just like all shareholders
in a business corporation, have a similar interest in seeing that the
organization, and hence they, are not defrauded by the organization's management. If anything, members are less in need of
standing to sue a nonprofit's management than are nonmember
patrons, because members generally have the opportunity of exercising some control over the organization's management through
the exercise of voting power.
5. Some Encouraging Developments
In recent years, several jurisdictions have significantly extended
the right of private parties to bring suits to rectify the errant management of nonprofit firms. The important developments to this
effect in New Jersey, and the somewhat older Wisconsin statute,
374
CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 5420, 7420, 7710 (West Supp. 1980).
Presumably,
patrons are not "creditors" for purposes of these sections.
375 See, e.g., Leeds v. Harrison, 7 N.J. Super. 558, 72 A.2d 371 (Ch. Div.
1950).
376 See, e.g., Dillaway v. Burton, 256 Mass. 568, 153 N.E. 13 (1926); Voelker
v. Saint Louis Mercantile Library Ass'n, 359 S.W.2d 689 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1962).
377
See Hansmann, supra note 2, at 890-91.
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Of most interest, however, are

two recent cases in which consumers of a nonprofit organization's
services were given standing to bring suit against the managers of
the organization for misuse of funds.
In the first of these cases, decided by Judge Gesell in the District Court for the District of Columbia, a group of patients at a
nonprofit hospital brought suit against the hospital's directors for
financial mismanagement and self-dealing.3 7 9 The case has received considerable attention on account of its holding concerning
the fiduciary duties of the directors of nonprofit corporations. 80
Yet the standards of conduct to which the directors in that case
were held were neither novel nor particularly strict; they are considerably less rigorous than the standards suggested above.38 1 What
is more remarkable-though it has been much less often remarked
upon-is Judge Gesell's ruling concerning standing. For, without
citing any authority, or even discussing the issue, he simply stated
that " '[p]laintiffs purporting to represent a class of users of the
Hospital's services have a sufficient special interest to challenge
the conduct of the trustees operating this charitable institution on a
theory of breach of trust.' "382 More recently still, the Supreme
Court of Alabama held that the students, staff, and faculty of a
private college have standing to institute a class action to force an
accounting by the president and directors for breach of their duty
as charitable fiduciaries in misusing federal and church funds re383
ceived by the college.

37

s See text accompanying notes 360-64 supra. The California courts, too,
have shown some inclination to abandon the traditional narrow view of standing.
See San Diego County Council, B.S.A. v. City of Escondido, 14 Cal. App. 3d 189,
92 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1971).
379 Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and
Missionaries, 367 F. Supp. 536 (D.D.C. 1973). The plaintiffs were eventually victorious. See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974), noted in 24 CATH. L. REv. 657

(1975).
38o See Brown, The Not-For-Profit CorporationDirector: Legal Liabilities and
Protection, 28 FED'N OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 57, 67-68 (1977); Hackler, Hospital
Trustees' Fiduciary Responsibilities: An Emerging Tripartite Distinction, 15 WAsHatnurmL.J. 422 (1976); Note, The Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and Care Associated

With the Directors and Trustees of Charitable Organizations, 64 VA. L. REv. 449,
459-60 (1978).
381 See text accompanying notes 209-40 supra. The directors were held to
the normal standards of fiduciary conduct demanded of directors of proprietary
firms. See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. at 1013-16; notes 209 & 210 supra & accompanying text.
382 Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and
Missionaries, 367 F. Supp. at 540 (quoting the court's earlier ruling following a
hearing on a motion to dismiss).
383 Jones v. Grant, 344 So.2d 1210 (Ala. Sup. Ct. 1977).
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Although all of the recent cases that have taken a liberal attitude toward standing make reference to the plaintiffs' "special interest," and thus link themselves to the established exceptions to
the general rule that no private party has standing, they appear to
be moving toward a wholesale abandonment of that rule. Even
more explicit steps in this direction would be desirable, with the
objective of extending a clear grant of standing to patrons of nonprofit organizations, and to all individuals who clearly fall within
the class that the organization's patrons intended to benefit.384
VII. DIscLosuRE
If nonprofits are to function properly in situations marked by
contract failure, information about the uses to which nonprofits put
their funds should be made available to patrons. Such disclosure
can help potential patrons choose the organization, whether nonprofit or for-profit, that provides services most in line with their
desires. Disclosure can also help patrons ensure that their contributions to nonprofits, once made, are devoted in their entirety to
the services that the organization promises to provide.
A. CharterPurposes
One way in which a nonprofit corporation can signal its purposes to patrons is through the purposes clause in its corporate
charter. As has been suggested throughout, the charter in general,
and the purposes clause in particular, can essentially be viewed as
terms in the organization's agreement with its patrons concerning
the uses that will be made of funds contributed by the patrons.
And, in keeping with the preceding discussion of enforcement
mechanisms, an attempt by a nonprofit to exceed its charter purposes should be grounds for its patrons (as well as the appropriate
state authorities) to bring suit.
Nonprofit corporations, like business corporations, 3 5 are naturally tempted to adopt the broadest possible statement of purposes in their charter in order to give management maximum
flexibility. Currently, this temptation is readily succumbed to,
since nonprofit corporation law leaves nonprofit organizations free
384

The New Jersey courts already appear to have moved this far with respect

to beneficiaries. See Township of Cinnaminson v. First Camden Natl Bank & Trust
Co., 99 N.J. Super. 115, 238 A.2d 701 (Ch. Div. 1968).
385

See H. BAtaANrwr,

BALxAw-ru

ON ConPonARTONS

§ 15 (1946).
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to define their charter purposes as broadly as they wish. 386 There
is something to be said, however, for forcing nonprofits to resist
this temptation. The reason for this is simply that the narrower
the statement of purposes, the more control the patron has over
the uses made of his or her money.
Note that narrowly drawn purposes clauses are of far more
importance for nonprofit corporations than for business corporations, where they have largely been abandoned in favor of boiler38 7
plate language that leaves the organization quite unconstrained.
The shareholders in a business corporation, for whose protection
the corporation's charter is primarily designed, typically all share
a common overriding interest in money profits; at best, they have
only a secondary interest in having the company remain in any
particular line of business, based on their judgment that that particular line appears especially likely to be profitable. 3 8 Patrons
of a nonprofit, on the other hand, have a clear and direct interest in
the purposes to which the organization is dedicated; someone who
contributes to a cancer research institute presumably does not want
to discover subsequently that the organization has turned its attention and resources (including his or her contribution) to parapsychology or the performance of pre-Columbian music on original
instruments, just as someone who pays to have his or her lawn
mowed will generally not be satisfied to receive a haircut instead. 389
386 E.g., MODEL AcT, supra note 19, § 29(c). Of course, the purposes listed
in the charter must fall within the general listing of permissible purposes given in
the state's nonprofit corporation statute. See generally text accompanying notes
14-116 supra.
The Internal Revenue Service insists that nonprofits seeking tax exemption

clearly confine their charter purposes to those that fall within the Code's listing of
exempt purposes. Thus, in order to qualify for exemption, it is not sufficient that
an organization simply confine its actual operation to exempt purposes; the charter

must also pledge the organization to such purposes. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)1(b)(1)(i) (1959). Yet the tax code, as it has been interpreted and applied,
exempts an enormous range of purposes.

Moreover, the Service permits an or-

ganization to draft as broad a statement of purposes as it wishes so long as they
are all exempt. Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-(1)(b)(1)(ii) (1959).
As a consequence, the limitations imposed on broad purposes clauses by the Service are not

of much help to patrons who may be more particular about the activities that they
wish to support
38
7 See N. LATriN, THE LAw oF ConRoRA-TrONS § 63 (2d ed. 1971).
388 Investors in a business firm might, to be sure, have preferences for growth
versus dividends depending on their tax bracket, or have preferences concerning
the riskiness of the organization's activities according to their degree of risk aversion and the composition of the rest of their portfolio. But these are preferences
that might well be consistent with having the company switch among any of a
broad range of products or lines of business.

389 The currently prevailing doctrine is that a nonprofit corporation's charter,
including the purposes clause, can be freely amended by vote of the organization's
board of directors or, if they are entitled to vote on such an issue, its members.
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Nevertheless, it would undoubtedly be wrong to attribute too
much importance to this issue. Patrons generally do not read
charters (though the charter statement of purposes could be among
the items that a nonprofit is required to disclose and publicize)
nor understand their legal significance. Further, a narrow statement of purposes carries the compensating disadvantage of inflexibility in the face of changing needs and circumstances. And finally,
it would be necessary to rely on judicial or administrative discretion to determine whether a given statement of purposes is sufficiently narrow, with the consequence that the requirement might
be capriciously applied or, more likely, yield constantly to the efforts
by corporate counsel to undercut the requirement by drafting as
general a statement as possible, thereby rendering the requirement
vacuous.
B. PublicReports
There is much to be said for mandating that nonprofits publicize the nature and finances of their operations through (1) periodic reports available to interested members of the public,3 90 and
(2) special statements targeted at individuals who are solicited to
become patrons.391 Such a flow of information can assist individuals in deciding which nonprofits to patronize in the first place,
and in policing nonprofits of which they are already patrons. The
motivation for disclosure in this context is therefore much the same
as in the case of business corporations, where the dissemination of
information to investors and potential investors has long been required by the federal securities laws.3 92 It is important to remember, however, that where nonprofits are concerned it is not investors,
but rather patrons, who need to be protected, and that the needs
of patrons are not quite the same as those of investors. In particular, patrons are in special need of detail concerning both the
See, e.g., MoDEL Acr, supra note 19, § 34. If narrowly drawn purposes clauses
are to be insisted on for the sake of providing some assurance to patrons, then obviously such power to amend would need to be curtailed. One approach might be
to require judicial approval for any change of purpose, see, e.g., N.Y. NoT-FoRNhorr
Conp. LAiw § 404 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1979) (doing just this for type B
and C nonprofits), and to apply to such changes a form of cy pres doctrine similar
to that which is commonly applied to charities that seek to divert their assets to
purposes not within the intention of the donor. See text accompanying notes 265 &
266 supra.
390 Cf. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (as amended), § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(1976 & Supp. 1II 1979) (requiring annual reporting by certain corporations).
391Cf. Securities Act of 1933 (as amended), § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976)
(requiring prospectuses to be given to public offerees of a new issue of securities).
3 92
See notes 390 & 391 supra.
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purposes for which the nonprofit uses its income and the financial
arrangements concerning controlling individuals that might involve
excessive compensation or self-dealing.
1. State Disclosure Requirements
Many states already impose disclosure requirements of some
form on at least a subclass of nonprofits. The statutory source of
such requirements is generally a charitable trust statute, a solicitation statute, or the state's nonprofit corporation act.
At present, most of the states have charitable trust statutes, 393
often patterned after the Uniform Supervision of Trustees for
Charitable Purposes Act.3 94 These statutes typically require that
charities register with the attorney general and file periodic financial reports. Occasionally, the statutes provide that the financial
reports are available for public inspection, though this right is
usually placed within the discretion of the attorney general. In
any case, no requirement generally exists that such reports be made
available by the charity to private individuals, or even that patrons
or other persons dealing with the charity be given notice of their
existence. Moreover, these statutes are all confined to organizations
that are "charitable" in nature, and thus do not apply to nonprofits that do not fall within that category. Also, most of the
statutes exempt various broad classes of organizations from their
coverage, such as religious organizations, educational organizations,
hospitals, or homes for the aged. Finally, in a few cases, the statutes
do not clearly apply to charities that are organized as corporations
rather than as charitable trusts.
Statutes regulating charitable solicitation have also been enacted in a majority of the states. 395 Typically, these statutes require, inter alia, that an organization soliciting funds for charitable
purposes register with state officials and provide some form of financial report. Like the charitable trust statutes, the solicitation
statutes are commonly confined to charitable organizations, and
39 An extensive survey of state charitable trust statutes is presented in Status
of State Regulation, supra note 319, at 2712-52. See also CHALT. BLE FOUNDATIONS, supra note 57, at §§ 683-688.
394 UNI7ORu1
SuPERVIsIoN OF TRus Exs FOR CHArSABLE Pmu'osEs ACT, reprinted in [1954] HANDBOOK OF =H NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMISSIONEP,S
ON UNwOuRm STATE LANWs 169-72, also reprinted in 9C UNnwom L. ANN. 210-15
(1957). See also CHa~arABr FOUNDATIONS, supra note 45, at § 684.
395 A survey and discussion of charitable solicitation statutes appears in Status
of State Regulation, supra note 319, at 2752-63. See also CHAmTABL_ FOUNDATI OsS, supra note 45, at §§ 740-756.
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also generally contain broad exemptions for religious and educational organizations, and often for other types of organizations as
well. Further, although the reports that must be filed are sometimes given the status of public documents, the statutes generally
provide no simple mechanism by which patrons can gain access to
them. New York is among the rare exceptions; in that state, a
charitable organization covered by the statute must include in its
solicitation literature a statement that, on request, a person may
obtain from the organization a copy of its last annual report, and
the organization must respond to such requests within fifteen
days. 396
Finally, although most nonprofit corporation statutes are silent
on the subject, there are a few that make some provision for disclosure. The recent New York and California statutes are in this
latter category. Although these two statutes do not generally require financial disclosure from nonprofits to individuals or even to
state officials, they do require that annual financial reports be made
available to members of nonprofits. 397 Here, as elsewhere, these
statutes apparently take their inspiration from the business corporation statutes, and treat members as analogous to shareholders.
2. Federal Disclosure Requirements
Federal tax law imposes further disclosure requirements on
nonprofits. With some exceptions, most notably for certain religious organizations, all organizations that are exempt from federal
income taxation must file an annual return giving income and expenditures, a balance sheet, and identification of all officers, directors, and substantial contributors, together with any compensation or other payments received by such individuals from the
organization. 398 These annual returns are public, except for the
names of contributors, and can be inspected at the offices of the
IRS. 399
In addition to the annual return, organizations classified as
private foundations must file an annual financial report with the
IRS.4 00 This report, like the annual return, is available for public
396 N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 174-b (McKinney Supp. 1980).
3 97
CAL. CoRnP. CODE §§ 6321, 8321 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. NoT-FoR-PFarrr
CoRP.39LAw § 519 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
81.R.C. § 6033(b); Treas. Beg. § 1.6033-2, T.D. 7551, 1978-2 C.B. 318.
39
9I.R.C. § 6104(b); Treas. Beg. § 301.6104-2, T.D. 7350, 1975-1 C.B. 370.
Applications for exemption are also made public. I.R.C. § 6104(a) (1) (A). Treas.
Reg. § 301.6104-1, T.D. 7350, 1975-1 C.B. 370.
400 I.R.C. § 6056(b) (l)-(10); Treas. Beg. § 1.6056-1, T.D. 7290, 1973-2 C.B.
396.
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inspection at the offices of the IRS. 401 The report must also be
made available for public inspection at the foundation's principal
office, and a notice announcing this fact must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation. 40 2 These reports must contain
detailed information concerning income and expenditures, as well
as balance sheets. Disclosure concerning possible self-dealing and
conflicts of interest, however, is limited to identification of the
foundation's managers and substantial contributors, a listing of
grants made to such persons, and a listing of any substantial investment of the foundation's assets in enterprises with which such
persons are associated. 403
3. Toward More Comprehensive Disclosure Rules
This existing patchwork of disclosure legislation suffers from
several significant defects.
First, there is no reason to restrict the coverage of such legislation to "charitable" organizations. As I have argued repeatedly
above, all nonprofit organizations should be held to the same rigorous fiduciary standards, regardless of the activities they undertake.
Patrons of nonprofit symphony orchestras, day care centers, or political organizations should not be given a lower degree of protection via disclosure than are patrons of the Red Cross, even though
the former organizations may fail to be classified as charities.
Similarly, the broad exemptions commonly given to religious and
other types of organizations are indefensible on any principled
grounds. It might be objected that extending public disclosure
even to private clubs would be an unnecessary invasion of privacy.
Yet in this context, as in others, if private clubs wish to avoid the
rigorous fiduciary standards appropriate for nonprofits, they should
perhaps just be left the option of incorporating as cooperatives
40
instead. 4
Another difficulty is that the various reports required under
the existing disclosure legislation often are not readily available
to members of the public, if they are made public at all. The more
comprehensive of the solicitation statutes, both existing and proposed, partially remedy this by recognizing the special need for
providing information to individuals solicited for contributions.
Even so, the similar needs of patrons solicited by commercial
401 I.R.C. § 6104(d); Treas. Reg. § 301.6104-2, T.D. 7350, 1975-1 C.B. 370.
402 I.R.C. § 6104(d); Treas. Reg. § 301.6104-4 (1971).
4031.R.C. § 6056(b)(7), (9), (10); Treas. Reg. § 1.6056-1, T.D. 7290, 1973-2

C.B. 396.
404 See text accompanying notes 311-15 supra.
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rather than donative nonprofits-as, for example, through advertisements directed at potential customers of nursing homes, day care
centers, and health maintenance organizations-continue to be ignored. There should be provision for adequate disclosure to patrons of all types of nonprofits.
Finally, the type of information required and the format in
which it must be presented vary from state to state and, within a
jurisdiction, from statute to statute, and are generally not subject
to uniform accounting principles.4 05 "
For all these reasons, it would be wise to supplement or replace the existing patchwork of reporting and disclosure legislation
with a simple and universal requirement that all nonprofit organizations beyond a certain minimum size, whether organized as trusts
or as corporations, whether charitable in their purpose or not, and
without exemption for religious, educational, or any other purposes,
must prepare and make public, at the very least, an annual financial statement giving a detailed account of income and expenditures,
a description of the activities supported by the expenditures, and
full disclosure of any transactions or investments involving the
organization in which controlling persons have an interest.406 Such
statements should be filed with the state attorney general and other
appropriate agencies, such as the state department of health in the
case of nursing homes, or the state council on the arts in the case
of subsidized arts organizations. Organizations that solicit contributions or advertise their services for sale should be required to
mail copies of the statements to members of the public who request
them. In those situations in which it would be inexpensive to do
so, such as large scale mailings soliciting contributions, and perhaps
all advertisements and brochures for abuse-prone industries such as
nursing and retirement homes, the nonprofit should be required to
make a public declaration of the availability of such materials. For
other nonprofits it may be sufficient, as under the current Internal
Revenue Code provisions concerning private foundations, for such
reports simply to be kept available for inspection at the organization's principal office.
Establishment of such requirements at the state rather than the
federal level would have the advantage of permitting coverage of
405

See Accounting Advisory Committee, A Study of the Inadequacies of Present

Financial Reporting by PhilanthropicOrganizations, in 5 CoimsssroN ox PmVATE
PTLAiW-rmoPY AND PuBLic NEEDs, RIEsEARcH PArms 2869 (1977).
406 This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of what should be disclosed.
The items given are merely the minimum necessary for adequate policing of the
nondistribution constraint.
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all nonprofits without difficulty; it might be awkward to establish
a jurisdictional hook that would permit federal legislation to be
similarly comprehensive. Nevertheless, the simplicity of securing
one federal enactment rather than fifty state enactments, and the
generally stronger level of expertise in federal bureaucracies, make
a federal approach attractive. For example, establishing such disclosure requirements as a condition of federal tax exemption would,
though leaving some (nonexempt) nonprofits unaffected, still cover
most substantial nonprofits. It would also make use of an existing
enforcement agency that is experienced and capable, and would involve only a modest extension of the reporting and disclosure requirements already imposed by the tax code. In any case, simultaneous federal and state efforts in the direction suggested need not
conflict, particularly if efforts are made to ensure uniformity in the
content and format of the disclosure statements involved, and both
40 7
should be encouraged.
VIII. TowARD

UNITARY AND RIGOROUS STANDARDS

In a misguided effort to meet the perceived needs of different
types of nonprofit organizations-needs that, as it turns out, either
have no legitimate basis, or could better be met through a welldesigned cooperative corporation statute-nonprofit corporation law
is today weak and fragmentary. In some cases, as with the Model
Act, the law has tended to follow a lowest common denominator
approach, applying to nearly all types of nonprofits the same minimal standards that have been thought appropriate for those organizations toward which the law should be most permissive. In
other cases, as with the New York and California statutes, the law
has proceeded to apply different standards to different types of nonprofits, with only slightly more satisfactory results.
407 The preceding discussion has focused primarily on the need for disclosure
to help police the overall operations of nonprofit organizations. Special abuses have
arisen, however, in the process of soliciting contributions itself. These problems include excessive payments to individuals or proprietary firms that manage a solicitation drive on behalf of a nonprofit and the undertaking of solicitations where it is
reasonably clear in advance that a large fraction of the funds received will be
necessary to pay the costs of the solicitation, with only a small portion left over
to devote to the purposes described in the appeal for contributions.
Such problems have been the principal focus of much of the solicitation legislation that has been adopted at the state and local levels and proposed at the
federal level.
See Ginsburg, Marks & Wertheim, Federal Oversight of Private

Philanthropy, in 5 ComssioN ON PRIVATE PHILANTnopy AND PUBLic Nmms,
REsEAmcI PAPms 2575, 2644-58; Status of State Regulation, supra note 319, at
2752-73. This is an appropriate subject for concern. But it is important not to
confine attention just to the solicitation process; disclosure rules should serve the
broader functions discussed above as well.
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REFORMING NONPROFIT CORPORATION LAW

I have suggested here, in contrast, that nonprofit corporation
law should be both unitary and rigorous. All nonprofit corporadons should be held to the same strict standards of fiduciary conduct toward their patrons. So long as nonprofit corporations are
held to such standards, there should be no restrictions on the purposes that they may serve. There should be, in particular, no
provision for special standards applicable to organizations that
are classified as charitable, and the appeals that have been made,
sometimes prominently, for a separate organizational law of charities should be rejected. 403 Rather, if there is any continuing role
for the concept of charity in the law of nonprofits, that role lies
primarily in demarcating a class of nonprofits that provide services
(including redistribution of wealth) that are perceived as public
goods409 by a large segment of the public, and that are therefore
deserving of public subsidies, such as that which is provided by
the charitable deduction in the federal income tax.
There are, of course, a number of issues in the organizational
law of nonprofits, such as the application of the securities laws and
of the bankruptcy laws, 410 that have not been considered here, and
that merit further study. Some of what has been said above may
prove helpful in approaching these subjects. But there is no need
to await resolution of such issues before proceeding with the simpler
and more urgent task of clarifying and reforming the essential features of the corporate law.
4 08
See M. F msoNr-Sm nfI, supra note 217, at 42-43, 435; Karst, supra note
326, at 436, 476-83. I am, of course, in sympathy with the view, expressed by
both Karst and Fremont-Smith, that the fiduciary standards applicable to nonprofit
corporations serving charitable purposes be strengthened and brought more in line
with the standards applicable to charitable trusts. I part ways with these authors,
however, in their apparent feeling (more implicit than explicit, as for the most part
they, like many other writers in this field, generally speak just of "charities" without relating their discussion to nonprofit entities that are not charities) that the
standards applicable to charities, whether incorporated or formed as trusts, should
be stricter than those applicable to other nonprofit corporations.
A role presumably remains for a separate law of charitable trusts, and in particular for the limitation of enforceable charitable trusts to purposes that are deemed
charitable. The reason for this is that the charitable trust is accorded unusual
privileges-most notably, the ability to serve as a vehicle by which assets may be
dedicated to a particular purpose in perpetuity-that are appropriately limited to
purposes that clearly serve the public interest. The rationale for confining the
charitable trust form to purposes deemed charitable is therefore much the same
as that for using the concept of charity to set boundaries to various explicit governmental subsidies. See text accompanying note 409 infra.
See note 7
409 1 use the term "public good" here in the economists sense.
supra.
410 Large though vaguely defined classes of nonprofits are exempted from federal securities regulation, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (4) (1976), and from the involuntary
bankruptcy provisions of the federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (Supp.
IT[ 1979).

